Inventor motives, collaboration and creativity by No, Yeon Ji


























In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy in the 












Copyright © 2013 by Yeonji No  


























Approved by:   
   
Dr. John P. Walsh, Advisor 
School of Public Policy 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Paula E. Stephan 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 
Georgia State University 
   
Dr. Mary Frank Fox 
School of Public Policy 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Christina Shalley 
Ernest Scheller Jr. College of Business 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
   
Dr. Gordon A. Kingsley 
School of Public Policy 





Date Approved:  November 11, 2013 
   





 When I decided to go to graduate school, I could not have imagined what was to 
come. As of this moment, my story has a happy ending, a d now I can show my gratitude 
to the large number of people who helped me throught this journey.  
I sometimes wonder what the story of my life would have been without John Walsh. I 
started my freshman year in graduate school with John; his class, his exam, and his 
comments. Now that I am closing this chapter, I see myself grown up so much both 
intellectually and personally. John has been not only a good mentor and advisor, but also 
a good friend to me. Without his advice, understanding, encouragement, and patience, I 
am sure that I would not be able to relish this moment of writing my acknowledgements. 
My gratitude also goes to my committee members, Mary Frank Fox, Paula Stephan, 
Christina Shalley and Gordon Kingsley. Dr. Fox’s kind, passionate advice and 
encouragement drove me to finish this job, and I will never regret doing that. I will not 
forget the moment when Paula graciously accepted a position on my committee, nor our 
talks in D.C., Tokyo and Milan. Constructive and warm comments from Gordon and 
Christina will be always remembered. Moreover, I would like to thank Hideo Owan, 
Sadao Nagaoka, and Yasunori Baba in Japan. When I felt stranded, Sue Rosser and 





In addition, I have enjoyed working and being friends with Hsini Huang, my BFF at 
Georgia Tech. Without her support, I would not have be n able to come this far. Of 
course, I will always remember the golden phrase from Taehyun Jung, “Search the help 
tab,” and his support in the back. My gratitude also goes to Youngsun Baek, Soyoung 
Park, Jungwon Yoon, Haewon Jun, Hyunju Jung and Anne for great companionship and 
warm support.      
Finally, my greatest appreciation goes to my parents. Their unconditional and unchanging 
love has been the greatest backup for me. Also, my dearest little sister, Yeona, has always 
been the source of joy for me. Seunghyun Hwang, my husband, best friend and awesome 
research assistant, has been one of the greatest supporters in finishing this dissertation 
and he will be so forever and ever in my life. Also, I want to express my deepest love to 
Seoyoon, my baby who has been living with my dissertation since her day one. Last but 
not least, I would like to thank and give all the glory to God.  
October 2013 








ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................. III 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................ VIII 
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... X 
SUMMARY ............................................................................................................... XII 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................1 
1.2 Research Questions ......................................................................................................5 
1.3 Dissertation Structure ..................................................................................................8 
1.4 Summary of Findings ....................................................................................................8 
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................. 10 
2.1 Individual Motives ...................................................................................................... 10 
2.1.1 Motives as Traits .......................................................................................................... 21 
2.2 Creativity ................................................................................................................... 24 
2.3 Commercialization of the Invention ............................................................................ 35 
2.3.1 Motives and Scientists versus Engineers...................................................................... 40 
2.4 Collaboration ............................................................................................................. 45 




CHAPTER 3. DATA AND MEASURES ........................................................................... 64 
3.1 Data ........................................................................................................................... 64 
3.1.1 The GT/RIETI 2007 Inventor Survey ............................................................................. 64 
3.1.2 Technology Subclasses Based on the Patent Archive .................................................. 68 
3.2 Measures ................................................................................................................... 70 
3.2.1 Dependent Variables .................................................................................................... 70 
3.2.2 Independent Variables ................................................................................................. 76 
3.2.3 Controls ........................................................................................................................ 81 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics .................................................................................................. 87 
3.3.1 Individuals and Motives ............................................................................................... 89 
3.3.2 New Combinations ....................................................................................................... 97 
3.3.3 Commercialization ..................................................................................................... 101 
3.3.4 Collaboration .............................................................................................................. 103 
3.4 Estimation Method ................................................................................................... 106 
3.5 Limitation of the Data ............................................................................................... 107 
CHAPTER 4. MOTIVES AND NEW COMBINATIONS ................................................... 108 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 108 
4.2 Regression Results .................................................................................................... 109 
4.3 Robustness Check ..................................................................................................... 115 
4.4 Conclusion and Discussion ........................................................................................ 117 
CHAPTER 5. MOTIVES AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF THE INVENTION FOR SCIENTISTS 




5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 120 
5.2 Regression Results .................................................................................................... 122 
5.2.1 Motives and Commercialization of the Invention ...................................................... 122 
5.2.2 Motives and Educational Background: Science and Engineering .............................. 131 
5.3 Robustness Check ..................................................................................................... 139 
5.4 Conclusion and Discussion ........................................................................................ 143 
CHAPTER 6. COLLABORATION AND MOTIVES .......................................................... 148 
6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 148 
6.2 Regression Results .................................................................................................... 150 
6.3 Conclusion and Discussion ........................................................................................ 163 
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS ............................................ 167 
7.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 167 
7.2 Summary of Key Findings .......................................................................................... 169 
7.3 Discussions and Implications..................................................................................... 171 
7.3.1 Motives ....................................................................................................................... 171 
7.3.2 New Combinations: Novelty and What? .................................................................... 175 
7.3.3 Collaboration at the Individual Level ......................................................................... 176 
7.4 Research Limitations ................................................................................................ 179 
7.5 Policy Implications.................................................................................................... 182 




LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.1 Summary of Findings ........................................................................................... 9 
Table 2.1. Organizational Commitment and Organizational Identification...................... 19 
Table 3.1 Correlation for New Combinations ................................................................... 72 
Table 3.2 Factor Analysis on Motives ............................................................................... 78 
Table 3.3 List of Variables and Brief Description .............................................................. 86 
Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics ......................................................................................... 93 
Table 3.5 Regression Results on Motives ......................................................................... 96 
Table 4.1 Regression Results on New Combinations ...................................................... 114 
Table 4.2 Regression Results on New Combinations, Solo Inventors Only, and on Primary 
New Combinations .......................................................................................................... 116 
Table 5.1 Regression Results on Commercialization of the Invention ........................... 128 
Table 5.2 Correlation Between Motives, Invention Disclosures, Firm Size, and Work 
Hours ............................................................................................................................... 130 




Table 5.4 Regression Results on Commercialization of the Invention, Interaction with 
Educational Backgrounds ................................................................................................ 135 
Table 5.5 Regression Results on Commercialization of the Invention, Interaction with 
Basic Research................................................................................................................. 138 
Table 5.6 Regression Results on Commercialization of the Invention, Solo Inventors Only
......................................................................................................................................... 141 
Table 5.7 Correlation Between Motives and Commercialization: Non-Solo versus Solo 
Inventors ......................................................................................................................... 142 
Table 5.8 Correlation Between Motives and Sources of Knowledge ............................. 146 
Table 6.1 Multinomial Regression Results on Co-Invention (Base: Any Internal Co-
Inventor) ......................................................................................................................... 158 
Table 6.2 Regression Results on Co-Invention, Interaction Effects of Recognition Motives 
and Tenure ...................................................................................................................... 160 
Table 6.3 Regression Results on Any Internal Co-inventor ............................................ 162 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1 Research Questions ........................................................................................... 6 
Figure 2.1 Typology of Motives ......................................................................................... 13 
Figure 3.1 Mean Score of Motive, Firms versus Public Research Organizations .............. 77 
Figure 3.2 IQR, Median, Mean Score of Motives .............................................................. 94 
Figure 3.3 Mean Score of Motives by Science versus Engineering Background .............. 94 
Figure 3.4 Mean Score of Motives by Firm Size ................................................................ 95 
Figure 3.5 Mean Score of Motives by Highest Degree Earned ......................................... 95 
Figure 3.6 Percent of New Combinations by Patent Applied Year ................................... 98 
Figure 3.7 Percent of New Combinations by Technology Sectors .................................... 99 
Figure 3.8 Percent of New Combinations by Highest Degree Earned .............................. 99 
Figure 3.9 Percent of New Combinations by Firm Size ................................................... 100 
Figure 3.10 Percent of New Combinations by Motives High versus Non-High .............. 100 
Figure 3.11 Percent of Commercialized Patents by Motive High versus Non-High ....... 102 




Figure 3.13 Percent of Solo Inventors by Firm Size ........................................................ 105 
Figure 3.14 Percent of Collaborative Activity by High Motive versus Non-High ............ 105 
Figure 5.1 Interaction Effects of Task Motive and Science Background ........................ 137 
Figure 5.2 Interaction Effects of Firm Motive and Engineering Background ................. 137 
Figure 5.3 Interaction Effects of Recognition Motive and Science Background ............ 138 
Figure 6.1 Interaction Effects of Recognition Motive and Tenure on Any External Co-
inventor ........................................................................................................................... 161 
Figure 6.2 Interaction Effects of Recognition Motive and Tenure on Any Internal Co-





This study examines the relationship between an inventor’s motives and creativity, 
invention commercialization, and collaboration pattern. Special emphasis is placed on the 
educational background of inventors when examining the effect of inventor motive on 
invention commercialization. The data are based on a u ique survey of patent inventors 
in the United States, and archival data. The GT/RIETI 2007 Inventor Survey includes 
information on commercialization for patented inventio s and measures of inventor 
motives. Archival data based on Lai et al. (2011) was the basis for the collection of 
creativity measures based on U.S. patent technology subclasses.  
The results indicate that inventors’ motives differentiate the outcome of innovative 
activities. We found a firm motive has a positive effect on creating new combinations, 
commercialization of patents, and collaboration with coworkers. The results also suggest 
that the recognition motive negatively affects the cr ation of new combinations, and that 
there is no effect on the commercialization of the patent. As for collaboration pattern, the 
results show that individual differences in motives are associated with different patterns 
in collaboration. For example, task-oriented inventors are less likely to collaborate with 
others outside of the firm entity, whereas inventors with recognition motives are more 
likely to have a larger collaborative network with other professionals in the same field. 
This dissertation suggests that policy-makers should consider individual heterogeneity in 
innovative performance, knowledge creation, and patterns of collaboration. Based on the 









Innovation is a key source of competitive advantage. Fagerberg, Mowery and Nelson 
(2004) defined innovation as the first attempt to put a new product or process into 
practice, and innovation is generally recognized to be the combination of invention and 
commercialization [or, putting into practice] (Afuah, 2003; Roberts, 1988). Schumpeter 
emphasized this point by asserting that invention “does not necessarily induce innovation, 
but produces of itself … no economically relevant effect at all” (1942). Ever since 
Schumpeter, innovation has played increasingly important roles in both national and 
industrial competitiveness (Cantwell, 2005). Along with the global trend toward a 
knowledge-based economy and globalized competition, building up innovation 
capabilities is taking the central place in the agendas of policy-makers as well as firms.  
Academic discourse relating to innovation began in the 1950s by economists such as 
Schmookler (1962), Griliches (1957), Nelson (1959), and Arrow (1962). They argued 
that innovation is the production of new information, and that it implies increasing 
returns within the firm because innovation creates natural monopolies in the market. 
Therefore, firms invest in innovation to generate more profit, and this behavior could 




characteristics such as non-rivalry and non-excludability so that more than one firm can 
benefit from the innovation simultaneously; and this cannot be prevented.  
Many researchers have examined the influence of individual and organizational factors 
on innovation, reflecting this growing emphasis on the role of innovation. Because of its 
national and industrial impact, innovation and its antecedents have also been the center of 
discussion for policy makers and firms. At the indivi ual level, factors such as 
personality traits, affect (Amabile et al., 2005), and motivation (Amabile, 1988; 
Sauermann & Cohen, 2010; Sauermann & Stephan, 2010) have been discussed. Also, 
many organizational antecedents have been explored, such as collaboration (Bikard & 
Murray, 2010; Fleming, Mingo & Chen, 2007; Singh & Fleming, 2010), network (Perry-
Smith & Shalley, 2003) and types of organization (Damanpour, 1991).  
We can measure innovation in a variety of ways. Patents have been one of the most 
widely used indicators due to their accessibility, well-established archive and objectivity 
(Sauermann & Cohen, 2010; Schmookler, 1954). Simultaneously, creativity has been the 
center of the discussion among policy-makers and firms, because creativity brings new 
ideas to the field and leads to innovation. Creativ work is defined to be novel and useful 
(Amabile, 1996; Stein, 1963), and some argue that novelty is based on new combinations 
(Simonton, 1999). Its creation may be individualistic, but its usefulness is socially 
defined (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999; Gardner, 1993; Simonton, 1999), and therefore, idea 




dissertation focuses on the “novelty” of invention n Chapter 4, and the “usefulness” of 
invention in Chapter 5.  
In terms of organizational context affecting innovation, many studies have tried to 
understand collaborative work, as collaboration has been adopted rapidly and emphasized 
in both the academy and firms (Adler, Kwon & Heckscher, 2008; DiMaggio, 2003; 
Wuchty, Jones & Uzzi, 2007). Even if some found weak influence of collaboration on 
productivity in scientific research (Lee & Bozeman, 2005) and communication problems 
in collaboration (Dougherty, 1992), many articles have emphasized the positive effect of 
the collaboration. For example, von Hippel (2005) suggested the possible democratizing 
effect of collaboration, and some have argued that collaboration increases creativity by 
creating opportunities for technology brokerage based on diversity in the group (Burt, 
2004; Fleming, Mingo & Chen, 2007; Hargadon, 2003; Hong & Page, 2004; Leonard-
Barton & Swap, 1999; Singh & Fleming, 2010). Despite the ample discussion of 
collaboration and its impact on innovative output, there is a lack of research relating 
collaboration to individual characteristics such as motives. Some (Beaver & Rosen, 1978; 
Fox & Faver, 1984; Lee & Bozeman, 2005; Melin, 2000) have suggested motivations for 
collaboration (i.e. complementing skills and knowledg ), but spoke more about the 
reasons for conducting collaboration, than about personal traits that lead to collaborative 
work. 
In this project, we aimed to understand individual antecedents of innovative 




investigated how individual factors such as motive influence collaborative behavior. 
Understanding individual motives behind innovative performances and collaboration, 
especially in terms of patented invention, contributes to the discussion of technology 
policies. The patent system has long been implemented as an important policy instrument 
used to stimulate innovation. By publicly disclosing "novel," "useful," and "nonobvious" 
invention, the inventor receives exclusive rights to exploit that patented invention for a 
fixed period of time. It creates a favorable environment where R&D investments can be 
recovered, and inventors are expected to use more of th ir resources toward R&D than 
elsewhere (Hall & Ziedonis, 2001). Based on this fundamental mechanism, we expect 
disclosed information on inventions to be appropriated in order to actually fulfill its 
purpose to the innovation. Nonetheless, there are mny unused patents available, calling 
for recent discussion on “sleeping patents” (Arya & Mittendorf, 2004; Jung, 2009). Even 
though we acknowledge that some patents are unused strategically (see Jung, 2009), 
many countries around the world have implemented policies in order to stimulate 
commercialization of the patent. For example, U.K. recently (April, 2013) introduced a 
policy called “the Patent Box”, which allows companies to apply for a lower rate of 
corporation tax on profits from exploiting patented inventions.1 As opposed to other tax 
initiatives provided that relate to R&D activities, the Patent Box policy is specifically 
aimed toward fostering commercialization of the inve tion while recognizing the 






problems of unused patents. That being said, this dissertation could expand our 
understanding of underlying mechanisms, from the inv ntion to the commercialization of 
the patents, through the examination of individuals’ motives for wanting more creative 
patents and wanting more commercialization of inventions. Moreover, it contributes to 
the discussion of R&D management in understanding productive R&D employees, and to 
the implication thereof. 
1.2 Research Questions 
Differentiating innovation by its uses and novelty, and perceiving individual antecedents 
will help us to gain a holistic understanding of innovation. This dissertation aligns with 
the effort of examining factors influencing innovation at both the individual and 
organizational levels. This study used both direct and indirect measures of innovation 
activities (created from multiple information sources including patent bibliometrics, firm 
and industry databases), and a large-scale inventor survey. Based on this novel dataset, 
this dissertation aims to answer the relationship between motives and creativity with a 
focus on patent originality; the effects of motives on patent usefulness (measured by 
invention commercialization); and lastly, how motives affect collaboration patterns. 
Grounded on previous literature, motive is understood with 4 different types (task, 
pecuniary, recognition and firm motives). The research question is illustrated as a 







Figure 1.1 Research Questions 
 
First, we looked at the effect of motive on the novelty side of invention. In addition to the 
GT/REITI Inventor Survey data, we created a recombination measure based on the data 
of Lai et al. (2011). They have collected patent document information including U.S. 
Patent Subclass (USPC). We paired technology subclasses to see if any new 
combinations appeared in the GT/RIETI Inventor Survey sample compared to the earlier 
patent stock. This analysis examined the patent originality as a function of motives. In 
this section, we expected that new combinations would be positively associated by 
inventors with all types of motives, except the recognition motive. Considering the risk 
associated with being original, inventors with recognition are expected to be more 




Next, we investigated how motives influence patent usefulness, measured by 
commercialization of the invention. Commercialization includes establishing a start-up 
company, licensing, cross licensing and commercializing the patent in the firm where the 
patent is filed (detailed discussion about measures is provided below). Also in this 
chapter, we examined if educational background moderates the effect of motives on the 
same dependent variable. It is hypothesized that all motives are positively associated with 
the commercialization of the invention. Also, the impact of recognition motive on 
commercialization would be stronger for basic research s opposed to applied research. 
Likewise, I hypothesized that the impact of firm motive on commercialization is stronger 
for applied research than for basic research. 
The last chapter of this dissertation surveys the effect of motives on collaboration. 
Collaboration is measured in various ways using the GT Inventor survey instruments. 
Among them, this dissertation uses information about the organizational affiliation of co-
inventors (such as the same firm where respondents b long, suppliers, customers, etc.) 
Comparing patents created by solo-inventors, internal co-inventors and external co-
inventors, this dissertation is expected to illustrate an in-depth understanding of 
collaboration patterns and inventor motives. Given the trait-like characteristics of motive, 
we expect that the task motive will decrease collabr tive activities. Also, researchers 
with recognition motives are expected to have larger collaborative networks, particularly 
as their experience increases. In general, inventors with recognition motive are expected 




consideration of the Matthew Effect (Merton, 1968), the size of the collaborative network 
is expected to expand. As for inventors with a firm motive, we expect that they would 
collaborate exclusively with researchers within the same firm.     
1.3 Dissertation Structure 
This dissertation consists of seven chapters. The next chapter discusses previous literature 
and develops the hypotheses that this research intends o test. Chapter 3 describes the 
data, measures and analytical strategies used in the research, before beginning to address 
research questions proposed by this research. Chapter 4 reports analyses on the 
relationship between motive and creativeness of the inv ntion, and Chapter 5 examines 
the impact of motive on the commercialization of the invention, and whether the impact 
is different between scientists and engineers. Subsequently, Chapter 6 analyzes how 
motive affects collaboration pattern. Last, Chapter 7 concludes with the result summaries, 
research limitations, and policy implications.  
1.4 Summary of Findings 
As described in Table 1.1, we have found that inventors’ with task, pecuniary and firm 
motives have a positive association with invention creativity and commercialization. 
However, inventors’ with recognition motives are negatively associated with invention 
creativity, and have no significant effect on commercialization. We have not found a 
significant moderating effect of educational background on the relationship between 
motive and commercialization of the patent. As to collaboration, the result suggests that 




as opposed to external co-invention. Task motivated inventors are found to have negative 
associations with co-inventing, which suggest that ey are more likely to work by 
themselves. For inventors with recognition motives, we have found that more senior 
inventors are more likely to engage in larger collabor tions.  





HP1 Task  New combinations Positive, but Not 
Significant 
 
HP2 Pecuniary  New combinations Positive, but Not 
Significant 
 HP3 Recognition  New combinations Negative 
 
HP4 Firm  New combinations Positive, but Not 
Significant 
    
Commercializa
tion 
HP A Task  Innovative performance Positive 
 HP B Pecuniary  Innovative performance Positive  
 HP C Recognition  Innovative performance Not Significant 
 HP D Firm  Innovative performance Positive 
 
HP E Recognition ×  Scientists > Recognition × 
Engineers on Innovative performance 
Not Significant 
 
HP F Firm × Engineers > Firm × Scientists on 
Innovative performance 
Not Significant 
    
Collaboration HP I Task  Collaborative activities Negative 
 
HP II Pecuniary has No-Significant relationship with 
the Collaborative activities 
Not Significant but 
positive on external co-
inventors 
 
HP III Recognition  Collaborative activities Positive only on the 





Recognition × Tenure  Collaborative activities Positive 




Firm  Internal collaboration, rather than 












In this section, previous literature on the individual motive, creativity and collaboration is 
summarized. In the next sections I introduce tested hypotheses. This literature review is 
particularly focused on individual motives, and their effect on innovation, creativity and 
collaboration. This dissertation first explicates individual motives to describe the main 
theme of the research, and then reviews the effect o  individual motives on creativity, as 
well as on commercialization. The next section discus es collaboration and its relation to 
individual motives.  
2.1 Individual Motives 
This study focuses on individual motives as major individual antecedents. The 
importance of the individual in innovative activities has long been featured across 
disciplines. The Sociology and Economics of Science have researched how individual 
motives such as recognition and intellectual challenge affect the advance of science 
(Dasgupta & David, 1994; Merton, 1973b; Stephan, 1996; Stephan & Levin, 1992; 
Zuckerman, 1988). Understanding the responsibility that firms have to innovate, 
particularly toward commercialization, economists have also paid attention to firms’ 




(1934; 1942), for example, suggests that individuals' incentives are critical for 
entrepreneurship and innovative activity. 
Prior work on motivation and motives has generally been focused on two key dimensions: 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations (Amabile, 1996; Amabile et al., 1994; Gagne & Deci, 
2005; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Sauermann, 2005; Sauermann & Cohen, 2010; Sauermann & 
Stephan, 2010). In Self-Determination Theory (SDT; eci & Ryan, 1985), the most basic 
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivatons is illustrated. Intrinsic motivation 
refers to doing something because it satisfies innate psychological needs such as 
competence, autonomy, and relatedness, while extrinsic motivation refers to doing 
something because it leads to a separable outcome. Ryan and Deci (2000) argued that 
extrinsic motivation can vary greatly upon the degre  to which it is autonomous. Even 
though the task might not be intrinsically interesting, they argue that individuals can self-
regulate such activities through internalization and integration so that individuals can 
implement activities without external pressure. They presented a taxonomy of 
human motivation describing four different types of extrinsic motivation: 
1. External regulation is the least autonomous form f extrinsic motivation. It is 
performed to satisfy external demand or reward.  
2. Introjection is a type of internal regulation with external contingencies. Ryan and 




in order to avoid guilt or anxiety or to attain ego-enhancements or pride” (2000, p. 
62).  
3. Identification is a more autonomous form of extrinsic motivation. An individual has 
identified with the activity and accepted associated regulations as their own.  
4. Integration is the most autonomous form of extrinsic behavior, and takes place when 
identified regulation is fully assimilated with the s lf. Individuals accord the given 
regulation with their values and needs.  
In addition to this intrinsic and extrinsic dichotomy, previous literature has incorporated 
recognition in describing motives. Stephan and Levin (1992) distinguished three: “puzzle,” 
“gold” and “ribbon,” which respectively stand for intrinsic, extrinsic, and recognition. 
Walsh and Tseng (1998) later explicated recognition n terms of social rewards. However, 
in order to address the different motives of inventors particularly in industry, this study 
expanded the motive groups to four dimensions: task, pecuniary, recognition, and firm, 
and tested the effect of motives on innovative performances. Based on Ryan and Deci’s 
taxonomy of human motivation, and types of extrinsic motivation, we illustrate in Figure 
2.1 how motives are classified in this dissertation. Moreover, in the following chapter, we 






Figure 2.1 Typology of Motives 
 
Task Motive is associated with the individual and the activity itself. It is also associated 
with the intellectual challenge and associated satisfaction from “solving puzzles” 
(Sauermann & Stephan, 2010; Stephan & Levin, 1992). Achievement, enjoyment, and 
intellectual challenge are examples of the task motive. In psychology, it is framed around 
“intrinsic” motivation, and scientists are shown to have higher research performance 
when “intrinsically motivated” (Amabile, 1996; Ryan & Deci, 2000). In this project, task 
motive is considered an extension of intrinsic motivation based on Ryan and Deci’s 
taxonomy (2000), since individuals satisfy their needs by the activity itself.  
Amabile (1996) and Stephan (1996) indicated that some task motivations, such as 
intellectual challenge and enjoyment of the task, are realized when individuals are 
involved in the activity. Other types of task motive, such as achievement or self-
competence, originate from task performance and outcome. In psychology, highly 




engage in research activities and find themselves content with the activity itself (Amabile, 
1996; Ryan & Deci, 2000). Previous research suggests tha  task motive is associated with 
the amount of effort researchers invest in research (Levin & Stephan, 1991; Sauermann & 
Cohen, 2010) and has a positive effect on the productivity of industrial scientists 
(Sauermann & Cohen, 2010). Empirically, Stern (2004) claimed that industrial scientists 
should have a “taste for science”—strong orientation oward research-oriented careers. 
Stressing preference toward solving puzzles and completing tasks, he showed that new 
biology PhDs prefer to work in firms where they arellowed to engage in more academic 
activities, such as publishing and taking part in scientific conferences, at the cost of a 
lower salary. His research concluded that these resea chers have a “taste for science” and 
are task motivated.  
Pecuniary Motive originates from environments such as markets, employers, or 
customers, and satisfaction of the motive is usually conditional upon the assessment of 
the task outcome. According to Ryan and Deci’s taxonomy (2000), this is considered to 
be the least autonomous form of extrinsic motivation, and they labeled it as an external 
regulation. Economists and social psychologists often measure pecuniary motive using 
monetary rewards, given that it is one of the most prevalent forms of external motivating 
factors. A positive relationship between financial incentives and work performance has a 
long tradition in theories of motivation. For example, Vroom’s Expectancy Theory 
(Vroom, 1964), which proposed that the desirability of the outcome determines how 




financial incentive is valuable. In turn, pecuniary incentives were perceived to increase 
work performance. Also, based on incentive theory (Lawler, 1971), Jenkins et al. (1998) 
summarized in their meta-analysis that high pay would engender high performance, and 
performance is reinforced and repeated. Moreover, a laboratory experiment by Camerer 
and Hogarth (1999) suggested that individuals’ cognition, memory, recall, and simple 
problem-solving functions have been improved by pecuniary rewards.  
Recognition Motive is defined as motivation toward receiving a ribbon, award, or other 
form of recognition or boost to reputation. It is contingent upon social context and is not 
associated with the task attributes. In the Hawthorne study, Mayo and colleagues claimed 
that employees have generated higher productivity when they were given attention and 
properly acknowledged by their supervisor (Mayo, 1945). Their findings signify the 
importance of recognition, and tell us that mere monetary rewards are not sufficient for 
increasing productivity among individuals who are recognition-motivated (Bendix, 1974; 
Walsh & Tseng, 1998). According to Pelz (1976), “recognition is a basic sense of 
awareness and appreciation rather than monetary reward” (p. 331). Examples of the 
recognition motive include forms of social approval, peer recognition, or a more formally 
institutionalized system such as an award. It has been claimed that recognition motive is 
one of the most important factors in determining whether and how the research result is 
disclosed (Haeussler et al., 2009; Mukhergee & Stern, 2009). In addition, according to 
West and Farr (1989; 1989), the degree of support fr m others (such as peers and 




Support can take many forms, from physical resources to positive feedback, all of which 
encourage attempts to be innovative (Farr & Ford, 1990).  
In the context of research, individuals are faced with the judgment of others, especially 
when disclosing the research (either through publication or invention disclosure). When 
an invention is proven to be novel, the only ones recognized are the people that first 
invent/introduce it to the scientific community (Merton, 1973a; Merton, 1973b). Even 
though there is a difference between priority rights and proprietary rights,2 they share 
similarities such as the fact that being first matters. Since Merton (1973b), it has been 
argued that there are rewards to priority—the endowment of credit for intellectual priority 
and property rights, establishment of reputation, and creation of opportunities for 
involvement with prestigious institutions, granting access to resources for future research 
(Stephan, 2010). For example, Shuji Nakamura has been recognized for his invention of 
the blue LED during his employment at Nichia. His invention led him to establish his 
reputation in the field with a number of awards, as well as a job at the University of 
California, Santa Barbara. Likewise, by disclosing i ventions with their name attached, 
industry researchers can be recognized as being first, especially when the firm does not 
allow publication. Numerous industry researchers have received top honors in their field, 
and firms like Bell Lab, DuPont, and IBM have housed top awards such as the Nobel 
                                                 
 




Prize. Stern (2004) evidenced that industry research rs sacrifice their monetary reward in 
the interest of receiving recognition from the field through publishing their research 
output. Moreover, because the nature of research rende s feedback from others inevitable, 
some argue that the recognition motive is one of the most important factors in 
determining whether and how the research result is disclosed (Haeussler et al., 2009; 
Mukhergee & Stern, 2009).  
Firm Motive is contingent on identity as an organizational memb r. It offers people a 
sense of belonging, and makes people want to maintain their membership in the 
organization. For example, people might think it ismportant to work for generating 
value to the firm, or for being responsible. Unlike other motives that are individualistic, 
this is a motive focused on membership and sense of “us” as a group. Considering that 
the goal of the firm is accepted by an individual as their own, and could develop to be 
congruent with their own needs and values, we argue that firm motive could be classified 
between identification and integration in Ryan and Deci’s taxonomy of human 
motivation. In other words, firm motive is rooted in external value that is separate from 
the activity itself; yet it leads the behavior to be volitional and integrated by one’s self. 
Even though it is not dealt with much in the motivation literature, many studies from 
Social Psychology discussed a similar concept and lbeled it as “Organizational 
Commitment” or “Organizational Identification.” Both of these concepts resonate with 
each other in the sense that they emphasize the attachment one has to the organization. 




relative strength of an individual’s identification with and involvement in a particular 
organization.” Furthermore, they characterized organizational commitment as “1) a 
strong belief in and acceptance of the organization’s goal and values; 2) a willingness to 
exert considerable effort on behalf of the organization; 3) a strong desire to maintain 
membership in the organization” (p.226). Later, Meyer and Allen (1991) defined three 
components of Organizational Commitment, or OC, as having an “emotional attachment 
to, identification with, and involvement in, the organization.” While Organizational 
Identification, or OI, has its roots in social identity theory, it is defined as “the perception 
of one-ness or belongingness to some human aggregate” (Ashforth & Mael, 1989).  
To better understand OC and OI, we compare and contrast the explicated characteristics 
of each orientation, as summarized in Table 2.1. Unlike OI, which is focused on self-
definition via organizational membership (Mael & Ashforth, 1995; Pratt, 1998; van 
Knippenberg & Sleebos, 2006), OC considers the organization and the self as separate 









Table 2.1. Organizational Commitment and Organizational Identification  
Organizational Commitment Organizational Identification 
Positive attitude toward organization: 
Self and organization remain separate 
entities 
Emphasis on self-definition via 
organizational membership: Perceived one-
ness with the organization 
How happy or satisfied am I with the 
organization? 
How do I perceive myself in relation with the 
organization? 
Transferrable to other organization Organization specific 
Associated with attitudinal variables like 
job satisfaction 
Associated with attractive, distinctive, 
internally consistent organizational identity 
(e.g. shared fate of organization, antipathy 
toward the rival organization, and self-
sacrifice on behalf of the organization) 
 
Can be associated with negative emotional 
experience 
Source: (Ashforth, Harrison & Corley, 2008) 
 
Empirically, different measures are associated withOC and OI so they can be 
distinguished (even though they often can be correlated). Riketta (2005) and others (van 
Knippenberg & Sleebos, 2006) have reported that OC is found to be associated with 
attitudinal variables such as job satisfaction, while OI is found to be related to variables 
that are distinctly described by the organizational identity, such as antipathy toward rival 
organizations and self-sacrifice for the organization (Ashforth, Harrison & Corley, 2008; 
Pratt, 1998; van Knippenberg & Sleebos, 2006). Also, a study by Herrbach (2006) 
reported that OI was associated with negative emotional experiences. At first, OI had a 
positive effect on emotional experience, but this as ociation disappeared once OC was 




Based on their differences, we consider OC to be a tter fit with firm motive than OI. As 
described above, Mowday, Steers and Porter (1979) claim that OC is operationalized as 
acceptance of the goals of the organization, working hard for the organization, and, in 
particular, having a strong desire to keep organization l membership. Moreover, 
questions asked in the survey conducted and analyzed for this dissertation had no 
assumption of oneness between the individual and the organization.  
Relating attitudinal organizational commitment to mtivations, Meyer and his colleague 
claimed that organizational commitment resonates with motivational processes explicated 
in Self-Determination Theory (Meyer, Becker & Vandeb rghe, 2004; Meyer & Maltin, 
2010). In particular, affective OC is considered to be close to autonomous forms of 
regulation, as opposed to controlled forms of regulation. Empirically, based on a survey 
of Italian automotive employees, Gagne et al. (2008) found partial support of this 
hypothesis, in that affective OC is more strongly related to measures of autonomous 
regulations than to measures of introjected and external regulations. Therefore, Meyer 
proposed that both motivations and commitment mindsets are related, in the sense that 
they are conditions influencing psychological satisf ction of the needs for autonomy, 
competence and relatedness in the work context. 
Previous studies have extensively analyzed the relationship between organizational 
commitment and work outcomes such as job performance. I  addition to meta-analyses 
that reported positive relationships between affectiv  OC and work performance 




Riketta, 2002; Wright & Bonett, 2002), empirical studies have asserted that individuals 
with higher levels of organizational commitment perform better (Hunter & Thatcher, 
2007; Morin et al., 2011; Vandenberghe, Bentein & Stinglhamber, 2004).  
Because of the implications of the concept of OC and its relevance to our research, we 
would like to expand the discussion about the motives and their related outputs beyond 
the three more widely studied pecuniary, recognitio, and task motives to include firm 
motive as a driver of innovation and collaboration.  
2.1.1 Motives as Traits 
In this dissertation, we use the term “motive” instead of “motivation.” Compared to 
motivation, which is framed around task, motive may be a more appropriate term, given 
that it connotes a trait-like characteristic (Sauermann & Cohen, 2010). Amabile et al. 
(1994) discussed motivational orientations being considered as personal traits to a certain 
extent, and signified that motives are a relatively stable and enduring individual 
characteristic across time and situation. Deci and Ryan (1985) developed measures of 
personal causation orientation, which is trait-like. Even though it concerned people’s 
causation, their argument resonates with intrinsic and extrinsic motives. For example, 
they suggested that autonomy-oriented people are molikely to be intrinsically 
motivated, while control-oriented individuals are extrinsically motivated. The research 
proposed that people’s causation process is contingent on their situation, needs, emotions, 
and cognition. Based on the reliability test conducted over a two-month period, they 




Similarly, Kanfer et al. (Kanfer & Ackerman 2000; Kanfer & Heggestad 1997; Kanfer & 
Heggestad, 1999) theorized about and tested motivati nal traits. Based on the assumption 
that relatively stable motivational traits affect how individuals perform in the work 
setting, they found that individual traits such as achievement and anxiety are reflected in 
work motivation. For example, Kanfer and Ackerman (2000) found evidences that 
achievement is related to individuals’ motive for desire to learn and task improvement. 
As such, we can think of motives as stable personal ch racteristics. In this manner, this 
research aims to distinguish between motive and incentives/rewards. Following operant 
theory (Skinner, 1953), rewards are commonly believd to promote all behaviors 
(including organizational goals) by enhancing the motivation and satisfaction of 
individual employees. With this tradition, previous studies from Economics and Social 
Psychology have implicitly assumed direct correspondence between individual 
motivation and a reward system. Accordingly, previous studies on incentives were 
focused on improving reward utility experienced by individuals (Chen, Ford & Farris, 
1999). On the other hand, based on learning theory (Hull, 1943), others assumed that all 
behaviors were derived from psychological drives rather than from rewards. For example, 
under the influence of learning theory, intrinsically motivated activities offer satisfaction 
of psychological needs rather than rewards, e.g. the activity itself (Ryan & Deci, 2000). 
This dissertation is grounded in the second approach, wherein individual activities are 




Extrinsic motivation, or the pecuniary motive, has been widely matched with extrinsic 
reward, while intrinsic motivation, or the task motive, has not been equated with 
incentives particularly due to its difficulty in anlysis and control (Williamson, 1985). 
Problems arise when assuming there is a direct correspondence between motivation and 
reward. One of the problems is that rewards may not motivate employees and benefit 
organizations, as they were initially intended to. F r example, an extrinsic reward that 
was given to employees in order to increase performance could turn out to cause negative 
effects, especially on their creativity (Amabile, 1988). 
Given that reward is contingent upon performance, we can distinguish motive from 
incentive. Unlike incentive, no condition is required for individuals to have such motive, 
and personal characteristics are not bound by their performances. It more concerns 
personal disposition, and is based on psychological needs of individuals. Correspondingly, 
motives precede an individual’s work behavior and outc me, so that a person would 
choose, for example, how to approach or avoid the problem in a way that aligns with their 
personality. Moreover, motive and incentive are different in their stability. As a personal 
disposition, a motive is a stable characteristic, while incentive is volatile, as it changes 
upon the established condition. 
However, this research is limited in that many studies referenced in this dissertation also 
assumed direct correspondence between reward and motive. Even though this dissertation 
is based on those articles, we want to clarify thatwe do not, and cannot, test incentives in 




on testing the effect of motives. In this way, we can contribute to the understanding of 
other types of motive.  
2.2 Creativity 
The concept of creativity at work represents generating new ideas or work processes, by 
either coming up with entirely innovative thoughts or recombining existing approaches in 
novel ways. Usually, creativity is defined as “an approach to work that leads to the 
generation of novel and appropriate ideas, processes, or solutions” (Perry-Smith & 
Shalley, 2003). This means that creativity does not have to take place only in certain units 
of the work place (for example, R&D); rather, it can happen wherever an individual 
performs their work, including the manufacturing and sales divisions. Regardless of 
location, it is more important that the output should entail some degree of uniqueness, but 
should be understood by others in order to be adopte  and implemented. In other words, 
creativity is framed around novelty and its usefulness, whereas productivity focuses on 
the quantity of the output (Amabile et al., 1996; Fleming, Mingo & Chen, 2007; Oldham 
& Cummings, 1996). These distinctive features of creativity go back to the pioneering 
work by Stein (1953). He suggested that creative work is a “deviation from the traditional 
or the status quo” and that the community should vaidate the usefulness of the work. 
This is reiterated by Simonton (1999), that novelty is first screened by an individual’s 





Creativity is also understood in a continuum based on its degree (Amabile, 1996; Perry-
Smith & Shalley, 2003; Shalley, 1995). Relative to its level, we can distinguish creativity 
between minor and major contribution (Mumford & Gustaf on, 1988). A major 
contribution, for example, could be a technological breakthrough that changes the 
approach to a problem, and therefore has a great impact in the field. On the other hand, a 
minor contribution could be the recombination and adjustment of existing principles. In 
this article, the term “creativity” does not differentiate between major and minor 
contributions. Rather, it embraces all degrees of creativity, not focusing on the tail end of 
its distribution. 
In his seminal work, Schumpeter stated that “innovati n combines components in a new 
way, or that it consists in carrying out new combinations” (1939). Understanding 
innovation as a process by which inventors create new technology, Nelson and Winter 
claim that recombining any existing conceptual and physical material is critical in the 
production of novel science and art (1982). Henderson and Clark (1990) also argued that 
technological breakthroughs can be created by the rearrangement of previously used 
components. Kogut and Zander (1992) introduced the term “Combinative Capabilities” to 
signify the ability to synthesize and apply acquired knowledge. They claimed, 
“innovations, are products of a firm’s combinative capability to generate new 
applications from existing knowledge” (p. 391). Here, Combinative Capability means the 
intersection of capability to exploit both knowledge and technical opportunity. Using the 




argued that the application of existing technology is critical to exploring new paths of 
application. Creative technology stems from the rich soil of existing resources, and could 
become “creative destruction” when dispersed to other niches.  
The ability to combine existing components is, however, limited. Because inventors and 
their teams pick what is thought to be relevant and significant, combining existing 
technology is bound by inventors’ experience and knowledge (Fleming, 2001). 
Consequently, the recombination process needs to be und rstood in relation to the 
individual. In fact, examining the relationship betw en individuals and their outcomes 
has been one of the most important topics in the study of innovation (Griliches, 1957; 
Gruber, Harhoff & Hoisl, 2012; Harhoff et al., 1999; Schumpeter, 1934; Stephan, 1996), 
which vary from inventor productivity (Zucker & Darby, 1996) to collaborations and 
network (Allen, 1977; Fleming, Mingo & Chen, 2007). Also, given that human resources 
are the core of constructing knowledge, and all resources, skills and knowledge are put 
together to create technological recombination, previous literatures discuss the individual 
differences and their effect on knowledge recombinatio  (Gruber, Harhoff & Hoisl, 2012; 
Kogut & Zander, 1992). However, there are limited studies that investigate knowledge 
recombination at the individual level. Studies on micro-foundations (Felin & Foss, 2005; 
Felin & Hesterly, 2007; Rothaermel & Hess, 2007) have called our attention to 
considering the “individual” as a way to explain the process of building the dynamic 
capability of the firm. Felin and Foss (2007) pointed out that current literature on 




individual. For them, this finding means that current literature does not assume the 
heterogeneity of the individual, who comprises the organization, and of the interaction 
between the two different levels. Therefore, they stressed the micro-foundation, which is 
defined as the individual-level heterogeneity that precedes the collective phenomena. 
Rothaermel and Hess (2007) empirically argued that,indeed, the innovation lies across 
different levels: individual, firm and network-level.    
Andrews (1979) claimed that individuals’ creative ability is reasonably stable, even 
though it may show short-term volatility. Stable and continuous trait-like personal 
characteristics have since been studied in relation to creativity. Simonton (1999) narrated 
the relationship between personal traits and individuals’ performances. Assuming that 
scientific theorizing needs combinatorial thoughts and trials, Simonton asserted that 
creative individuals have particular inclinations to pursue combinatorial research. In 
addition to the personal disposition, Fleming et al. (2007) indicated that several 
individual-level factors, such as boundary-spanning inventor’s cohesive networks and 
experience are critical in producing new combinations f subclasses in invention. 
Recently, Gruber et al. (2012) showed the importance of educational training in 
combining technology boundaries. They reported that higher education (PhDs) and 
degrees in science are more likely to generate technological recombination. Borrowing 
literature from creativity and the economics of scien e, which also can be understood in 
terms of recombination (Hargadon, 2008; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997), Sauermann and 




Previous studies on motivation and creativity have discussed that intrinsic (task) motive 
is a critical driver of creativity (Amabile, 1983; Elsbach & Hargadon, 2006). Shalley et al. 
(2004) reported that task motive increases creativity by stimulating positive affect, 
cognitive flexibility, risk taking, and persistence. Recently, however, it has been 
questioned as to whether the sole effect of intrinsic motivation on creativity has been 
taken into consideration, as have other factors such as network (Perry-Smith, 2006; 
Shalley & Perry-Smith, 2001). Pursuing in-depth understanding of the relationship 
between motivations and creativity, Grant and his colleagues (2011; 2008) have claimed 
that prosocial motive—the desire to help others—has a moderating effect on the 
relationship between intrinsic motive and creativity. In this dissertation, we would like to 
examine creativity—defined as technology recombinatio —based on creativity literature 
and sociology of science on individual motives and their effect. In particular, this study 
aims to expand the discussion by introducing other motives, such as firm motive, and 
examining the interaction effect.  
As noted above, it has long been discussed that intrinsic motivation is an important factor 
for creativity. Based on close examination of 115 scientists, Andrews (1979) asserted that 
creative people need to have freedom in order to show t eir innovativeness. Under 
autonomous working conditions, industrial scientists and engineers are believed to give 
their best in order to fulfill their intrinsic motive toward solving puzzles or completing 
tasks. Moreover, Amabile and colleagues argue that an individual’s inherent drive in 




1981). Trying to understand the mechanism behind the relationship between the intrinsic 
motive and creativity, it has been suggested that a t sk motive broadens the range of 
information (expanding the scope of attention to the wider set of ideas) and increases the 
cognitive ability to identify combinatory elements (Amabile et al., 2005). Moreover, 
employees’ task motives help individuals increase their willingness to take risks, their 
openness to complexity (Gagne & Deci, 2005), their wo k effort (Fredrickson, 1998; 
Levin & Stephan, 1991; Sauermann & Cohen, 2010), and their perseverance at times of 
challenge, and enables them to continue working (Amabile, 1996; Shalley & Oldham, 
1997). This in turn enhances individuals’ access to new ideas and possible solutions, as 
well as ability to concentrate on the task more effctively (e.g., Amabile, 1996). 
However, we found that empirical findings are somewhat mixed. In particular, studies of 
employees in organizations questioned whether intrinsic motivation enhances creativity, 
as opposed to laboratory studies that examined studen s’ creativity (for review, see Grant 
and Berry, 2011).  Furthermore, studies focused on R&D personnel have provided 
conflicting results. Based on field study, Dewett (2007) reported that an employee’s self-
reported creativity is positively associated with the ask motive, whereas a supervisor’s 
rating of creativity is not. Perry-Smith (2006) also found no significant relationship 
between intrinsic motivation and creativity, measured by a supervisor’s rating of an 
employee’s creativity. On the other hand, Shin and Zhou (2003) showed that the presence 




Tierney, Farmer and Graen (1999) evidenced a positive relationship between an 
employee’s intrinsic motivation and their supervisor’  rating of creativity.  
Nonetheless, note that creativity, primarily measured by novelty and originality (e.g. 
creating artwork or poetry), is reported to be positively associated with the task motive 
(Amabile, 1985; Amabile, Hennessey & Grossman, 1986). Tasks in the R&D setting 
involve a stronger usefulness component, so that whis measured under the name of 
creativity should distinguish between novelty and usef lness. Based on this difference, 
Grant and Berry (2011) claimed that intrinsic motiva on is a critical driver in producing 
novel work, but not necessarily useful ideas. In this dissertation, we try to measure 
novelty, rather than usefulness. Therefore, we hypothesize the relationship between the 
task motive and creativity is as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: Task motives are positively associated with the creation of new 
combinations. 
Previous literature suggested that formal organization l extrinsic motive can be 
detrimental to creative behavior (Amabile, 1988; Amabile, 1996; Farr & Ford, 1990). 
However, Amabile later modified her stance, and suggested that some extrinsic motive 
can encourage creativity. She claimed that, to some extent, interaction between extrinsic 
and intrinsic motive could stimulate creativity. She used the term “motivational synergy” 
to describe when extrinsic motive helps promote intrinsic motive (Amabile, 1993). For 
example, an intrinsically motivated employee was found to be deeply involved in work 




and Cameron (1996) evidenced that extrinsic rewards help to stimulate individual 
innovation implementation. Sauermann and Cohen (2010) also found that, in addition to 
the task motive, pecuniary motives had a significant positive effect on innovative 
activities engaged in by Science and Engineering professionals. Thus, while there are 
arguments that the pecuniary motive is associated with lower creativity, there are also 
arguments suggesting that it has no effect or even a positive effect on creativity.  
Hypothesis 2: Pecuniary motives are positively associated with the creation of 
new combinations. 
Many recent studies have shown that encouragement and support from their supervisor 
increases an employee’s creativity and innovation (Oldham & Cummings, 1996; Shalley, 
2008). As Mayo (1945) argued, employees are psychological beings who need attention 
and recognition, so much so that a simple monetary w ge would not be enough to elicit 
an increased output. Accordingly, organizations are encouraged to be attentive and 
sensitive to an employee’s non-tangible needs in order to maximize their commitment to 
the organization. 
Pelz (1976) also emphasized that it is critical for researchers to have some achievement 
that bears their name. Being visible and recognized in the community increases exposure 
to new problems, stimulates curiosity, and eventually productivity. Furthermore, 
Andrews (1979) suggested that there are stages a scienti t/researcher may put a creative 
idea through: the idea is internally evaluated, communicated to others, and finally, is 




after it is circulated among fellow experts in the field (Storer, 1966) assuring the research 
has been conducted properly, after which it can be published, disclosed, and/or patented. 
Fleming (2001) also stressed the importance of perce tion in developing novel 
recombinations. From many possible components, inventors come up with an idea for 
recombination based on their range of experience, knowledge and thoughts. Fleming 
argued that social construction and previous associati n determines if certain components 
“belong together.” For example, elements required for semiconductors were not 
previously perceived as belonging together (Fleming, 2001). Since technology evolves 
interdependent to existing technology, there is the matter of the right timing and 
environment in order for a new technology to be considered novel, rather than absurd. 
Abundant resources of existing components provide inv ntors a pool of recombination 
for future inventions. However, if the process/invetion is not understood, it is likely to 
fail.  
Therefore, recognition motive might prohibit individuals from introducing novel 
inventions. Given the possible risk of misunderstanding, and considering that ribbon 
motive is more likely to be dependent on social approval than other types of motive, there 
is the possibility of generating more conformity to the usual. Noting that creative work is 




are bound to consider how others evaluate it.3 Consequently, for example, groupthink 
(Janis, 1971; 1972) might prevent inventors from being creative through self-censorship 
of ideas that deviate from the apparent group consensus. The society of the individual and 
their recognition is so important that Simonton stated there is no unrecognized genius 
(1999). Thus, individuals motivated by recognition would be much more perceptive and 
sensitive to other’s appraisal, resulting in a lesscreative project compared to the 
invention made by those with other motives.  
Hypothesis 3. Recognition motives are negatively associated with the creation of 
new combinations. 
Andrews and Farris (1967) claimed that scientists’ creativity increased when 
organizations were supportive. In particular, when mangers listened to scientists’ 
concerns and asked for their opinions about decisions affecting them, their creativity was 
found to be higher. Likewise, Andrews (1979) showed that creativity increased when 
scientists felt more secure in their settings, e.g. stable employment. He argued that a 
scientist with a sense of security in their professional life stimulates effective utilization 
of their creative ability.. 
                                                 
 
3 Even though this dissertation is focused on creativity in terms of novelty, we cannot ignore its utility 




Moreover, relating the prosocial motive and the affctive organizational commitment, we 
postulate the positive association between creativity and firm motives. Prosocial motive 
is “the desire to expend effort based on a concern for helping or contributing to other 
people” (Grant, 2011, p.77), and Bastson et al. (2008) argue that, with the prosocial 
motive, employees desire to help others because they car  about them, and would like to 
maintain their membership in a valued group. Because the prosocial motive and the 
affective organizational commitment share a similar sense of belonging, we can argue 
that those who subscribe to organizational commitmen  and the prosocial motive will 
share similar consequences at work. Empirically, the prosocial motive is reported to 
benefit work context through organizational citizenship behavior, and positive association 
with job performance (De Dreu & Nauta, 2009). Also, Grant and Berry (2011) showed 
that the prosocial motive strengthens creativity. Consequently, we can suggest the 
following hypothesis. 





2.3 Commercialization of the Invention 
In this dissertation, innovation performance is divided into the novel and useful 
“creativity” (Amabile, 1996; Stein, 1963). Initially, we focused on the novelty side of 
creativity by measuring new technology subclass combinations of the patent. In the 
second section of this study, we examined the effect of motives on innovation 
performance, which stressed the usefulness of the patent by measuring whether or not it 
is commercialized. Since patents require the invention to be both novel and useful (and 
nonobvious), they are perceived to resemble the definition of creativity as described 
above. However, having a patented invention does not aut matically mean it is put to use. 
In particular, the appropriability of the patented invention has been emphasized since 
Schumpeter (1942) said that invention does not haveany economic effect at all if it does 
not produce innovation. Therefore, we have proxied innovative performance by 
measuring whether it has been commercialized, as commercialization of the patent can 
definitely give us a measure of its usefulness. Focusing on the attempt to put invention 
into the market, in this section we investigate the relationship between individual motive 
and innovative performance in order to examine the usefulness of creativity. 
Typically, scientists and engineers are considered to be more task-oriented than those 
with other vocations. The General Social Survey (GSS), for example, illustrated that 
members of the S&E workforce are more likely to score high on tests measuring the non-
pecuniary motives of the desire for challenge at work and the need for achievements than 




significantly larger for the S&E workforce than for p oduction workers (Cohen & 
Sauermann, 2007; General Social Survey, 2001).  
Amabile and colleagues argued that creativity is strongly associated with a task-oriented 
motive, rather than with recognition and pecuniary motives. They argued that those who 
are intrinsically motivated are likely to be more exploratory, and hence task-motivated 
people are more productive than those motivated by pecuniary rewards or peer 
recognition (Amabile, 1993; Hennessey & Amabile, 1998). Based on this argument, it 
has been conjectured that scientists are more task-oriented, satisfied by inventing and 
discovering something new. Like creative artists, S&E professionals with task motive are 
assumed to perform better in research-related jobs.Moreover, it has been argued that 
R&D professionals place more value on intrinsic rewards and often believe that extrinsic 
rewards are counterproductive (Chen et al., 1999).  
On the other hand, some have suggested that monetary r wards enhance an individual’s 
cognitive ability to solve problems (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999). Based on 39 laboratory, 
experimental simulation, and field studies, Jenkins et al. (1998) have conducted meta-
analysis and reported a significant positive association between high monetary reward 
and performance quantity, but no relationship betwen lower monetary rewards and 
performance quality. In their study of 70 leading R&D organizations, Haigh and 
Gladkowski (1992) found that stability in base salary has more positive impact on 
employee motivation than highly-leveraged incentive packages. Also, Kuvaas (2006) 




performance for Norwegian energy-intensive industry workers. Furthermore, he argued 
that the relationship is mediated by task motive, and it is especially distinctive for highly 
educated knowledge workers. In a similar vein, not negating the importance of the task 
motive, Sauermann and Cohen (2010) found that both the task and pecuniary motives had 
a significant positive effect on innovative activities for doctorate recipients, graduate 
students, and recent college graduates from science and ngineering fields engaged in 
basic or applied research. Likewise, Chen et al. (1999) found that providing employees 
both the autonomy to solve puzzles and financial stabili y can generate the best 
productivity. However, the effect of pecuniary incetives can vary depending on the task 
and capabilities of the individual. Previous literature suggested that formal organizational 
rewards may inhibit creative behavior (Amabile, 1988; Amabile, 1996; Farr & Ford, 
1990). Farr and Ford (1990) claimed that reward structures based on relatively long-term 
perspectives may “at least not inhibit” an individual’s innovative behavior. For the 
reasons discussed above in relation to the task motive and pecuniary motive, we offer the 
following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis A: Task motives are positively associated with commercialization of 
the invention. 
Hypothesis B: Pecuniary motives are positively associated with 
commercialization of the invention. 
Merton (1973b) suggested that, in addition to a strong task motive, scientists are 




scientific knowledge (which explains why they publish results rather than be content with 
satisfying their task motivation by solving the problems). Stephan (1996) and Cohen and 
Walsh (2008) argued that this recognition may also be linked to the pecuniary motive that 
accompanies recognition for significant scientific accomplishments (including higher 
salaries, better working conditions, and monetary prizes such as the Nobel Prize).  
Empirically, Walsh and Tseng (1998) found that the recognition motive, with its social 
context, elicits more active effort by workers, suggesting that non-pecuniary motives may 
be important for increasing productivity. Also, based on interviews of eight 
biotechnology firms, Judge, Fryxell and Dooley (1997) found that less innovative firms 
exclusively employed monetary rewards, whereas more innovative firms relied heavily 
on highly-personalized socio-emotional rewards likerecognition. In their interview, a 
scientist working at a less innovative firm stated that they “can keep the money, what I 
want is the title” (p.78). In their study, all four of the most innovative firms surveyed 
implemented a personalized recognition system by tailoring non-monetary rewards to the 
unique needs of the recipients. Therefore, we would like to test following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis C: Recognition motives are positively associated with 
commercialization of the invention. 
Humans have the basic need to search out safety, affiliation, and uncertainty reduction 
(Ashforth et al., 2008). As Weick (1995) described, uncertainties around the introduction 
of a new environment and changes in life could be mitigated when individuals associated 




affiliations, individuals are provided a sense of cnnection, a source of self-definition, 
and commitment to shared values (Ashforth et al., 2008). 
We considered that the firm motive represents the indiv duals’ need for security and 
affiliation. Within an organization, they can be sati fied with and feel secured by a sense 
of membership, which in turn reduces one’s uncertainties.  Therefore, the firm becomes a 
top priority in the lives of firm-motivated individuals. We expect that inventions created 
by them can be easily adopted and used within the context of the firm, because inventions 
will bear the inventors’ understanding of the firm’s need and capability. In particular, it is 
suspected that their inventions will have higher commercial value, as a firm’s most 
important goal is generating profit. 
Previous studies in organizational commitment suggested that commitment is positively 
related to individual and firm-level performance (Meyer & Allen, 1991; Mowday, Porter 
& Dublin, 1974). Meta-analyses have addressed how OC influences job performance 
(Mathieu & Zajac, 1990; Randall, 1990; Riketta, 200; Wright & Bonett, 2002). Even 
though there are some mixed results, many studies reported that individuals with higher 
levels of organizational commitment perform better. Empirically, Hunter and Thatcher 
(2007) surveyed 410 bank employees, and showed that affec ive OC is positively 
associated with employee performance. Moreover, recent studies on OC have diversified 
the foci of the commitment, and introduced non-linear relationships to work outcomes. 
For example, Vandenberghe et al. (2006) found that organizational commitment had an 




(2012) have shown curvilinear association between commitment and outcome. Based on 
the interviews conducted, Judge et al. (1997) also suggested the importance of creating a 
sense of community in the workplace has in building a  innovative atmosphere. 
According to these researchers, the most common phrase used by employees in the highly 
innovative firms was “family feeling;” a manager described that his team is very close 
and they frequently socialize together like a family. Judge et al. (1997) argued that this 
family feeling gives employees a sense of trust and caring. 
Meyer and Allen (1991) suggested that better performance by employees with 
organizational commitment could be due to their desire to belong to the organization. 
They asserted that employees who want to maintain organizational membership are more 
likely to exert effort on behalf of the organization. Relating to the work effort, Sauermann 
and Cohen (2008) showed in their research that motives positively affect work effort. 
Even if their research did not include the firm motive, we expect a similar relationship 
with firm motive, effort, and resulting innovative performance. Following the previous 
literature, we suggest that firm motive is positively associated with innovative 
performance.   
Hypothesis D: Firm motives are positively associated with commercialization of 
the invention.  
2.3.1 Motives and Scientists versus Engineers 
The effect of motive on innovative performance can v ry depending upon the nature of 




working conditions. Amabile’s argument suggested that ask motive and rewards are 
more closely associated with R&D tasks that require creative approaches and solutions 
for innovative activity. On the other hand, the pecuniary motive may govern innovative 
performance for those R&D tasks that require little cr ativity, but perhaps sustained 
effort (Amabile, 1993). Based on this, Sauermann and Cohen (2008) conjectured that 
pecuniary rewards might, for example, enhance performance in more downstream R&D 
tasks that are more routinized, such as clinical tri ls in pharmaceutical research. 
Even though there is a large body of research on the effect of incentive and motive in 
different organizations (such as academia versus industry), there is very limited recent 
literature on the motive differences between R&D personnel within the industry. 
Research conducted in prior decades, however, studied th s issue extensively in relation 
to cosmopolitan-local distinction (Allen, 1977; Kerr & Von Glinow, 1977; Miller, 1967; 
Pelz & Andrews, 1976; Ritti, 1968).  
Research distinguishing scientists from engineers is based in the distinction between 
cosmopolitans and locals developed by Merton (1957), and extended by Gouldner (1957, 
1958). The distinction between locals and cosmopolitans refers to, in Merton’s terms, a 
basic orientation: one toward its immediate locale and the other toward the wider world. 
One important difference between locals and cosmopolitans is their very different social-
relational structure. Locals tend to be connected to, loyal to the local organization, and to 
maintain a strong orientation toward people in the local community (Gouldner, 1957a). 




displaying high commitment to their skills and expertise is of much more importance, as 
this group is oriented to an external reference group. In this regard, we can link motives 
and the local-cosmopolitan distinction. For example, w  expect locals to be more group-
oriented and committed to their organizations; while cosmopolitans, due to the fact that 
their identity lies outside their professional field, seek recognition more than any other 
motive.  
Friedlander (1971) applied the local-cosmopolitan co cept to the industry S&E 
workforce, and argued that where engineers are locals interested in management 
promotion, scientists are cosmopolitans focused on pr fessional recognition. Shepard 
(1956) stated that cosmopolitans are productive and v luable to the company, but their 
outputs happen to be valuable to the company as byproducts of their work. These 
differences led both Merton and Gouldner to conclude that locals and cosmopolitans 
should be understood as distinct identities with very different implied roles. 
Furthermore, Allen (1977) suggested the importance of educational training and 
socialization to the difference between scientists and engineers. They argued that 
industrial scientists are heavily influenced by their academic training, and thus are more 
likely to value specialized skills, focus on the scientific community, and desire autonomy 
and publication opportunities in order to develop a social reputation in the field. On the 
other hand, engineers in industry tend to seek more p wer positions and participation in 
organizations. Therefore, scientists and engineers have distinct responses to the goal of 




enterprise, unlike scientists, who are focused on attaining their own scientific goals. This 
suggests that industrial scientists are expected to be in conflict with corporate value 
systems, and to be disadvantaged in corporate incent ve systems, which may lead to 
lower job satisfaction (Gouldner, 1957a; Kornhauser, 1962; Miller, 1967). This outcome 
is not desirable from the company’s perspective either, as they have to pay the price of 
employing un-socialized PhDs (Allen & Katz, 1992, p. 242).  
Based on the differences described above, we conjecture that the recognition motive is 
particularly correlated with higher innovative outp for industrial scientists. The 
educational background and job requirements for research positions are particularly 
designed to push industry scientists to come up with cu ting-edge inventions. As 
cosmopolitans, scientists are socialized to value specialized skills and recognition from 
the external scientific community. Accordingly, inventors with a high recognition motive 
and science backgrounds are expected to have stronger impact on commercialization than 
inventors with a high recognition motive and engineering backgrounds. We propose that 
inventors with a high firm motive and an engineering background would demonstrate 
higher performance than inventors with a high firm motive and science background. 
Since both an engineering background and the firm motive focus on local organization, 
these employees are loyal to the firm, and the goalof the organization is emphasized. 
Therefore, it is expected that inventors who are especially responsive to the firm would 
achieve more commercialization than inventors with a science background and/or other 




Hypothesis E: The improvement in innovation performance associated with 
recognition motives would be greater for inventors with science backgrounds 
than for those with engineering backgrounds (interaction effect). 
Hypothesis F: The improvement in innovation performance associated with firm 
motives would be greater for inventors with engineering backgrounds than for 





Science improves upon what has already been studied (Cottrell, 1962). Even though 
science requires an individual’s strong determination in pursuit of high excellence, it is 
the scientific community that generates, verifies and validates the idea that binds it. 
Communalism in science engenders collaboration, and t kes place in the form of 
teamwork, cooperation and interdependence through communication and the exchange of 
research results (Allison, 1980; Cole & Cole, 1973; Fox & Faver, 1984; Merton, 1973a).  
Since March and Simon (1958), many scholars have suggested that inter-organizational 
learning is important. Organizations can learn from collaboration as well as observing 
and adapting each others’ practices (Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, 1996), which is 
critical to a firm’s success. Understanding collaborati n based on a network perspective 
and organizational learning, it has been suggested that a “network” of firms is critical in 
producing, recombining and transferring knowledge (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Dyer & 
Singh, 1988; Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, 1996). As opposed to the traditional role of a 
firm in creating, storing, and applying knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1992), it has been 
argued that the boundary of complementary assets extends outside of the single firm. 
Collaboration expands the network by serving in a brokerage role (Hargadon & Sutton, 
1997), and a broader network is associated with the creative output (Fleming, Mingo & 
Chen, 2007). Therefore, collaboration in the network of firms can generate positive 




Furthermore, von Hippel (1988) emphasized the relationship between customer and 
supplier, and suggested that it is one of the primary sources of innovative ideas. He 
argued that the knowledge transfer mechanism among suppliers, users and manufacturers 
could be superior in innovation to less effective knowledge-sharing routines.  
The open innovation perspective (Chesbrough, 2003) has also stressed external paths to 
innovation. Open innovation is contingent upon diverse sources of knowledge, including 
suppliers, customers, universities and competitors. Under the regime of open innovation, 
Chesbrough (2003) argued that companies strive to gain knowledge brokerage instead of 
knowledge creation. Empirically, based on a UK manuf ct ring firm survey, Laursen and 
Salter (2006) showed that there is an inverted U-shape relationship between innovative 
performance and the breadth of search through external sources of innovation. Also, 
Nagaoka and Walsh (2009) reported that external collab ration, particularly vertical 
collaboration, increases commercialization of the patent after controlling for the size of 
the project and the education of the inventor, both in Japan and the U.S. 
Because firms are encouraged to procure knowledge externally, it becomes very 
important to evaluate external knowledge in order to succeed in innovation (Chesbrough, 
2003; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Laursen & Salter, 2006; von Hippel, 1988). Taking 
advantage of external knowledge provides inventors with a large pool of recombinant 
technology components (Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Laursen & Salter, 2006; March 1991). 
Cohen et al. (Cohen, Nelson & Walsh, 2002) reported that start-up firms and large firms 




their R&D projects. This is particularly true in the pharmaceutical industry, as shown by 
Zucker and her colleagues (Zucker, Darby & Amstrong, 2002; Zucker, Darby & Brewer, 
1998). As to the relationship between external knowledge and innovation, Caloghirou, 
Kastelli and Tsakanikas (2004) suggested that external scientific knowledge increases the 
innovative performance of the firm in terms of sale attributable to the innovative product. 
Collaborative activities in science and technology have significantly increased. For U.S. 
academic articles, the percentage of papers that had two or more authors increased from 
55% in 1990 to 75% in 2010 (National Science Foundation, 2012). According to the NSF 
Science and Engineering Indicator 2012, collaboratin bridges boundaries between fields, 
institutions, sectors and countries. For example, th  percentage of papers that have 
international coauthors increased from 11.71% in 1990 to 31.57% in 2010 (National 
Science Foundation, 2012, Figure 5-25). Inter-industry collaboration, measured by 
coauthorship, has increased from 14.5% to 19.3% between 2000 and 2010 (National 
Science Foundation, 2012, Table 5-23). Furthermore, co-invention has increased 
internationally as indicated by the OECD Patent Datab se.4 For patents granted in the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the percentage with a foreign co-inventor 
has increased from 5.9% in 1999 (priority year) to 7.7% in 2008. Likewise, for the 27 






countries that comprise the European Union, the total cooperation with inventors abroad 
increased from 13.5% to 23.9% during the same period.   
Hicks and Katz (1996) studied the growth of inter-inst tutional collaborations within the 
British system by investigating rates of co-authorsip. In 1981, the average number of 
articles with co-authors was 2.63, which increased to 3.34 by 1991 with a linear increase 
of .08 ± .01. They argued that the increase in research collaborations was a general trend 
in science, facilitated by the competitive environment that requires pooled resources, 
skills, and competencies in order to make significant contributions. According to Jones 
(2009), collaboration has become the norm in scientif c research because of what he 
called “the Burden of Knowledge:” the stock of scient fic knowledge has increased and 
become so specialized that one cannot do everything, and scientists are forced to 
collaborate in order to employ broader knowledge stocks. Using U.S. patents between 
1975 and 1999, he empirically showed that collaborati n, measured by the number of 
inventors, has increased at a rate of 17% per decade (Jones, 2009). 
Diverse aspects have been associated with the increase in collaboration. As science has 
become more specialized (Hagstrom, 1964), professionalized, and requiring of greater 
expertise, and disciplines have matured (Beaver & Rosen, 1979; Maanten, 1970), 
collaboration has increased. Funding structure also contributes to collaboration (Heffner, 
1979). Particularly, government agencies have encouraged collaboration through 
requiring it as a condition for funding, especially between universities and industries 




facilitated collaboration among researchers and industrial R&D organizations. For 
example, in 1980 the Stevenson-Wydler Act created th  CRADA (Collaborative 
Research and Development Agreement). It permitted private corporations to select 
marketable products and processes from inventors of federal laboratories’ intellectual 
property, and to work in collaboration with federal scientists to bring the product or 
process to market in order to facilitate joint research and development. Also, some 
technology programs such as the Advanced Technology Program (ATP) mandated inter-
organizational collaboration as a prerequisite for g vernment funding. As noted in the 
Conference Report that accompanied the bill, ATP was intended “to serve as a focal point 
for cooperation between the public and private sectors in the development of industrial 
technology.” ATP provided seed funding to single companies or industry-led consortia of 
universities, businesses, and/or government laboratories for development of generic 
(broad-based), precompetitive technologies with applications across industries. 
Technological and logistic advances have also caused easier and cheaper collaboration 
(Walsh & Bayma, 1996). Traveling has become less expensive. More significantly, 
communication methods have made physical distance less of a barrier between scientists 
so that collaborators can exchange news, data, reports, equipment, instruments and other 
resources much more easily (Finholt, 2002; Hesse et al., 1993; Kouzes, Myers & Wulf, 
1996). In other words, the unavoidable transaction cost of collaboration has been lowered 





2.4.1 Motives and Collaboration 
Fox and Faver (1984) noted factors that induce and prohibit collaboration, and Beaver 
and Rosen (1978) indicated 18 motives for collaborati n. Empirically, Melin (2000) 
conducted research based on a survey of 195 university p ofessors, and reported motive 
for collaboration. This indicated that many of the respondents collaborate because of “co-
author’s special competence,” “co-author’s data or equipment,” “social reasons: old 
friends, past collaboration,” and so on.   
However, these studies focused more on the cost and be efits of collaboration rather than 
personal dispositions. This dissertation distinguishes from other researches in that regard. 
Instead of temporal motivation for collaboration based on advantages and disadvantages 
of collaboration, this dissertation investigates how motives – trait-like personal 
dispositions – affect collaborative activities. In fact, motives are suggested as one of the 
critical factors for transferring knowledge (Deci & Flaste, 1995; Lin 2007; Osterloh & 
Frey, 2000). For example, it has been argued that motives are critical in regard to the 
effort and time required to transfer knowledge and overcome concerns about ownership 
of information (Quigley et al., 2007).  
For the inventor with a task motive, the most ideal form of incentive would be the task 
itself, because they are satisfied by what they are doing. Their locus of satisfaction 
resides in themselves so that, presumably, they would not like to share the joy of solving 
the certain research problem. Moreover, inventors with task motives prefer the autonomy 




nature of collaboration does not guarantee full-fledged freedom. Rather, it requires 
coordination, and it is difficult (Cummings & Kiesler, 2007). Because of the diversity of 
the group, coordination issues arise in the form of communication problems, conflict, and 
lack of cohesion and motivation (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Jehn, Northcraft & Neale, 
1999; Miliken, Bartel & Kurtzberg, 2003; Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001). Dougherty 
(1992) claimed that different interdepartmental ways of thinking can lead to 
miscommunication, and is shown to result in poor performance (Ancona & Caldwell, 
1992). Therefore, we can expect that inventors withtask motives are less likely to 
collaborate than their other-motivated counterparts. 
Additionally, collaboration is associated with trans ction cost (Landry & Amara, 1998). 
Because of the nature of collaborative activity, it is necessary to discuss and negotiate 
ideas among collaborators. They need to plan the resea ch, assign the work dependent 
upon an individual’s expertise, and manage their progress in order to maintain coherence. 
Also, if one of the collaborators is not as committed o the work as much as the others, it 
can extend the length of time allotted, which can delay the project because collaborators 
need to wait for all parties to do their share of wrk before they can respond. Accordingly, 
it might take longer than the research executed alone. For some researchers, this is the 
cost that they don’t want to pay, as narrated in Fox and Faver (1984): “…that takes time 
that I could probably go ahead and use to do it if working on my own” (p.352). Our data 
suggested that collaborative projects took longer to finish (even if we are not sure about 




jeopardize the project by delaying its progress. Such slowdown has been the most 
common complaint about collaboration (Fox & Faver, 1984).  
Given this possible time lag and uncoordinated routine, collaboration can sometimes be 
less productive than imagined. This is well documented in Perlow’s study about Ditto’s 
software engineers (1997). She portrayed how individual productivity is hampered, and 
so-called “time famine” is created by unsynchronized collaborative behavior. 
Furthermore, collaboration can be more expensive than working alone. Collaborators 
need to stay in touch and engage in social interaction among their working group, 
resulting in expenses incurred, e.g. phone calls, mailing fees, and travel costs (Fox & 
Faver, 1984). Even though collaborators can share exp nses on data collection and 
management (Fox & Faver, 1984), and computer mediated communication has lowered 
the cost for communication (Walsh & Bayma, 1996), collaboration is not costless.  
Another cost that can easily be neglected is the personal and emotional one. Fox and 
Faver (1984) indicated that collaborators pay the price for maintaining good relationships 
among group members. It is inevitable that individuals will have different opinions on 
collaborative projects, which can be time- and energy-consuming to alleviate. They need 
to find a good equilibrium between different perspectives and personalities. Without 
commitment, it is too costly to go through such negotiations; and collaborative projects 
can always be called off. In this regard, we can expect that inventors with task motives 
would not like to participate in collaboration, as they are focused on the puzzle itself. 




only hampers their problem-solving methodology.      
However, collaboration can offer some degree of satisfaction in enhanced knowledge or 
self-competence through the act of providing knowledge to others (Kankanhalli, Tan & 
Wei, 2005; Wasko & Farag, 2005). Previous studies repo ted that employees with 
intrinsic motivation are more likely to participate in collaborative behaviors because it is 
associated with employee willingness to create a positive work environment (Deci & 
Flaste, 1995). Lin (2007) argued that a sense of competence or confidence could induce 
employees to involve themselves in collaboration. Moreover, through collaboration, an 
inventor can attain competencies and skills that had been lacking. The specialized 
technical capability of someone else may help with solving problems that a sole inventor 
would not have been able to achieve otherwise (Dyer & Singh, 1988).  
Through sharing relevant knowledge, ideas, suggestions and expertise with one another, 
individuals add skills and competencies that help to solve problems (Hagstrom, 1967). 
Allen (1984) noted that one distinct feature of collaboration is “the exchange and 
circulation of ideas and practices among distributed n tworks of individuals located in 
diverse settings” (Powell & Giannella, 2010). In relation to social structure, Powell (1990) 
mentioned that collaboration gives timely access to quality resources and information. 
According to him, collaborative network structure is governed by the norm of reciprocity 
and reputational concern. Due to the reciprocity and “freer” environment that network 
entails, exchanged knowledge and information is considered to be better in quality than 




colleagues (Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, 1996) evidenced that, in the biotech industry, 
where knowledge matters in engendering competitive advantage, knowledge is created 
under the unstructured form instead of a tightly restricted organizational form. Because 
the network offers timely access to resources and information, it becomes the locus of 
innovation, not the individual firm, especially in a knowledge-based economy. They 
further argued that biotech firms are at a competitiv  disadvantage if they are not able to 
participate in “learning networks” (Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, 1996). Therefore, 
having and maintaining a collaborative network may be critical in order for engineers and 
scientists to be productive. Since it is not based on hierarchical structure, reciprocating 
and being respectful toward fellow collaborators is highly regarded as well. The sense of 
reciprocity, one of the founding mechanisms of thisnetwork structure, encourages 
employees to take part in collaboration, and thus enables long-term mutual cooperation 
(Bock, Zmud & Kim, 2005; Kankanhalli, Tan & Wei, 2005; Lin, 2007). Ongoing 
collaborations can develop trust, reduce uncertainty, and prevent shirking responsibilities, 
which can alleviate the high transaction costs associated with collaboration. Then, we can 
argue that employees who seek satisfaction from solving problems could positively affect 
collaboration.  
Furthermore, collaboration saves time because certain expertise makes it easy to solve the 
problem (Fox & Faver, 1984), and helps reduce trials and errors. According to Fox and 
Faver (1984), one interviewee in their paper said that technological change was one of 




researchers are required to obtain new information, and collaboration can aid that process. 
Also, Thorsteindottir (2000) indicated that collaboration permits use of expensive or 
unique equipment that is not otherwise available. Therefore, having access to certain 
equipment through collaboration has become necessary if researchers lack it. In other 
words, collaboration can not only increase efficieny (Heffner, 1979), but also the 
effectiveness (Presser, 1980) of the work. Aside from special expertise and explicit 
knowledge, it should be noted that tacit knowledge can be transferred through 
collaborative activities (Beaver & Rosen, 1978; 1979). Nonaka (1994) suggested that 
socialization, observation, and apprenticeship could be used to transfer tacit knowledge, 
and the relationship between advisor and graduate student is a good example of a 
situation where tacit knowledge is passed on (Bozeman & Corley, 2004); industry 
researchers are also expected to share their tacit knowledge when working together. 
In summary, we suspect two possible effects of taskmotive on collaboration. First, task-
oriented inventors are less likely to participate in collaboration because they are inclined 
to solve problems by themselves. Also, considering the cost associated with collaboration, 
task-motivated inventors would be less likely to participate in collaboration because it 
could decrease their focus on the problem. Second, task-oriented inventors could be more 
likely to participate in collaboration because it gives them competent and quality 
information to enhance their own problem-solving capabilities. In this dissertation, we 
propose that innate personal disposition toward solving problems would win over the 




control over their behavior (Amabile et al., 1994), it is expected that they would not be 
willing to sacrifice their work preference, even if collaboration offers a wealth of 
information. Moreover, satisfaction from solving problems is where they are focused, so 
inventors with task motives may not enjoy receiving a y sort of support. Therefore, we 
propose to test following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis I: Task motives are negatively associated with collaborative activity. 
Based on the positive effect of extrinsic rewards on w rker participation (Fenwich & 
Olson, 1986) and goal expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), it has been suggested that 
employees would be stimulated to collaborate when accompanied by extrinsic reward or 
incentive. Employees are expected to participate in collaborative behavior after weighing 
the cost and the benefit associated with collaboration. Here, the cost would include time 
and physical or mental effort associated with the behavior; the benefit would be possible 
organizational reward and creation of a sense of indebtedness for future collaboration 
(Lin, 2007). Based on incentive theory, Lawler (198) suggested that a knowledge 
provider’s decision to participate in the collaboration is found to be most predicted by a 
pecuniary motive. Osterloh and Frey (2000) also mentioned that an extrinsic reward such 




contribution cannot be guaranteed. Based on the argument of Amabile (1993),5 Bartol 
and Srivastava (2002) theorized that extrinsic rewad may hamper knowledge sharing to 
the extent that collaborators are not able to generate as many creative ideas. There is 
limited empirical research, but Lin (2007) found that expected organizational reward did 
not significantly increase employees’ collaborative behavior. 
As such, it is assumed in this dissertation that the pecuniary motive would not affect 
much of the collaborative activity. Moreover, collaboration is not cheap, both physically 
and emotionally. Sometimes, collaboration is so loosely structured that it can be stressful. 
The relationship between collaborators may be too informal to specify individuals’ 
responsibility. Not knowing what they are responsible for could lead to a lack of 
commitment to the work (Fox & Faver, 1984). Moreover, Cummings and Kiesler (2007) 
noted the importance of coordination in predicting the success of a collaborative 
performance. If not managed properly, the diversity of the collaborative team can 
jeopardize the project by creating inefficiencies. Taking the coordination cost as well as 
possible under-performance into consideration, pecuniary-motivated inventors may 
hesitate to take part in collaboration. Even if the project is successfully finished, it has to 
go through a much more diverse screening process in order for it to be evaluated (Hessels 
& Lente, 2008). Furthermore, collaborators may need to share the reward once it is 
                                                 
 
5 That extrinsic reward has positive effect on straightforward activities that require no creativity, while 




successfully commercialized. This would strongly dissuade monetary-oriented inventors 
from collaboration. After weighing the pros and cons of collaboration, inventors with the 
pecuniary motive may choose not to collaborate. Hence, it is expected that the pecuniary 
motive would not significantly affect collaborative activity. 
Hypothesis II: Pecuniary motives have no significant effect on collaborative 
activity. 
Working with well-known entities can improve exposure to the community. Stuart et al. 
(1999) called it “endorsement,” and Podolny (2005) called it “status leakage,” because 
collaboration with the renowned can endow legitimacy to the unknown individual and 
their work. Therefore, it is likely that the recognition-motivated inventor would seek 
these collaboration opportunities.  
However, seniority may actually moderate the effect of the recognition motive on 
collaboration. For inventors with recognition motives, collaboration may not seem 
desirable for both the experienced and the inexperienced. In the phenomenon known as 
the Matthew Effect, the renowned scholar will get more fame, and the lesser known 
collaborator will get less (Merton, 1968;1973a). In the case of a junior researcher 
working with a famous researcher, both being listed as co-authors, it is possible that the 
less-renowned co-author will not receive the credit they deserve. No matter how the work 
was distributed, it is conceivable that the famous party has influenced the output more 
than the junior. Visibility is gained and the famous researcher lends credibility to the 




name. This is partly because of the difficulty in assessing contribution to the work, but 
also because of the cumulative advantage of the well-known entity. Moreover, 
considering the possibility that the famous name may be solely rewarded, a recognition-
motivated inventor may not be inclined to work with that person.  
On the other hand, from the senior’s perspective, collaboration may not be beneficial 
because their productivity is already well known, ad collaboration does not greatly 
increase their performance (Bozeman & Corley, 2004). Nonetheless, they already have an 
established network for collaboration, and are invited to collaborate in order to take 
advantage of their expertise, visibility or status (Stuart, Hoang & Hybels, 1999). 
Moreover, a collaborative network is known to help firms exploit market opportunities. 
Through collaboration, individual inventors can acknowledge the technological 
competency of each other, so that former collaborators can become consumers of the 
invention in the future (Stuart, Hoang & Hybels, 1999). Not to mention that the trust built 
among collaborators helps aid streamlined commercialization. Empirically, it has been 
shown that networks formed during the explorative stage are more likely to create 
networks for the commercialization stage of the innovation (Powell, Koput & Smith-
Doerr, 1996; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). In other wods, senior researchers who have a 
record of success through collaboration are expected to prefer other collaborations 
because they are aware of the increase their reputation will see in the firm due to 
successful commercialization. Moreover, network argument also claims that social 




transaction cost. Through repeated interactions, collaborators can develop trust, and are 
encouraged to share knowledge and information. Formal and informal knowledge shared 
in the network helps collaborators to reduce uncertainties, and the trust built in the 
network can prevent opportunistic behavior. Therefore, as inventors’ seniority increases 
and their collaborative network ripens, collaboration grows less cumbersome. For 
inventors who have a higher recognition motive, a moderation effect is strongly expected, 
since broader and larger collaborative activities grant them a better reputation in their 
field. Therefore, we propose that seniority moderates the effect between the recognition 
motive and the propensity toward collaboration.  
Hypothesis III: Recognition motives are positively associated with the instance of 
collaborative activity.  
Hypothesis III-A: The relationship between recognitio  motives and 
collaborative activity is moderated by an inventor’s tenure (interaction effect).  
Inventors with firm motives are expected to be more lik ly to collaborate. Collaboration 
can generate a sense of helpfulness, and it has been suggested that it is positively related 
to knowledge sharing (Osterloh & Frey, 2000). Here, th  sense of helpfulness resonates 
with prosocial motivation, so we suggest that a firm motive (equivalently referred in this 
dissertation as organizational commitment and prosocial motivation) increases 




Collaboration helps inventors remain connected to the community where they belong and 
alleviates a sense of isolation (Fox & Faver, 1984). Fox and Faver (1984) argued that 
some individuals can become detached from the scientific community, especially if the 
scientist is in a marginal group, such as women and scholars with heavy teaching loads in 
academia. Collaboration can ease this tension between their roles in research and other 
performances. Collaboration can also help them to keep in touch with research by 
providing opportunities to view current discourse on their research topics. Presser (1980) 
showed that collaboration and favorable review is highly associated with researchers in 
non-doctoral degree departments. This suggested that marginal members of the 
community are more likely to collaborate. In fact, our data shows a similar result. Even 
though female inventors comprise about 5% of our sample (100 out of 1854), they are 
more likely to have a greater number of co-inventors, co-invent within the firm, and co-
invent with universities (significant at α < .05 level). It also means that collaboration 
fosters a sense of belonging, camaraderie, and companionship in work. In their interviews 
(Fox & Faver, 1984), one female professor in a non-d ctoral program noted that she 
didn’t “want to buy expertise; I want to buy company” (p. 351). Therefore, we suspect 
that many work units are arranged at the team levelbecause collaborative activities give 
people the chance to satisfy the need of companionship, as the above quote suggests. As 
such, we expect inventors with a firm motive who are inclined to feel secure within the 




Kogut and Zander (1996) argued that a firm is different from a market because a firm 
coordinates, communicates and learns not only physically, in locality, but also mentally, 
in an identity. Sharing the same identity helps firms to lower the cost of communication, 
and to create explicit and tacit rules of coordination. Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) also 
claimed that individuals who shared the same identity with a larger collective created, 
combined, and transferred knowledge much more effectively. In fact, previous research 
argued that intrinsic motivation can be aligned with the firm’s strategic goals, shared 
purposes, and the fulfillment of norms for its own sake (Osterloh & Frey, 2000). Because 
of alignment with employees and the firm, intrinsic motivation serves as an 
organizational advantage through lowering transaction costs and raising trust (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998). Quigley et al. (2007) described trust in relation to commitment, and 
claimed that trust was found to help collaboration (Szulanski, Cappetta & Jensen, 2004). 
With that said, we argue that collaboration should take place much more actively within 
the firm, because it is clear that employees from the same firm are more likely to share 
the same identity and goals as the firm. Szulanski and colleagues (1996; 2004) mentioned 
the ambiguity in recognition/reward-sharing and the amount of effort required for the 
knowledge-sharing to impede collaboration. However, inventors with firm motives would 
care less about who gets what from the collaboration. Rather, they would focus on the 





Moreover, collaboration within the firm can help protect confidentiality. Since inventors’ 
behavior signals their pledge to the organization, they would not want to share the 
property rights with collaborators working outside of their firm. It would not be 
beneficial to the firm in that regard, so the inventor with a firm motive would be less 
likely to co-invent with an external entity.   
Hypothesis IV: Firm motives are positively associated with collaborative activity. 
Hypothesis IV-A: For inventors with firm motives, the difference in collaborative 
activity is larger for internal collaboration than for external collaboration 








To investigate our research questions, we have collcted the novel data consisting of 
multiple data sources, including a U.S. inventor survey and archival datasets such as 
USPTO CASSIS. The major data is the “The Georgia Tech/RIETI 2007 Inventor Survey: 
Inventors and Their Inventions” (The GT/RIETI Survey, 2007). Patent documents are 
used a number of times to examine recombination of technology components (Fleming, 
2001; Gruber, Harhoff & Hoisl, 2012). The next section describes the GT/RIETI Survey 
and additional archival data regarding its sampling design, survey instruments, and the 
variables used for this study. 
3.1 Data 
3.1.1 The GT/RIETI 2007 Inventor Survey 
This project used a unique dataset based on a nationally representative survey of 
inventors in the U.S. “The Georgia Tech/RIETI 2007 Inventor Survey: Inventors and 
Their Invention” was conducted in the summer of 2007. The population was the 32,390 
U.S. patents that had been applied for at the European Patent Office (EPO) and Japanese 
Patent Office (JPO), and that were granted by the U.S. Patent Office (USPTO), with 
priority years from 2000 to 2003 (inclusive), and having at least one inventor with a U.S. 
address. Those patents were included in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 




patents that the patent owners feel have significant v lue (enough to take on the expense 
of filing a patent in three jurisdictions) and a potential global market.  
However, we should note that not all inventions are patented, and that patent propensities 
vary by industry, so we should be careful when making inferences from this population 
(Cohen, Nelson & Walsh, 2000b). Specifically, this population is not a random sample of 
the S&E workforce, but rather represented that subset of inventors who had successfully 
created a patented invention (and likely, a fairly valuable invention). Still, this population 
represents a significant subset of inventors, and yiel ed U.S. inventors with global 
patents and therefore can be thought to consist of especially important patents with higher 
chances of commercialization. Thus, if inventors with specific motives were especially 
active in this population of inventors, this is stronger evidence that they have made a 
significant contribution to the U.S. innovation system than we would get from a random 
sample of all U.S. patents, which would include many trivial and low-value patents (cf. 
Harhoff, 1999; Gambardella et al., 2008) (Gambardella, Harhoff & Verspagen, 2008; 
Harhoff et al., 1999). 
Note that this sampling strategy did not distinguish between those in an R&D function, 
those having an S&E degree, or even invention as a primary work activity. Instead, this 
sample consisted of those who had actually invented. Also, by surveying inventors about 
specific patents, we were able to link inventor characteristics (such as education and 
experience) with invention characteristics (such as the value or commercialization of that 




firm characteristics (such as size), which gave us a more detailed picture of the 
contribution of inventors’ motives (net of other predictors of valuable inventions).  We 
also directly linked our survey data to bibliometric indicators (such as novelty, forward 
citations and number of inventors), so that our study could combine the strengths of prior 
survey-based studies with those of bibliometric-based tudies. 
We drew a systematic sample of 9,060 triadic patents with at least one U.S.-addressed 
inventor, stratified by the National Business Economic Research (NBER) technology 
class (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001). Taking the first available U.S. inventor as the 
representative inventor, we collected U.S. addresses from the EPO database or other 
sources as needed (e.g. phone directories). If we wer not able to find any valid address 
for that inventor, we took the next U.S. inventor of the patent and searched their U.S. 
address accordingly. Then, we randomly drew one patnt for inventors with multiple 
patents in our sample. Finally, we had 7,933 unique US-based inventors in our mail-out 
sample. In our analyses, we used sampling weights (inverse probability of selection) to 
adjust for multiple-patent inventors.  
The survey was operated in mixed-modes: web and mail surveys. In the survey packet, 
we included individualized, signed cover letters (including information on the web-based 
survey URL), questionnaires, and first-class stamps. Re pondents could choose to 
respond either by post or online. After sending the survey packet, follow-up letters, and a 
second-wave mailing of the full packet (Dillman, 1978), we received 1,919 responses 




adjusted response rate of 31.8%. Item non-response reduces the totals somewhat for 
specific items.  
Using data from the patent documents for the full set of respondents and non-respondents 
(N=7,933), we also conducted non-response bias analyses. We found little evidence of 
non-response biases that were either statistically or substantively significant. In particular, 
measures of collaboration (solo inventions: 27% for respondents, 26% for non-
respondents; average number of inventors: 2.71 for respondents, 2.80 for non-
respondents), links to universities (citations to non-patent literature: 2.4 for respondents, 
2.7 for non-respondents), and measures of patent value (forward citations, 2.2 for 
respondents, 2.4 for non-respondents) were all simiar (p<. 05, N=7933). The only 
significant differences were that inventors for which we only had a company address 
(instead of home address) were less likely to respond (4% of respondents had a company 
address versus 6% for non-respondents, p< .001) and those with more patents were more 
likely to respond (mean of 1.18 patents for respondents, 1.13 for non-respondents, 
p< .001), although the absolute differences are quite small. Thus, despite the modest 
response rate, we have some confidence that our sample is representative of the 
underlying population of US-based inventors on triadic patents. 
The GT/RIETI Survey focused across the innovative landscape, not limiting our analysis 
to high-tech sectors or to particular industries (such as biotech or IT). Our data allowed us 
to combine the inventor, project and company-level information from the survey with 




outcomes of each invention. Therefore, unlike prior w k, we were able to estimate 
patent-level models of invention performance, contrlling for detailed field, firm, 
inventor and project-level characteristics. We have multiple measures of patent quality, 
including: self-reports on whether the patent ranks i  the top 10% in terms of technical 
significance in its field, self-rated top 10% in economic value, and the number of forward 
citations, as well as patent novelty (described below). Our data also has information on 
the highest educational degree attained.  
3.1.2 Technology Subclasses Based on the Patent Archive 
In this dissertation, we used patent data from Lai et l. (2011) in order to form the 
creativity measure used in Chapter 4. Merging multiple data such as the U.S. Patent 
Office (USPTO) and the NBER, Lai et al. have collected diverse variables including our 
focal interest: the U.S. Patent Classification (USPC). According to Lai et al.(2011), they 
collected USPC from USPTO CASSIS, which reflects November 2009 concordance. 
USPTO organized all technology into approximately 100,000 categories. The dataset has 
information on U.S. utility patents granted from 1975 to the present. Instead of 
International Patent Class (IPC), we have used USPC as the proxy of creativity for the 
following reasons: Not only is there a well-established tradition utilizing USPC for 
measuring recombination (e.g. (Fleming 2001; Fleming, Mingo & Chen, 2007), but also 
the USPC is periodically updated and overwritten for past patents, a process by which 
data integrity between current patents and previous patents is maintained. Moreover, the 










In this section, we describe variables used for analysis to test the aforementioned research 
questions. We begin by introducing dependent variables, including innovative 
performance, new recombinations and collaboration. Next, we explicate independent 
variables, i.e., individual motives and education background. Control variables are also 
described. The list of variables and the data source is presented in Table 3.3. 
3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
New Combinations 
To examine if the subclass pairing in the GT/RIETI Survey is original, we began by 
constructing a pair of technology subclasses for eve y U.S. utility patent granted from 
1975 and filed by 1999, based on Lai et al. (2011). Since the GT/RIETI Survey included 
patents filed from 2000 to 2003 (inclusive), we used the cut point of patents filed by 1999. 
The database included 2,534,035 patents, and 435,133 unique pairs of technology 
subclasses. We took the GT/RIETI Inventor Survey 2007 as one cohort, and also created 
a pair of USPC technology subclasses for every sample in the survey. Then, we compared 
the GT/RIETI Survey subclass pairs to the base data, and constructed a dummy variable 
coded 1 if the subclass pair had never been introduced in the base data; otherwise 0.  
The results showed that the GT/RIETI Inventor Survey had 10,434 unique subclass pairs, 
and 1,004 patents with at least one new subclass pair. Again, the GT/RIETI Inventor 
Survey 2007 included a total sample of 1,919 patents. It may seem little bit high that 




account that our sample is based on the triadic patent family. Applying for a patent in the 
US, Japan and EU shows its significance in terms of technical value as well as 
commercial appropriability. Likewise, triadic patens can be more creative. In fact, the 
robust check on the creativity measure with a random sample of 100 U.S. patents from 
the USPTO showed that 37% of them had at least one new combination. This result 
provided us some confidence in our measure, contrasted with the fact that 52% of triadic 
patents in the GT/REITI survey had at least one newtechnology subclass combination. 
Moreover, we must take into account the fact that tere are many possibilities having at 
least one new combination. There are more than 100,00  USPC subclasses (Fleming, 
Mingo & Chen, 2007; Harris, Arens & Srinivasan, 2010), so we can assume that 
5,000,000,000 possible subclass pairs can be generat d  (100,000* 100,000/2). When we 
processed existing technology subclass pairs from utility patents granted from 1975 and 
filed by 1999, we came up with 10,789,819 technology subclasses. After creating pairs 
and cleaning duplicates, we found about 435,000 existing technology pairs for the given 
period. In other words, little less than 5 billion technology subclass pairs have still not 
been observed. Therefore, we are confident that our 52% of the triadic patent sample has 
at least one new combination.  
Moreover, Jung and Lee (2012) created a measure that indicated new recombinations of 
subclasses in the nanotechnology class. In their resea ch, the sample included all 
nanotechnology patents granted from 1980 to 2008. Their creativity measure indicated 




nanotechnology class (USPC Class 977), and 81% of nanotechnology patents included a 
new subclass pair across all technology subclasses.  
Since our dataset also encompassed all technology subclasses, we can validate that our 
creativity measure shows a reasonable rate of novelty. On top of that, we ran correlation 
analysis between new combinations and other variables in order to validate our measure. 
The result indicated that new combinations and technical significance are weakly (p < .10) 
but positively correlated (r = .058). Focusing on new combinations that only include 
primary subclasses, we found a stronger correlation (r = .090 at p < .05). Also, variables 
indicating strength of the patent, such as number of claims and number of cited U.S. 
patents, were correlated against new combinations (Gambardella, Giuri & Luzzi, 2007; 
Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2004). The result indicated that the number of claims was 
positively correlated with new combinations (r =.114), illustrating that new combinations 
have broader appropriability. 




Variables Mean S. D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 New Combinations 0.54 0.50
2 New Combiantions_Primary class 0.31 0.46 0.612 ***
3 Technical Significance 0.16 0.37 0.058 * 0.090 ***
4 Number of different USPC Subclass 4.54 3.38 0.474 *** 0.332 *** 0.110 ***
5 Number of other cited reference 2.47 8.49 -0.018 -0.008 0.103 *** 0.077 **
6 Number of claims 23.31 16.76 0.114 *** 0.066 ** 0.065 ** 0.062 ** 0.067 **
7 Size of the project 21.07 24.21 0.009 0.005 0.206 *** 0.034 0.041 0.008
8 Enhancing Technology Seeds 0.23 0.42 0.002 -0.026 0.035 0.006 -0.001 -0.026 -0.035
9 Creating Newline of Business 0.26 0.44 -0.038 -0.059 ** 0.067 ** -0.037 0.031 0.055 * 0.119 *** -0.323 ***





The GT/RIETI Survey had a unique measure for innovative performance, which had not 
been reported often. Our survey asked respondents if their patented invention was 
commercially used. Questions included information regarding the commercialization of 
an invention in a product/process/service by the applicant/owner; licensing by (one of) 
the patent-holder(s) to an independent party (including cross-licensing); and whether the 
invention was used to establish a new start-up company. These categories are not 
mutually exclusive (e.g., the same patented invention can both be used in-house and be 
licensed). Based on these categories, we constructed an aggregated commercialization 
variable by coding it 1 if the patented invention fell into any of these three categories, and 
0 otherwise. This was used as a proxy for innovative performance in this dissertation. 
Previous research has used salary (Stern, 2004) and number of patents generated 
(Sauermann & Cohen, 2010) as indicators of inventor performance. Unlike those 
measures, our measure directly tested whether the invention was put on the market. 
Therefore, it is expected that commercialization tells more about innovative performance, 
closer to what has been mentioned by Schumpeter (1942). A detailed analysis on 
commercialization of the patents, examining modes of commercialization and their 
correlates, is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but see a recent study by Jung for 





Previous work has measured collaboration by using co-inventorship, co-assignee, 
citations, licensing, joint ventures, and other methods (Arora, Fosfuri & Gambardella, 
2001; Branstetter & Sakakibara, 1998; Hagedoorn, 2003; Hicks & Narin, 2001; Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg & Henderson, 1993; Sakakibara, 2002). Whereas these formal measures 
captured the relationship between collaboration and in ovation, they were limited in the 
sense that codified information only reflects part of the underlying activities (Walsh & 
Nagaoka, 2009). For the sake of simple property rights, for example, some patents are 
only assigned to a single assignee, even if it is the result of a multiple firm collaboration 
(Hagedoorn, 2003).  
Having said that, in order to understand the cooperative behavior thoroughly, the 
GT/RIETI Survey measured collaboration in various ways. In addition to the information 
that was publicly available (i.e. co-assignee, citation to a prior patent or publication), the 
GT/RIETI Survey included a unique approach to measure inventors’ collaboration 
patterns. First, it questioned how many co-inventors were listed in the focal patent, and 
what types of organization the co-inventor worked for. The types of firm included same 
firm, suppliers (including contractors), customers and users, competitors, non-
competitors within the same industry, other firms, universities, government research 
organizations, hospitals, and private research organizations. In this way, we were able to 





In order to examine the collaborative pattern in more detail, we recoded survey measures 
into internal and external collaboration. The same firm categories were considered as 
internal co-invention and collaboration, and other categories were coded into external co-
invention and collaboration. We first made it as a dichotomous variable, “Any Co-
invention,” coded to 1 if there were any external co-inventors; otherwise, it was 0. Then, 





3.2.2 Independent Variables 
Motives 
We asked respondents to rate the importance of eleven factors when researching the focal 
patent6. Respondents rated the importance based on a 5-point scale from 1, not important, 
to 5, very important. Following is the list of each factor: 1) Satisfaction from solving 
technical problem, 2) Satisfaction from contributing to the progress of science and 
technology, 3) Job to invent, 4) Generating the value for the firm, 5) Career advances and 
opportunities for a new/better job, 6) Prestige/Reputation, 7) Recognition from co-
workers, 8) Recognition from others in the same profession (outside the firm), 9) 
Beneficial working conditions from my company (e.g., increased research budget), 10) 
Monetary rewards, and 11) For societal good.  
Even though we have only used samples from industry in our analysis, we compared the 
mean score of the motives between those in firms and those in public research 
organizations in order to validate our measure. As reported in Figure 3.1, inventors from 
public research organizations were significantly more motivated by seeking satisfaction 
from contributing to the field, but indicated a lower range of motivating factors in 
generating value for the firm. This result gives some confidence to our motive measures 
                                                 
 
6 The question was phrased as follows: During the research leading to the focal patent, how important to 




based on previous research about the academic S&E workforce (Sauermann & Cohen, 
2010). 
 
Figure 3.1 Mean Score of Motive, Firms versus Public Research Organizations 
 
Based on theoretical framework suggested by Ryan and Deci (2000), we initially 
conducted a factor analysis with two dichotomized motives: intrinsic and extrinsic 
motives. However, as reported in Table 3.2, we were not able to find that factor loadings 
aggregate based on the theory. Therefore, we employed a factor analysis with four 
motives: task, pecuniary, recognition, and firm motives. Results indicated that 




opportunities for a new/better job, 6) Prestige/Reputation, 7) Recognition from co-
workers, and 8) Recognition from others in the same profession (outside the firm).  
Table 3.2 Factor Analysis on Motives 
 
Moreover, an internal consistency test showed a Cronbach alpha score of .85, above the 
recommended threshold value of .70 (Nunally, 1978); therefore, the factor score was used 
for the propensity toward the recognition motive in the analysis. For other motives, the 
eigenvalue did not exceed 1; hence, we first employed a factor-based score method. 
Grounded on theoretical framework and the result of exploratory factor analysis, the task 
motive included: 1) satisfaction from solving technical problem, and 2) satisfaction from 
contributing to the progress of science and technology; the monetary motive included: 9) 
beneficial working conditions from my company (e.g., increased research budget), and 10) 
monetary rewards; and the firm motive included: 3) job to invent, and 4) generating the 
value for the firm. However, internal consistency turned out to be lower than the 
conventional level (reliability coefficient of .70 or higher); .52, .57, and .50, respectively 
for monetary, task, and firm motives. Therefore, we decided to employ a single indicator 
for each concept in order to fully describe which measure explains the most of the 
dependent variable, though we may introduce some measur ment error. Accordingly, we 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Uniqueness
Satisfaction of solving problem 0.3398 -0.1382 0.8654 0.1837 0.5056 0.045 -0.0296 0.7077
Contributing to science 0.4724 -0.1072 0.7653 0.2869 0.5494 0.0398 0.0948 0.6052
Job to invent 0.2017 0.4433 0.7628 0.1621 0.0976 0.4968 0.1079 0.7057
Generating value for the firm 0.0546 0.4257 0.8158 0.0537 0.0021 0.4777 0.0298 0.768
Career Advance 0.5978 0.3692 0.5063 0.6148 -0.0072 0.2974 0.1956 0.4952
Prestige 0.791 0.0718 0.3691 0.8099 0.1177 0.0577 0.0286 0.326
Recognition from co-worker 0.7758 0.1075 0.3866 0.8034 0.0706 0.0641 0.0682 0.3408
Recognition from the field 0.7652 0.011 0.4144 0.7231 0.1965 -0.034 0.1751 0.4067
Benefitial working condition 0.472 0.2819 0.6977 0.3825 0.1123 0.1582 0.4506 0.613




chose 1) satisfaction from solving technical problem, 4) generating the value for the firm, 
and 10) monetary rewards for task, firm and pecuniary motives, since they are stated 
much closer to the motives described in this study.  
Educational background 
We questioned the respondents’ educational backgrounds by asking in which discipline 
their highest degree was earned (such as Mechanical Engineering and Biochemistry). The 
response was provided in an open-ended format, and we recoded and aggregated them 
based on NSF Discipline Codes. Removing Social Science and Humanities majors 
(Sociology, Economics, History, Anthropology, Social Psychology, Psychology, 
Linguistics, Political Science, and other Social Scien es), we constructed a dummy 
variable indicating Science background, which included Physics/Astronomy, 
Mathematics, Chemistry, and Life Sciences (i.e. Biological Science, Environmental 
Biology, Agricultural Sciences, and Medical Sciences). Engineering background was 
comprised of Computer Science, Chemical Engineering, Civil Engineering, Electrical 
Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Matallurgy and Material Engineering, 
Aeronautical Engineering, and Other Engineering fields.   
Tenure of the Inventor at the Organization  
Tenure was included in the analysis because not only does it measure job specific skills 
and knowledge, but can also capture the cohort effect (Sauermann & Stephan, 2010; 




to indicate “the year in which this [highest] degree was earned.” We recoded the 
responses into a continuous variable by subtracting them from the patent filed year. In 
other words, the tenure variable indicated years of inventor experience after graduation, 
until the year that this focal patent was filed.7   
Inventing Hours 
We created a variable for measuring inventing hours, since motives affect effort put into 
the work, and effort is shown to exert a positive eff ct on higher productivity (Sauermann 
& Cohen, 2010). We asked about work hours in a week and the share of overall working 
time devoted to “inventing” or R&D activities at the time of invention. The question 
wordings were: “At the time of the invention, about how many hours did you work in a 
typical week?” and “Please tell us the share of overall working time you spent on 
‘inventing’ or on R&D activities at the time of the invention.” After coding as missing 
those that answered working more than 150 hours a week (N=2), we created an 
“inventing hours” variable by multiplying the hours worked in a week and the share of 
the work time spent on inventing. Here, we specifically picked inventing hours instead of 
work hours, because the former would reflect exact time devoted to invention. 
                                                 
 
7 We also have measures of individuals' age, tenure i  the current job, and tenure in the technical field of 
the patent. Since those variables are highly correlated with the tenure variable, we only include tenure in 





Prior literature reported that inventors with higher education levels had a more abstract 
understanding of problem solving (Gruber, Harhoff & Hoisl, 2012). Also, given the 
unlimited possibilities of recombination, inventors are bound to choose a technological 
component near their knowledge and experience (Fleming, 2001). Level of education 
attainment is also known to be associated with cognitive ability (Pelled, 1996). Moreover, 
according to Hargadon (2006), higher levels of education raise the possibility of 
boundary-spanning activities. Therefore, higher education, which reflects in-depth 
knowledge and experience as well as higher cognitive ability, is particularly expected to 
increase the propensity of technology recombination.  
We asked, “When the research leading to this patent was conducted, your highest degree 
was...” Six categories for answer ranged from “High sc ool or lower” to “PhD, MD or 
equivalent.” We then created dummy variables standing for bachelor’s, master’s, and 
PhD degrees. Advanced degrees such as master’s and PhDs were included in the model, 
and bachelor’s degrees became the exclude category.  
3.2.3 Controls 
Technical Significance 
We asked respondents to rate their patent’s technical significance in the U.S. to examine 
the value of the patent. Respondents ranked the patent (compared to other inventions in 




between top 25% and top 50%, and the bottom half. According to previous studies 
conducted in Europe and Japan, self-reported patent values were found to be closely 
matched with expected correlates of value, such as inventor-months devoted to the 
project, commercialization of the invention, citations to the patent, and inventor self-
assessment of the monetary value of the patent (Giuri, Mariani et al., 2007; Nagaoka & 
Walsh, 2009).  
Size of the project 
We built a control for the inventor months used in the project that produced the patented 
invention based on a question in the survey. It was an ordinal variable created from the 
question, “Approximately how many man-months did the research leading to the focal 
patent require?” From nine answer categories, ranging from “less than one man-month” 
to “more than 97 man-months,” we took the median value nd recoded it accordingly. 
Types of R&D  
Using the survey, we were able to discern if the pat nt was invented for creating new 
lines of business, enhancing existing lines of business or expanding the technology base 
of the firm/long term cultivation of the technology seeds. Patents resulting from projects 
designed to strengthen the company’s technological base might have lower 
commercialization. Accordingly, we created the dummy variable “new line” and 
“enhancing technology base.” We coded 1 for “new line” when the respondent indicated 




the respondent answered that the invention was created for the purpose of cultivating 
technology seeds for the firm. Having those two dummy variables in the model, the 
exclude category became “enhancing existing line of business.”   
Number of Inventors 
The number of inventors on a patent application is one of the measures for examining the 
resources put into in producing focal invention. The number of inventors was collected 
from the patent documents registered at the U.S. Patent Office.   
Size of the organization  
The size of the organization is likely to affect dependent variables, particularly 
commercializing behavior. For example, Gambardella et l. (2007) asserted that the size 
of the firm is an important indicator for a company’s propensity in licensing. Cohen and 
Klepper (1996) summarized consistent findings of early studies that R&D investment 
increases as a firm size increases, but the innovation output (mostly examined by using 
patent counts) decreases disproportionately as firm size increases. Furthermore, it would 
impact collaboration pattern. Since small firms may be more protective of their 
intellectual property, they may be less likely to externally co-invent. On the other hand, 
because they have fewer resources, they may have greater need to collaborate. Also, firm 
size is likely to affect the value of the patent (since small firms may be more constrained 
in their propensity to patent, focusing only on themost valuable) and the 




likelihood of engaging in strategic patents (such as blocking patents or defensive patents, 
which may be of low value and unlikely to be commercialized) (Cohen, Nelson & Walsh, 
2000a). 
Thus, we included a control for organization size, using three dummy variables: 1) Large 
firm, coded 1 if the inventor belonged to a large firm (defined as having more than 500 
employees) at the time of invention and 0 otherwise; 2) Small firm, coded 1 if the 
respondents belonged to a firm with less than 100 employees, and 0 otherwise.  
Belonging to a medium-sized firm (100-500 employees) was the excluded category.  
Strength of Patents 
In this dissertation, we employed two variables to measure the strength of patents: the 
number of different technology classes and the number of claims. The number of 
technology classes has been used in previous studie (Gambardella, Giuri & Luzzi, 2007; 
Jung, 2009) to measure the strength of patents. Also, it is considered a measure of 
complexity of technology (Nerkar & Shane, 2007).  
Number of claims is also a measure of patent scope (and hence value) (Lerner, 1994). 
Since each claim is considered an independent patent (To g & Frame, 1994), the number 
of claims is sometimes used as a proxy for breath of utility or applicability of the patent. 





We employed controls for technology sectors (using dummy variable controls, five 1-
digit NBER categories with “Miscellaneous” as the excluded category) based on the 
assumption that there may be a difference in the gen ral trend by specific technology 
sectors. For example, there are likely to be higher rates of commercialization in particular 
technologies.  
Additional controls 
We used patent-filed year fixed effects. Our patent fili g years span 2000 to 2003. 
Additionally, we used sampling weights, calculated as the inverse probability of selection 
of that patent divided by the mean probability of selection, so that inventors with multiple 
patents (hence a lower probability of having a given patent selected for the survey) get 
greater weight in our analysis. This weighting produced unbiased estimates of the 








Dependent Variables   
Commercialization Dummy variable coded 1 if the patent is commercialized  GT/RIETI 
Survey 
New Combination Dummy variable coded 1 if at least one pair of technology 
subclasses is never introduced between 1975-1999 
USPTO, 
Lai et al. 
Collaboration Any Internal  
Co-inventor 
Dummy variable coded 1 if there is any outside co-inventor 
formally listed in the patent document 
GT/RIETI 
Survey 
 Number of Outside 
Co-inventors 




 Any Internal  
Co-inventors 
Dummy variable coded 1 if there is any internal co-inventor 
formally listed in the patent document 
GT/RIETI 
Survey 
 Number of Internal 
Co-inventors 




Independent Variables   




 High motive Dummy variable coded 1 if a inventor responded such 
motive is important and very important 
GT/RIETI 
Survey 
Educational Background Major discipline of the invetor: science or engineering GT/RIETI 
Survey 
Tenure of the Inventor Continuous variable indicating inventor experience from 
graduation to the patent filed year 
GT/RIETI 
Survey 




Controls   




Inventor Education Highest degree earned GT/RIETI 
Survey 




Types of R&D Dummy variables indicating the project is aimed to 1) create 
new line of business, and 2) cultivate technology seed. 
Excluded category is for enhancing existing business 
GT/RIETI 
Survey 
Number of Inventors Number of inventors on the U.S. patent PATSTAT 
Size of the Organization Dummy variables indicating the size of the firm: large firm 
means more than 500 employees, small firm means less than 
100 employees. Excluded category is the medium sized f rm 
GT/RIETI 
Survey 
Technology Dummies Dummies of six technology fields are included: Chemical, 
Computer & Communication, Drug & Medical, Electrical & 
Electronic, Mechanical, and Others. Excluded category is 
the “others” 
PATSTAT 




3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Out of the total 1,919 patents in the GT/RIETI Survey, this dissertation is only focused 
on industry R&D inventors with science and engineering backgrounds, decreasing the 
sample size to 1,232 cases. We further removed cases that had missing values for motives, 
reducing our sample to 1,175. This is the base number for our descriptive statistics. 
Moreover, we used sampling weight to better estimate the expected value of the measures 
for descriptive statistics. For the analysis of each chapter, we removed cases that had 
missing values in dependent variables, so that eachchapter has different total cases.    
To begin, we have summarized descriptive statistics in Table 3.4. About 61% of patents 
in the sample were commercialized, including the forms of licensing and startup 
companies. Again, we identified a patented inventions commercialized if it was (a) 
commercialized in a product/process/service by the pat nt applicant or owner of the 
patent; (b) licensed out or cross-licensed by one of the patent holders to an independent 
party; or (c) commercially exploited by the responde t or any co-inventors for starting a 
new company. At first glance, it seems that 61% of the sample being commercialized is 
high. However, taking into account that our sample was made up of triadic patents, 
applied for both in Europe and Japan, and then granted i  the U.S., this sample has high 
potential for commercialization.  
As to the new combinations, about 53.6% of the patents in the sample had at least one 
new USPC subclass combination. Again, after comparing that with the result of Jung and 




reasonable that we might get a number this high from the triadic patent sample. In terms 
of the collaboration measures, we took advantage of the GT/RIETI Survey in order to 
investigate collaborative behavior in various ways. Registered number of inventors for 
the focal patent in USPTO was 2.8 on average, and solo inventors generated 
approximately 25% of the sample. Approximately 11% of the sample had at least one co-
inventor from outside of the firm, and 71% of the sample had at least one co-inventor 
from the same firm. Detailed descriptions of the new combinations and collaboration 
measures are presented in the following sections.    
Looking at the individual-level statistics, we found that a significant number of 
inventors—50%—hold a PhD, and another 25% had a master’s degree as their highest 
degree earned. As for educational backgrounds, about 43% of the inventors were science 
majors, and 57% of the sample had an engineering degree (with social science and 
humanities excluded). Female inventors only accounted for less than 5% of the sample, 
and the mean age of the sample was 46 years. On average, inventors worked 26.3 hours a 
week on inventing, which was calculated by multiplying the hours worked in a week and 
the share of the work time spent on inventing. Also, inventors had approximately 18 
years of experience after graduating with their highest degree, before filing the focal 
patent application. In terms of firm size, most of he inventors belonged to large firms 
with more than 500 employees (about 82%), but small-firm (with employees fewer than 




Project-wise, an average of 21 man-months were spent in creating the focal patent. About 
23% of the project was aimed at cultivating technological seeds, and 26% of the project 
resulted from the endeavor to create a new line of business in the organization. The 
distribution across technology classes was fairly even; nonetheless, the chemical sector 
stood out, accounting for 24% of the sample.  
Even though we did not include the following measure  in the model, we disclose these 
here for better understanding; after taking out outliers for a number of disclosures and 
publications, inventors produced 12.5 disclosures and 3.3 publications in the last 3 years 
of the focal patent on average. The number of forward citations were collected from the 
USPTO database, and, on average, 2.95 forward citations were made based on the focal 
patent.   
3.3.1 Individuals and Motives 
Motive is the main theme of this research, and as such, we now begin to describe the 
relationship between individuals and motives more closely. As explicated earlier, except 
for the factor loading of the recognition motive, we decided to employ single variables to 
indicate each motive because of the low internal consistency of factor loadings. Therefore, 
we have used the following survey options: 1) satisf ction from solving problem, 4) 
generating value for the firm, and 10) monetary reward. They represent the task motive, 
the firm motive, and the pecuniary motive, respectively. In addition to the original form 
of motive variables, we constructed a dummy variable indicating the percentage of 




responses which report “important,” and “highly important,” otherwise 0. 
As shown in Table 3.4, the mean score for the task and firm motives was relatively high 
compared to the pecuniary motive. Task motive showed th  highest mean score of 4.4, 
and pecuniary motive had the lowest mean score of 2.4. A similar pattern was observed 
with the dummy variable, in that those who considere  task motive as important or very 
important made up more than 86% of our sample. Thiswas consistent with earlier studies 
(c.f. Sauermann & Cohen, 2010) that showed intellectual ch llenge with a mean score of 
3.75 out of 4 on the Lickert scale; the highest score among motive indicators. Also, the 
firm motive was highly regarded by approximately 80% of the sample. On the other hand, 
pecuniary motive was important for only 21%. In Figure 3.2, we have shown variance of 
the motives with illustrating interquartile range, median and mean score for each 
indicator. We have observed that inventors with strong task motives as their median score 
illustrated that the task motive was “very important” based on the survey category. The 
firm motive turned out to be very strong for our sample, with interquartile ranges from 
“important” to “very important,” while the recognition motive was important for only 25% 
of the sample, and interquartile for pecuniary motive ranged from 1) very not important, 
to 3) neutral.  
We briefly illustrated differences in motive by some characteristics in Fig. 3.3 to 3.5. We 
have not observed much difference in motive between science and engineering majors. 
For recognition motive, inventors with science backgrounds had marginally higher mean 




results indicated that there are meaningful differences between small firm employees and 
non-small firm employees. For example, small-firm eployees had higher pecuniary and 
firm motives than large-firm employees (significant t p < .01). On the other hand, large 
firm employees were more oriented toward the recogniti n motive compared to the non-
large firm employees (significant at p < .01). However, there was no significant 
difference in task motive compared to firm size. Wehave also compared the mean score 
of motive to highest degree earned. The result showed that PhD inventors had higher 
orientation toward recognition motives than non-PhDs.  
In addition to the simple descriptive statistics, we ran ordered logit analysis in order to 
investigate what factors influence the shaping of mtives. Determining the antecedents, it 
has been shown that age, tenure, gender and education are associated with motive (Meyer 
& Allen, 1991; Mottaz, 1988). 
As shown in Table 3.5, level of education is one of the most important factors affecting 
inventor motives. For example, PhD inventors were more likely to have recognition 
motives, and less likely to focus on the firm’s performance, as were inventors with 
master’s degrees (though weakly significant at p < .10). Inventors with master’s degrees 
were also less likely to have task motives. Results also indicated that inventors with 
bachelor’s degrees were likely to be more concerned with a firm’s performance than of 
their own reputations. An inventor’s educational background (science or engineering) did 
not significantly affect their motives. As for those with longer tenure, a task motive 




negatively associated with an inventor’s tenure.  
In terms of the firm size, inventors from both large and small firms were more likely to 
have pecuniary motives, compared to inventors from medium-sized firms. In particular, 
small-firm inventors sought high-monetary rewards and were highly firm-oriented, by a 
significant margin. In contrast, small-firm inventors were less likely to care about 
recognition motives, compared to inventors in medium-sized firms. 
Mobile inventors who had changed their organizational affiliation within the last 5 years 
of the focal patent application seemed not to care about their own firm’s performance, but 
were concerned about their recognition. Female inventors (despite comprising only about 
5% of the sample) were more likely to be satisfied by solving problems when inventing 
than their male counterparts. 
Project characteristics showed that patents aimed at cre ting a new line of business for 
the firm were more likely to have lead inventors with task motives, compared to the 
patents resulting from an enhanced existing busines line. Also, inventors who were less 
concerned about the firm’s performance led more projects resulting in patents aimed at 





Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variable
Any Commercialization 983 0.608 0.489 0 1
New Combinations 1175 0.536 0.499 0 1
Solo Inventor 1175 0.249 0.433 0 1
Number of Inventors 1175 2.837 1.860 1 16
Any external co-inventor 1095 0.108 0.311 0 1
Number of external co-inventor 1095 0.143 0.495 0 7
Any Internal co-inventor 1095 0.713 0.453 0 1
Independent Variables
Satisfaction of solving problem 1175 4.372 0.841 1 5
Generating value for the firm 1175 4.198 0.912 1 5
Ribbon_Factor loading 1175 0.025 0.904 -1.637 1.969
Monetary reward 1175 2.421 1.264 1 5
Percent high_Solving problem 1175 0.866 0.340 0 1
Percent high_Firm performance 1175 0.814 0.389 0 1
Percent high_Ribbon 1175 0.261 0.439 0 1
Percent high_Monetary reward 1175 0.208 0.406 0 1
Science Education background* 1031 0.426 0.495 0 1
Controls
Technical Significance 970 0.158 0.365 0 1
Size of the Project 1119 21.074 24.211 0.5 97
Inventing Hour 1163 26.345 16.608 0 128
Inventors' Tenure 1140 18.553 9.935 0 49
Bachelor's Degree 1174 0.201 0.401 0 1
Master's Degree 1174 0.250 0.433 0 1
PhD Degree 1174 0.502 0.500 0 1
Seeds 1174 0.230 0.421 0 1
Newline 1174 0.259 0.438 0 1
Large Firm (employee >500) 1175 0.821 0.384 0 1
Medium Firm (100>, <500) 1175 0.065 0.247 0 1
Small Firm (employee <100) 1175 0.114 0.318 0 1
Chemical 1175 0.247 0.432 0 1
Computer & Communications 1175 0.193 0.395 0 1
Drugs & Medical 1175 0.144 0.352 0 1
Electrical & Electronic 1175 0.193 0.395 0 1
Mechanical 1175 0.124 0.330 0 1
Patent Filed Year 2000 1175 0.262 0.440 0 1
Patent Filed Year 2001 1175 0.327 0.469 0 1
Patent Filed Year 2002 1175 0.288 0.453 0 1
Patent Filed Year 2003 1175 0.117 0.321 0 1
Others
Male 1165 0.953 0.213 0 1
Inventor Age 1148 46.166 9.511 18 81
Number of Invention Disclosures last 3 years 1155 12.534 22.534 0 250
Number of Publications last 3 years 1154 3.347 8.636 0 130
Number of Forward Citation 1175 2.950 4.689 0 50
Weighted by sampling weights





Figure 3.2 IQR, Median, Mean Score of Motives 
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Figure 3.4 Mean Score of Motives by Firm Size 
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Table 3.5 Regression Results on Motives 
 
 
Solving Problems Firm Performance Ribbon Monetary reward
Ologit Ologit Regression Ologit
Tenure -0.060** -0.003 -0.021** -0.033
(0.010) (0.022) (0.010) (0.021)
Tenure_sq 0.002*** -0.000 0.000** 0.001*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
PhD Degree -0.086 -0.294* 0.254*** -0.007
(0.074) (0.165) (0.074) (0.156)
Master Degree -0.351* -0.330* 0.011 0.061
(0.080) (0.178) (0.080) (0.168)
Science Major -0.016 -0.091 0.034 -0.189
(0.061) (0.136) (0.061) (0.129)
Large firm (>500) -0.205 -0.029 -0.026 0.386*
(0.110) (0.238) (0.110) (0.231)
Small fi rm (<100) -0.490 0.745** -0.367*** 1.075***
(0.136) (0.308) (0.136) (0.293)
Mobile 0.214 -0.355** 0.149** 0.096
(0.067) (0.148) (0.067) (0.141)
Male -0.929** -0.310 -0.087 0.138
(0.133) (0.299) (0.133) (0.282)
Seeds 0.291* -0.314** 0.087 0.063
(0.069) (0.149) (0.069) (0.143)
Newline 0.416*** 0.071 -0.032 0.061
(0.066) (0.146) (0.066) (0.140)
Constant -6.080*** -4.823*** 0.180 -0.517
(0.500) (0.500) (0.193) (0.414)
Constant -4.875*** -3.686*** 0.595
(0.459) (0.459) (0.414)
Constant -3.405*** -2.205*** 1.722***
(0.442) (0.442) (0.417)
Constant -1.712*** -0.504 2.863***
(0.436) (0.436) (0.427)
Observations 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
Log Likelihood -1033.55 -1190.83 -1287.22 -1511.46
Wald Chi2 32.92 27.75 28.35
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.01 0.01
R-Squared 0.05
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Weighted by sampling weights
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3.3.2 New Combinations 
As stated earlier, we found that approximately 54% of the sample had at least one new 
pair of technology subclasses. Figure 3.6 shows how many new subclass pairings 
appeared in each patent application year. With the sampling weights, we have not 
observed any certain trend in recombination by patent application year. In fact, there are 
more than 100,000 USPC subclasses (Fleming, Mingo & Chen, 2007; Harris, Arens & 
Srinivasan, 2010), so we can assume 5,000,000,000 possible subclass pairs. When we 
processed existing technology subclass pairs from utility patents granted from 1975 and 
filed by 1999, we found 10,789,819 technology subclasses. After creating pairs and 
removing duplicates, we have found about 440,000 existing technology pairs for the 
given period. In other words, a little less than 5 billion technology subclass pairs are still 
unobserved. Therefore, we were not able to observe a decreasing trend in new 
combinations over the years, as there are simply too many possibilities.   
In figure 3.7, we have reported new subclass combinatio s by technology sectors, as 
defined by NBER technology sectors. For example, th C emical sector had the most 
new subclasses that appeared in our sample, while the Drugs and Medical sector had the 
least. Then, we examined any differences in the invntor’s level of education attainment. 
Regarding the highest degree earned, we have not observed a significant difference in the 
rate of new combinations (Figure 3.8). However, the result showed that inventors with 
bachelor’s degrees had generated a higher rate of nw combinations (56%). Considering 
the firm size (Figure 3.9), the rate of new combinations was also fairly evenly distributed 
(differences were not statistically significant).   
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As to the motives, we compared the rate of patents with at least one new combination 
between high motives and non-high motives (Figure 3.10). For those who indicated that 
the motive category was “important” or “very importan ,” we created a variable 
specifying high score motive, coded 1, otherwise 0. For the recognition factor loading, 
we recoded 1 for the high recognition motive in the top 25%, otherwise 0. We found that 
inventors with a high firm motive were strongly and positively associated with a higher 
rate of creating new combinations (p < .01). This was consistent with previous literature, 
in that inventors who feel secure in their organizations are more creative, as claimed by 
Pelz (1976) and Grant and Berry (2011).  
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Figure 3.7 Percent of New Combinations by Technology Sectors 
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Figure 3.9 Percent of New Combinations by Firm Size 
 
 



































 New combina on is significantly different from high mo ves and non-high 
mo ves at **p<.05, and *** p<.01 
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3.3.3 Commercialization  
Innovative performance has been measured by whether or not the patent was 
commercialized. Based on the same data, the GT/RIEIT Inventor survey, Jung (2009) and 
Huang (2012) have already extensively studied commercialization of the patent. Jung 
(2009) examined the uses and non-uses of patents at the levels of technology, 
organization and project. Huang (2012) studied commercialization of the patent at the 
regional level. This study is built upon their result , and these prior studies are used to 
generate a base-model of commercialization, from which we can explain the added 
effects of motive. Accordingly, we have not reported much about descriptive statistics of 
commercialization. However, this study contributes to the understanding the relation 
between commercialization and motive, as well as educational background; therefore, we 
add simple descriptive statistics.  
As presented in Figure 3.11, we have observed that motive and commercialization are 
somewhat significantly related. For example, the results indicated that inventors with 
higher task, firm performance, and pecuniary motives g nerated a higher rate of 
commercialized patents compared to those with low motives in those categories. This 
was consistent with our hypotheses A, B and D, which expected that task, firm, and 
pecuniary motives would increase innovative performance. Moreover, it was consistent 
with Sauermann and Cohen (2010) in that motives toward intellectual challenge, 
independence and money are positively associated with the number of patent applications 
generated by scientists and engineers. This was not urprising, as the result suggested that 
more motivated researchers produce better than their less-motivated colleagues. However, 
the result still matters in the sense that they suggest different motives have different 
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effects (we have not observed significant association between high recognition motive 
and commercialization of the patent). As for educational background, we have also 
observed that inventors with engineering backgrounds had a higher rate of 
commercialization (Fig. 3.12). 
  



























 Commercializa on is significantly different from high mo ves and non-
high mo ves at **p<.05, and *** p<.01 
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Figure 3.12 Percent of Commercialized Patents by Educational Background 
 
3.3.4 Collaboration 
Collaboration can be measured in various ways. Co-assignment, which involves sharing 
the property rights, and co-inventing have been widely used, in part because they can be 
measured using publicly available information (Hagedoorn, 2003; Hicks & Narin, 2001). 
In addition, formal or informal collaboration has been measured in the PATVAL-EU 
survey (Walsh & Nagaoka, 2009). In the GT/RIETI Inve tor survey, we included all of 
the preceding information in order to thoroughly capture cooperative R&D activities in 
the U.S. The result showed that about 75% of the sample consisted of “multiple 
inventors,” i.e. when a patent has two or more inventors. In figure 3.13, we have 
illustrated the percentage of solo inventor patents by firm size. It was revealed that about 
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25% of U.S. firm inventions have a single inventor listed in the patent, and small firms 
have significantly higher rates of solo inventors at about 33%.  
The rate of collaborative activities in relation to high versus non-high motives is shown in 
Figure 3.14. Collaborative activities were broken into solo inventor, external co-invention, 
and internal co-invention. Overall, we observed that motives affect patterns in no 
collaboration (measured by solo inventors), external co-invention, and internal co-
invention. For example, inventors with high firm motives were less likely to be solo 
inventors, and more likely to collaborate, especially if employed by the same firm. Also, 
inventors with high task motives were more likely to be solo inventors, even though the 
findings were not statistically significant. Result on external co-invention also supported 
the same trend. The task motive significantly influenced the decision whether or not to 
externally co-invent, in that those with high task motive were less likely to do so by 
choice. These findings resonated with our underlying assumption that task motivated 
inventors are less likely to collaborate. As to other motives, we found that inventors with 
high recognition and pecuniary motives were more lik ly to co-invent with entities 







Figure 3.13 Percent of Solo Inventors by Firm Size 
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3.4 Estimation Method 
For the following chapters, we employ two major types of dependent variables: Binary 
and Count variables. For the dichotomous dependent variables such as commercialization, 
new combination, co-invention, collaboration, and solo invention, we used logit 
regression models. The outcome variable is the probability of dependent variables based 
on a nonlinear function of the predictor variables. The logit model was estimated with a 
maximum likelihood procedure with the following specification:  
 
 
Where Xij is the vector of predictor variables and is the prdicted probability of the 
event. 
The other group of outcome variables was measured with count variables (the number of 
external co-inventors and number of internal co-inventors). Since they are non-negative 
integer counts with a limited range, the Poisson family of models is used. (Long, 1997) 
The Poisson model is specified as follows: 
 
Where y is a non-negative count variable, and the left side tands for the probability that 
x will generate the observed number of dependent variables. Even though we found over-
dispersion for count variables (i.e. the number of external co-inventor had a mean of 
ˆ Y 





0.143 and a variance of 0.245), we decided to employ the Poisson model because 
overdispersion was modest for all count variables.  
Additionally, we employed the multinomial logit in order to explain nominal outcomes. 
For Chapter 6, we recoded collaborative activities into nominal variables, including 
values such as no co-invention, internal co-invention, and external co-invention. By 
doing so, we expect that the results concisely illustrate the effect of motives on 
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3.5 Limitation of the Data 
One limitation of our dataset was that we were asking a representative inventor to 
respond for the whole project team. About 70% of the inventions in question had multiple 
inventors (with a mean of 2.7 inventors). Our sampling strategy targeted the first-listed 
U.S. inventor. In over 95% of the cases, this was the first inventor (and in 27% of the 
cases, the only inventor). Thus, we interpreted our sample as representing the “lead 
inventor” on the patent, and argue that this lead inventor had significant influence on the 
outcome of the project, such that the lead inventor’s characteristics (including motives, 
educational background and firm size) can be used to characterize the invention. For 
example, we coded patents as being generated by task-motivated inventors if the lead 
inventor (our respondent) reported having a high task motive. There may be additional 
inventors listed on the patent with other motives, which adds some measurement error to 
our classification. However, we have tried to mitiga e measurement errors as much as 
possible through conducting robustness checks with a solo inventors-only sample. 
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Creativity can be described as the creation of novel, valuable and nonobvious solutions 
(Amabile, 1983; 1988). This is very similar to the requirement of the patent: novelty, 
utility, and non-obviousness. Because of this definitio , we can assume that our entire 
sample is creative, as they have all been patented. However, borrowing the concept of 
“generative creativity” (Fleming et al., 2007, p. 446), which restricts creativity to the 
collection of new combinations (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Simonton, 1999), we propose to 
test the novelty of the patented inventions. We have examined how individual differences 
influence a patent’s usefulness, and whether organizational settings affect the relationship. 
In this chapter, we test the effect of motives on patent’s novelty following the same logic 
introduced in earlier chapters.  
Creativity is sometimes a matter of combination (Hargadon, 2008; Simonton, 1999). Ever 
since Schumpeter (1934) claimed that innovation is the “carrying out of new 
combinations,” (pp. 65-66), many previous research studies have echoed this notion. 
Thomas Edison was one famous example of an inventor wh  put things together and 
created a world-famous product. As is widely known, Edison was not the first inventor to 
create the light bulb (Israel, 1998); rather, he successfully combined the electric light, 
generators, wiring, materials, and business models (Hargadon, 2008).   
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Accordingly, we developed a creativity measure thatindicated whether the technology 
was recombined and introduced for the first time (Fl ming, Mingo & Chen, 2007). It 
created a unique dataset in addition to the GT/RIETI nventor survey. Not only is it 
expected to complement our survey, but it also promotes understanding of the effect of 
motive on creativity. Using this operationalization, we set up following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Task motives are positively associated with the creation of new 
combinations. 
Hypothesis 2: Pecuniary motives are positively associated with the creation of 
new combinations. 
Hypothesis 3. Recognition motives are negatively associated with the creation of 
new combinations. 
Hypothesis 4: Firm motives are positively associated with the creation of new 
combinations.  
4.2 Regression Results 
In this section, we present the regression results, beginning with the binary logit 
regression with the dichotomous dependent variable “New Subclass Combination.” We 
considered new combination as a measure of creativity. Regarding motives, we employed 
an ordinal variable, the original form taken from the survey.  
Table 4.1 represents the logit regression results on new combinations. Model 1 is a base 
model, and only includes control variables. The results showed a positive association 
between measures of strength of the patents (i.e. the number of claims and number of 
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USPC subclasses) and having at least one new pair of technology subclasses. Measures 
indicating strength of patents have been widely used in previous studies, including Jung 
(2009), who also utilized the GT/RIETI survey (Gambardella, Giuri & Luzzi, 2007; 
Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2004). These studies focused broader utility, since they 
described the scope of the patents. Nerkar and Shane (2007) have shown that the number 
of USPC subclasses was associated with commercializat on of academic patents. Note, 
however, that our dependent variable “new combinatio s” was created based on USPC 
subclasses. Therefore, the positive association between the number of USPC subclasses 
and new combinations suggested that the more subclasses found in the patent, the more 
novel pairing opportunities exist. As to the interpr tation of the result, consequently, we 
have illustrated the relationship between motives and new combinations after controlling 
for the numbers of subclasses in the focal patent. Moreover, we conducted a robustness 
check in the latter section of this chapter by employing the new primary technology 
subclass combinations. New technology pairs are created between a primary subclass and 
any of the other subclasses that are listed in the pat nt. As the first-listed in USPC 
subclass indication in the patent document, primary subclass had superiority among 
subclasses, and suggested the main technology associated with the patent. As such, it was 
a stronger measure of new combination, since primary new combinations only reflected 
the new combinations closest to the main technology.  
Also, as to highest degree earned, we expected that high education levels would 
encourage a propensity toward creating new combinatio s. Education brings more 
experience and the abstract understanding needed for creating recombination (Fleming, 
2001; Gruber, Harhoff & Hoisl, 2012), so we expected a positive relationship as the level 
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of education rose. However, in this dissertation, we found that inventors with master’s 
degrees were less likely to come up with new combinatio s, compared to inventors with 
bachelor’s degrees. Also, we found no significant association between PhD inventors and 
recombination compared to bachelor’s level inventors.  
In terms of firm size, the results evidenced that small-firm inventors were more likely to 
come up with a new technology subclass combination compared to medium-firm 
inventors. We found no significant difference between large-firm researchers and 
medium-firm researchers.  
With motive variables in the model, we found some int resting results. We expected that 
task-oriented motives would increase the creation of new combinations. In this 
dissertation, we measured creativity by operationalzing it as new subclass combinations. 
Overall, we found positive effects of task, pecuniary nd firm motives on the creation of 
new combinations, even though they were not statistically significant. As illustrated in 
models 2 and 6, we have not found any significant relationship between task motives and 
the creation of recombinations, whether regressed with or without other motive variables. 
The pecuniary motive also turned out to be positive, but a non-significant factor on 
creating new combinations. Previous literature suggested a mixed effect of pecuniary 
motive, in that it could decrease creative behavior (Amabile, 1988; 1996; Farr & Ford, 
1990; Fleming, 2001; Gruber, Harhoff & Hoisl, 2012) or could have no or even positive 
effect on innovative activities (Sauermann & Cohen, 2010). Our findings showed no 
significant effect, so we can suggest at least that pecuniary motives do not decrease 
creative activity.  
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We hypothesized that recognition motives would be negatively associated with the 
creation of new combinations in Hypothesis 3. Because of the importance of social 
approval when producing a new idea (Simonton, 1999), we expected that recognition 
motives would be negatively associated with creativ activity. Given that recognition 
motives particularly rely on social approval, we assumed that risk associated with 
creativity would affect recognition-driven inventors more strongly than it would 
inventors with other motives. Recognition factor loading was used to capture instances of 
the recognition motive. As expected, we found signif cantly negative associations 
between recognition and the generation of new technology subclass combinations.  
Firm motive, measured by “generating value for the firm,” had a positive association with 
the dependent variable. We expected that it would encourage the creation of 
recombination, and the result upheld our hypothesis 4. Even though we have not found a 
significant effect of firm motives in Models 3 and 6, the effect of firm motives is close to 
the conventional significance, level, with z-statistic  over 1.0. In other words, inventors 
aligned strongly with a firm motive were more likely to create new combinations. Based 
on previous literature (Andrews, 1979; Andrews & Farris, 1967; Oldham & Cummings, 
1996; Shalley, 2008), we conjectured that inventors with a high firm motive feel secure in 
being a member of an organization, therefore allowing their creativity to increase. 
Moreover, this aligned with the finding of Grant and Berry (2011) in that prosocial 
motivation – the desire to help others, and to maintain membership with a group of 
people they care about – strengthens creativity.  
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Questioning that task and pecuniary motives show no significant effect on new 
combinations, we hypothesized a mediating effect of work hours. Previous studies have 
found that intrinsic motives increase the work effort (Fredrickson, 1998; Levin & 
Stephan, 1991; Sauermann & Cohen, 2010). In general, mediation can be said to occur 
when: the independent variable significantly affects the mediator; the independent 
variable significantly affects the dependent variable in the absence of the mediator; the 
mediator has a significant unique effect on the dependent variable; and the effect of the 
independent variable on the dependent variable shrinks upon addition of the mediator to 
the model. Therefore, we employed Sobel-Goodman tests o examine whether a mediator 
carries the influence of an independent variable to a dependent variable (Sobel, 1982). 
What we found was that the mediation effect of work hours was small across motives (i.e. 
ranged from less than 10% to 0%). Direct influence of task motives on work hours was 
positively significant, but t-value was 1.85. This confirmed previous literature in that 
work hours were affected by task motives, but our result was not as significant as earlier 
studies. Therefore, we do not suspect that a mediation effect causes no effect on motives 
in regards to creating new combinations.  
Another interesting result was that, with all motives included in the model (Table 4.1, 
Model 6), we have found that a project’s goal of “creating a new line of business” 
decreases the generation of new combinations compared to that of “enhancing an existing 
line of business.” In other words, an invention that c me out of a project aimed at 
enhancing an existing line of business was more likely to produce new technology 
subclass combinations. A technology combination that has never been introduced may 
seem to be a “breakthrough,” but our results indicated otherwise.  
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Table 4.1 Regression Results on New Combinations 
Dependent Variable: New Combination (Y/N)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Solving Problem 0.105 0.161
(0.104) (0.106)




Monetary Rewards 0.033 0.085
(0.070) (0.077)
Technical Significance 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.027 0.010 0.024
(0.088) (0.088) (0.087) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088)
Size of Project -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Inventing Hour -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Number of Inventors -0.005 -0.001 -0.007 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044)
Inventor's Tenure -0.018 -0.016 -0.018 -0.022 -0.017 -0.019
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
(Inventor's Tenure) 2 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Master Degree -0.477* -0.465* -0.464* -0.469* -0.479** -0.440*
(0.243) (0.243) (0.244) (0.243) (0.243) (0.245)
PhD Degree -0.325 -0.318 -0.306 -0.283 -0.321 -0.227
(0.210) (0.209) (0.209) (0.212) (0.210) (0.211)
SEEDS -0.197 -0.215 -0.177 -0.176 -0.200 -0.185
(0.244) (0.243) (0.244) (0.244) (0.245) (0.243)
NEWLINE -0.322 -0.338 -0.325 -0.330 -0.331 -0.381*
(0.207) (0.209) (0.206) (0.205) (0.205) (0.205)
Number of claims 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.013**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Number of USPC class 0.673*** 0.675*** 0.672*** 0.682*** 0.672*** 0.685***
(0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066)
Large firm (>500) 0.176 0.185 0.171 0.161 0.169 0.140
(0.332) (0.330) (0.329) (0.333) (0.333) (0.328)
Small firm (<100) 0.799* 0.843** 0.763* 0.701* 0.778* 0.634
(0.409) (0.411) (0.409) (0.413) (0.412) (0.420)
Constant -4.976*** -5.440*** -5.559*** -5.050*** -5.058*** -6.605***
(1.102) (1.222) (1.191) (1.095) (1.105) (1.309)
Technology Class Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Patent Filed Year Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Observations 921 921 921 921 921 921
Log Likelihood -636.02 -636.02 -636.02 -636.02 -636.02 -636.02
Wald Chi2 151.89 150.71 150.12 166.68 151.79 166.09
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.30
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All Motives
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Weighted by sampling weights
Controls 
Only





4.3 Robustness Check 
Because we attributed one inventor’s motive to the w ole invention, we might introduce 
some measurement error. In order to examine the robustness of our findings, we 
conducted the same analysis only for the patents generated by solo inventors. As 
represented in Table 4.2, we are confident in our finding that only a firm motive 
positively affects the creation of new combinations. A ide from firm motives, solo 
inventor’s task, pecuniary or recognition motives rflected no significant relationship 
with new combination creation.  
Also, as described earlier, we ran regression analysis on primary technology subclass new 
combinations. Here, this stands for new technology pairs created between a primary 
subclass and any of the other subclasses listed in the patent. As the first-listed in USPC 
subclass indication in the patent document, primary subclass had superiority among 
subclasses, and suggested the main technology associated with the patent. Therefore, it 
was a stronger measure of the new combination, since primary new combinations only 
reflected the new combinations closest to the main technology. As described in Table 4.2, 
our findings were similar to those in Table 4.1.  
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Dependent Variable: New Combination (Y/N), Solo inventors Dependent Variable: Primary New Combination (Y/N)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5











Solving Problem 0.255 0.235 0.012 0.063
(0.252) (0.257) (0.096) (0.099)
Firm Performance 0.292 0.285 0.171* 0.184*
(0.202) (0.203) (0.096) (0.096)
Recognition 0.217 0.129 -0.188* -0.231**
(0.227) (0.273) (0.103) (0.117)
Monetary Rewards 0.128 0.048 -0.013 0.032
(0.168) (0.198) (0.074) (0.082)
Base Model Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Technology Class Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Patent Filed Year Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Observations 225 225 225 225 225 921 921 921 921 921
Log Likelihood -154.33 -154.33 -154.33 -154.33 -154.33 -570.24 -570.24 -570.24 -570.24 -570.24
Wald Chi2 122.43 123.52 122.31 121.97 125.19 96.63 99.17 97.88 96.99 102.32
Pseudo R2 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Weighted by sampling weights
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.4 Conclusion and Discussion 
In summary, we found that the following were positively associated with new 
combinations: task, pecuniary and firm motives, a project that aims to enhance an 
existing line of business, and small-firm inventors with bachelor’s degrees. These 
findings suggested that how we measured creativity ma have captured exploitation 
rather than exploration. Stemming from March (1991), while exploration relates to things 
captured by terms such as search, variation, experimentation, innovation and the pursuit 
of new knowledge, exploitation relates to refinement, selection and reuse of existing 
knowledge and resources. They share attributes such as learning, improvement, and 
acquisition of new knowledge (Gupta, Smith & Shalley, 2006), but exploitation focuses 
on an existing technological trajectory (Benner & Tushman, 2002). Given that our 
creativity measure was operationalized as new combinations of technology subclasses, 
we can say that new combinations are based on an existing technological trajectory 
because they are an assemblage of existing technology subclasses. Our results resonated 
with this differentiation, in that a project aimed at improving an existing line of business 
was positively associated with new combinations. Based on inventors and/or a firm’s 
existing competencies, new combinations are created.  
Moreover, the positive relationship between firm motives, bachelor’s degrees and new 
combinations supported our argument that new combinatio s capture exploitation. Since 
exploitation entails repetition and incremental changes based on established knowledge, 
bachelor’s degree-holding inventors who are highly committed to their firm are expected 
to continue engaging in those activities. Conventionally, higher-degree holders have been 
more responsible for exploring new projects because they are known to have an abstract 
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understanding of problem solving (Gruber et al., 2012). Additionally, employees with a 
high commitment to the organization were reported to have a lower turnover rate (Porter 
et al., 1974), and those with seniority in the organiz tion were considered to have 
redundant knowledge, routines and paradigms (March, 1991). Therefore, we claim that 
our results indicate that the creation of new combinations are closer to minor creativity 
than those considered as technological major “breakthroughs” (Mumford & Gustafson, 
1988).  
Previous literature has been more focused on how an idea is transferred and diffused than 
the process of idea generation (Damanpour, 1991; Fleming, 2001; Rogers, 1995). This 
dissertation adds to the discussion of how new ideas are generated, with particular 
interest in the individual differences. We found a positive effect of the task, pecuniary 
and firm motives on the creation of new combinations (even though they were not 
statistically significant). Also, the results suggested that recognition motives negatively 
influenced the creation of new combinations.  
These findings allude to the importance of attachment to the organization for industry 
scientists and engineers. We suspected that attachment to the firm mattered in increasing 
creativity, because they do not consider themselves as “estranged labor” (Marx, 1932). 
This sense of belonging can develop into commitment to the firm when, for example, 
supervisors seem to really listen to their employees, and their opinions are heard and 
considered when the company makes a decision (Andrews & Farris, 1967). Free from 
feelings of alienation or isolation, employees are ble to satisfy their need for security, 
and in this safe environment, enhance their creativity.  
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Therefore, this dissertation can contribute to the managerial implication, in that firms 
need to develop policies that reduce employee feelings of isolation or estrangement. 
Perceived organizational support (POS) (Podsakoff et al., 2000), perceptions of 
procedural justice, and participation in the decision-making process (Konovsky, 2000) 
have been reported to create a work environment that induces commitment to the 
organization. In order to build a sense of belonging, for example, Samsung has created a 
strong sense of cohort with fellow employees who got hired in the same year through the 
summer-camp-like program that began their employment. Also, increased mentorship in 
addition to desirable supervisory relationships would be a plus. Even though the system 
can generate “estranged labor,” individually targeted policy can mitigate this effect.  
It is also worth noting that we found a significantly negative association between 
recognition motives and new combinations. The results supported the assumption that 
there is risk associated with creativity, and this could hamper the creativity of R&D 
employees. Considering that recognition-driven inventors are more likely to depend on 
the approval of others, they can be more apprehensiv  about differences, and creating 
new ideas. In the firm level, creating work environments that protect R&D employees 
from encountering hard criticism might help to encourage recognition-driven inventors to 
come up with new ideas. Also, if inventors acknowledg  that unusual inventions can be 
taken seriously under any circumstances in their work setting, recognition-driven R&D 
personnel would be less likely to worry about losing their reputation, which, in turn, 
would increase creativity in inventors with recognition motives.   
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CHAPTER 5. MOTIVES AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF THE 




Employee motives have been identified as an important factor for generating high value 
innovation. Prior research findings indicated the importance of intrinsic motivation, in 
that researchers performed better when motivated by the task itself, and were satisfied by 
solving technical questions (Amabile et al., 1994; Sauermann & Cohen, 2010; Sauermann 
& Stephan, 2010). Empirical work showed that industry researchers chose companies 
providing a “scientific work environment,” even sacrifi ing their salary to do so (Stern, 
2004). Some experimental work in social psychology, on the other hand, indicated that 
performance was a function of the interaction betwen monetary rewards and intrinsic 
motivation (Amabile, 1996; Deci, Koestner & Ryan, 1999; Frey & Jegen, 2001; Wiersma, 
1992). Specifically targeted toward the motives of the S&E workforce, some studies also 
showed that both task and pecuniary motives played rol s in promoting productivity 
(Sauermann & Cohen, 2010; Sauermann & Stephan, 2010; Stephan & Everhart, 1998; 
Stephan & Levin, 1992). Following the prior work tha  examined the effect of motivation 
on performance in terms of salary (Stern, 2004) and pro uctivity (i.e., the number of 
patents generated) (Sauermann & Cohen, 2010), we examined the effect of motives on 
the rates of commercialization of inventions.  
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The relationship between motivational differences and educational background, 
especially under industrial settings, has received limited attention. Given the different 
natures of research and development regarding the nov lty involved in each work, it was 
conjectured that different forms of motivation might operate in different work settings. It 
was claimed that engineers and scientists hold different types of motivation (Kerr & Von 
Glinow, 1977; Miller, 1967; Pelz & Andrews, 1976; Ritti, 1968); engineers were more 
likely to assimilate the goals of the enterprise, while scientists were focused on satisfying 
their needs for scientific achievement. However, most of these studies were conducted 
decades ago. Also, the possible motivational differences derived from researcher 
educational backgrounds had been almost unexplored.  
To address this gap in research, we would like to examine firstly the influence of motives 
on innovative performance, and secondly, the difference in motives by educational 
background, and how these interact to affect performance. Innovative performance was 
measured by the commercialization of the invention. The first research question entailed 
the following set of hypotheses:  
Hypothesis A: Task motives are positively associated with commercialization of 
the invention. 
Hypothesis B: Pecuniary motives are positively associated with 
commercialization of the invention. 
Hypothesis C: Recognition motives are positively associated with 
commercialization of the invention. 
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Hypothesis D: Firm motives are positively associated with commercialization of 
the invention.  
We then investigated whether educational background makes any difference in 
commercialization of the invention, in relation to motive. Disciplinary training was 
measured as a proxy for educational background, and inventors were categorized as 
scientists and engineers based on training. Following the distinction between 
cosmopolitans and locals (Gouldner, 1957b; 1958; Merton, 1957), we set up the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis E: The improvement in innovation performance associated with 
recognition motives would be larger for inventors with science backgrounds than 
for those with engineering backgrounds (interaction effect). 
Hypothesis F: The improvement in innovation performance associated with firm 
motives would be larger for inventors with engineering backgrounds than for 
those with science backgrounds (interaction effect). 
5.2 Regression Results 
5.2.1 Motives and Commercialization of the Invention 
In this section, we present the regression results, beginning with the binary logit 
regression with dichotomous dependent variable “commercialization,” a proxy of an 
innovative performance.  
Table 5.1 represents the logit regression results predicting rates of commercialized 
activities based on the focal patent. Model 1 is the basic model with control variables. 
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The results showed a positive effect of the technical significance of the patent on its 
commercialization. As to the inventor’s tenure, it indicated a weak but negative 
association with commercialization. Previous research based on life-cycle models showed 
that scientists’ output, measured by publication, peaked during the career and declined 
over time (Levin & Stephan, 1991).  As Levin and Stephan mentioned, the model is 
compounded with age and cohort effect, which rendered it hard to untangle. This 
dissertation employed tenure after graduation in order to measure the skills and 
knowledge of the individual inventor,. However, we found no significant association.  
In addition, the base model indicated a negative association between an inventor’s 
education level and commercialization. In particular, PhD degree-holders were less likely 
to come up with a commercialized invention when compared to bachelor’s degree-
holders. We observed no significant relationship of master’s degree-holders on the 
commercialization of a patent. Also, in terms of the project characteristics, we found that 
inventions with the goal of “enhancing the technology base of the firm” or “long-term 
cultivation of technology seeds” were less likely to be commercialized, compared to 
inventions with the goal of “enhancing existing lines of business.” Cohen and Levinthal 
(1990) found that inventions built upon existing businesses were more likely to be 
commercialized because they are grounded on/by existing capabilities. Our findings 
supported this. Regarding the size of the firm, our results indicated that larger firms were 
less likely to commercialize the invention (at p < .05) compared to medium-sized firms 
(employees between 100 and 500).  
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When adding motive variables, we found some evidence to support our hypotheses. It 
had been expected that task motives would be positively associated with the 
commercialization of the invention in hypothesis A. We operationalized the task motive 
by using the survey category “satisfaction from solving problems.” The result in models 2 
and 6 indicated that, in general, task motives were positively associated with 
commercialization. The effect of task motive was signif cant after controlling for 
technical significance, strength of the patent, inventors’ level of education, firm size, and 
project size. It suggested that inventions generated from inventors with task motives were 
more likely to be commercialized, no matter how criti al the invention was. Also, 
regardless of the amount of resources invested, inventions produced with task motives 
were more likely to be put on the market. The negative effects of PhD inventors and seed 
project variables on patent commercialization remained the same across models. Note, 
however, that work hours were reported to be positively associated with 
commercialization of the patent, even though the significance was at p < .10. 
Pecuniary motives also positively influenced commercialization, supporting hypothesis B. 
The results in model 5 indicated that pecuniary motives had positive effects on innovative 
activities (at p < .05) after controlling for the value and strength of the patent, 
investments put into the patent, and inventors’ individual characteristics (see Table 5.1). 
Even though the significance reduced when introducing all motives in the model, it was 
consistent with previous studies in that both task nd pecuniary motives were important 
factors in positively affecting commercialization of the inventions (Sauermann & Cohen, 
2010; Chen et al., 1999). In other words, both autonomy to conduct research of their 
interests and financial security were essential for R&D employees. In particular, our 
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findings were meaningful given that the ultimate goal f the firm is profit. Furthermore, 
we directly measured the effect of the pecuniary motive on commercialization of the 
patent, which can generate profit for the company. I  this regard, this dissertation 
complements previous literature by suggesting a systematic reward structure for inventors 
in order to stimulate the commercialization of the invention of the firm.    
As for the recognition motive, we also expected that it would be positively associated 
with the commercialization of the invention. We operationalized the recognition motive 
by using factor loading of indicators like “career advance,” “prestige/reputation,” 
“recognition from co-worker,” and “recognition from the field.” As opposed to 
hypothesis C, our results showed that inventors who cared about rewards, ribbons and 
recognition were not significantly associated with the likelihood of commercialization 
(See Table 5.1, Model 4 & 6). We suspect this result i  due to the fact that inventors 
already have their recognition by having their name on the patent. The aforementioned 
interview conducted by Judge et al. (1997) suggested that what inventors want is the title, 
not the money. Also, Friedlander (1971) suggested that professionally oriented research 
scientists were more likely to regard their organiztions as a place that offered them 
facilities and opportunities for pursuing their work. Hence, appropriation of the patent 
would not matter for recognition-oriented inventors. Rather, they are more likely to take 
advantage of what organizations provide them, and try to obtain recognition out of it. 
Aoshima and Kubota (2011) illustrated a good example of the aforementioned proclivity 
by comparing the cases of Fujitsu and IBM. In developing ArF resistant materials, IBM 
was intentionally striving to improve resolution, while Fujitsu was focused on the 
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commercialization process. Improvement of the resolution was a perfect indicator for 
proclaiming IBM’s technological advantage inside and outside of the company. Based on 
the research outcome, IBM employees were also actively participating in academic 
conferences to demonstrate their superiority. However, when it came to 
commercialization, Fujitsu prevailed since it acknowledged the problems associated with 
the development process. Therefore, instead of focusing on improving the technology, 
Fujitsu geared their efforts toward easy development. It was noted by a Fujitsu employee 
that making ArF resistant materials as a resin was the path of least resistance because it 
was “easy to manufacture and commercialize” (p.12). In the market, IBM was not as 
successful as Fujitsu, regardless of their technological edge and reputation in the field. 
Taking this example to our dissertation, we can imagine that recognition-oriented 
inventors would not care whether the invention was e y to commercialize; rather, they 
would focus on gaining a reputation inside and outside of the firm by having the title in 
patents, presentations, and publications.  
In hypothesis D, we expected that firm motives would be positively associated with the 
commercialization of the invention. The concept of he firm motive is considered to be 
equivalent to organizational commitment in this dissertation, and was measured by the 
survey category “generating value for the firm.” In models 3 and 6, our findings 
confirmed hypothesis D, in that patents made by firm-oriented inventors were more likely 
to be commercialized. As a member of an organization, inventors fulfilled their need for 
security, and reduced uncertainties around them (Weick, 1995). In turn, this fostered 
commitment to the organization, and its value was shared among its members (Ashforth 
et al., 2008). Therefore, we suspected that inventors prioritize firm’s performance in 
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order to maintain their sense of belongingness and to prove their loyalty. Due to their 
high understanding of the capability of the firm, their inventions could turn out to 
produce a higher chance of patent commercialization. 
At the same time, we suspected firm motives would reflect in some way the pecuniary 
motive. For example, many companies implement a system called an “Employment 
Stock Purchase Plan,” which allows employees to purchase stock in their firm at a 
relatively cheaper price (about 10-15%) than what is offered on the open market. This 
gives employees a chance to capture financial returns when their firm performs well in 
the market. This system latently helps align employees’ goals to the firm’s performance, 
as employees benefit from the firm’s good performance i  the market. In other words, 
even though they do not indicate monetary rewards, these financial benefits may help 
inventors to generate heightened commercialization of the invention through an 
interesting strategy of the firm. Since we explicitly asked respondents to rate whether 
monetary reward was an important motive for them, we assumed they were exclusive 
categories. However, in order to check the robustnes  of our findings, we employed a 
correlation analysis on motives against firm size. As indicated in Table 5.3, we found that 
firm motives and pecuniary motives had a strong positive association with inventors in 
small firms and startup firms (defined as younger than five years old), as opposed to large 
firms. The strength of the correlation increased from .08 for overall to .22 and .26, 
respectively, for small firms and startups. Any correlation between pecuniary and firm 
motives disappeared only for the large firm employees. This result suggested that 
smaller-firm inventors could conflate their pecuniary nd firm motives, since the future 
of both firm and inventor is jointly affected by the success of the firm.  
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Dependent Variable: Commercial use of patented invention (Y/N)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Satisfaction of solving problem 0.245** 0.235**
(0.105) (0.111)




Monetary Rewards 0.145** 0.127*
(0.069) (0.075)
Technical Significance 0.518*** 0.513*** 0.513*** 0.503*** 0.521*** 0.508***
(0.085) (0.086) (0.085) (0.085) (0.086) (0.088)
Size of Project 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ln(work hours) 0.487 0.503* 0.448 0.518* 0.532* 0.514*
(0.309) (0.298) (0.320) (0.308) (0.301) (0.304)
Number of Inventors 0.004 0.011 0.000 0.008 0.002 0.007
(0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
All MotivesControls 
Only





Table 5.1 continued 
  
Inventor's Tenure -0.014 -0.008 -0.012 -0.010 -0.007 0.001
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
(Inventor's Tenure)
2
0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Master Degree -0.256 -0.249 -0.210 -0.264 -0.257 -0.209
(0.249) (0.248) (0.254) (0.250) (0.252) (0.255)
PhD Degree -0.574*** -0.581*** -0.554*** -0.619*** -0.567*** -0.565***
(0.213) (0.212) (0.213) (0.216) (0.213) (0.215)
SEEDS -0.583*** -0.636*** -0.556** -0.606*** -0.590*** -0.619***
(0.217) (0.217) (0.217) (0.217) (0.219) (0.218)
NEWLINE -0.337 -0.370* -0.330 -0.339* -0.360* -0.384*
(0.205) (0.205) (0.208) (0.206) (0.207) (0.209)
Number of USPC subclasses -0.010 -0.008 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.010
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)
Number of claims -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Large firm (>500) -0.677** -0.642* -0.675** -0.644* -0.709** -0.661*
(0.343) (0.344) (0.343) (0.341) (0.338) (0.341)
Small firm (<100) 0.723 0.846* 0.664 0.825* 0.619 0.713
(0.441) (0.453) (0.440) (0.444) (0.438) (0.453)
Constant -0.975 -2.074 -1.825 -1.064 -1.460 -3.300**
(1.504) (1.530) (1.579) (1.499) (1.495) (1.630)
Technology Class Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Patent Filed Year Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Observations 789 789 789 789 789 789
Log Likelihood -527.16 -527.16 -527.16 -527.16 -527.16 -527.16
Wald Chi2 85.94 87.27 88.46 86.65 84.28 87.17
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




Table 5.2 Correlation Between Motives, Invention Disclosures, Firm Size, and Work Hours 
  
 
Table 5.3 Correlation Between Pecuniary and Firm Motives by Firm Size 
 
Variables Mean Std.Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Solving Problems 4.372 0.841
2 Firm Performance 4.198 0.912 0.0337
3 Recognition 0.025 0.904 0.2048 *** 0.0599 **
4 Monetary Rewards 2.421 1.264 0.0531 ** 0.021 0.2999 ***
5 Invention Disclosures 11.174 18.111 0.0131 0.0476 ** -0.009 0.0477 **
6 Large firm (>500) 0.821 0.384 0.0419 * 0.0629 *** 0.1026 *** -0.0953 *** 0.0745 ***
7 Small firm (<100) 0.065 0.247 -0.046 * 0.0451 * -0.1362 *** 0.1215 *** -0.0432 * -0.6778 ***
8 Startup (< 5yrs) 0.057 0.231 -0.029 0.0359 -0.0148 0.0253 -0.0002 -0.2213 *** 0.3193 ***
9 ln(work hours) 3.855 0.281 0.0134 -0.001 -0.0257 -0.0263 0.0097 -0.0812 *** 0.0731 *** 0.068 ***
10 Percent of work hours devoted to inventing 52.816 30.562 0.1119 *** 0.0582 ** 0.0849 *** 0.0075 0.009 0.02 0.0071 -0.0069 -0.0096
* p <.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
Overall Large firm (>500) Small firm (<100) Startup (< 5yrs)
Firm Performance 0.0856** 0.0472 0.2184*** 0.2636**
Monetary Rewards
* p <.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01
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5.2.2 Motives and Educational Background: Science and Engineering  
Based on the Cosmopolitans-Local distinction (Gouldner, 1957b; 1958; Merton, 1957), 
we expected that educational backgrounds would moderate the relationship between 
motive and commercialization of the invention. In particular, we hypothesized that 
recognition motives would be positively associated with the commercialization of the 
invention for inventors with science backgrounds, and firm motives would be positively 
associated with commercialization of the invention f r inventors with engineering 
backgrounds. Educational backgrounds were measured by disciplinary training and coded 
1 for science backgrounds, otherwise 0. 
Table 5.4 shows that inventors with science majors numbered 298 out of 711 samples 
after missing cases were removed. In model 1, we only included inventors with science 
backgrounds (N=298), and then, for the entire sample (N=711), we regressed the science 
variable only, without motives. The result showed that educational backgrounds, either 
science or engineering, were not significantly related to commercialization. In model 3, 
regression analysis was conducted for all samples with motives and science variables. 
The result reported a statistically stronger effect of the firm motive, and the task motive 
was also shown to positively influence commercialization. With interaction variables, we 
were not able to find any significant moderation effect of educational backgrounds on the 
relationship between motives and patent commercialization. In brief, results showed that 
we could not support our hypotheses E and F; we could not find a moderating effect of 
educational backgrounds.  
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Across model 4 through model 8, none of the interaction coefficients were significant, 
but this did not clearly indicate an interaction effect. As Norton et al. (2004) suggested, 
interaction terms (i.e. signs, magnitude and significance) varied by covariates. Based on 
our hypotheses, we created marginal effects and z-statistics of interaction terms using 
inteff command in STATA. As Figures from 5.1 to 5.3 show, none of the interaction 
effects were significant given that z-statistics were between |z|<1.96. We illustrated the 
interaction effect of each motive with science backgrounds as well as their z-statistics in 
Figure 5.1 to 5.3. What we found is that, for task nd recognition motives, there was a 
positive interaction effect of science backgrounds, even though it was not statistically 
significant, and the marginal effect ranged close to 0. Figure 5.2 reports a negative 
interaction effect between firm motives and engineering backgrounds. Therefore, we 
cannot support hypothesis E and F.   
To check robustness of the finding, we also ran the same analysis using the type of work 
(basic or applied research). It was operationalized as to whether inventors fit well into the 
work context based on socialization and motives. In the GT/RIETI Inventor Survey, we 
asked how much of the R&D effort leading to the focal patent was basic, applied design 
or technical service8. Out of 100%, respondents’ median contribution to the basic 
research was 1%. Based on this, we created a dummy variable indicating basic research, 
1 indicating inventions that had at least 1% of basic research effort; otherwise 0. The 
                                                 
 
8 Exact questionnaire was the following: “At the time of the research leading to the focal patent, 
approximately what percentage of your R&D effort was…"  
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result is reported in Table 5.5, and we were not able to find significant interaction effect 
of the type of work, either.  
Our findings are suggestive of the multidimensional conceptualization of cosmopolitans 
and locals. As opposed to distinguishing cosmopolitans and locals, some studies 
suggested that R&D employees’ orientation toward the profession can be independent of 
their orientation toward the organization (Pelz, 1956). Also, it has been empirically found 
that highly-motivated scientists have features of both cosmopolitans and locals (Glaser, 
1963). Friedlander (1971) examined 178 research scientists surveyed in six of the Navy’s 
largest R&D labs, and reported greater multidimensio al complexity in scientists’ 
orientation. By comparing R&D scientists’ orientation with their six disciplines 
(engineering, mathematics, physics, physiology, chemistry, and psychology), he found a 
significant difference among disciplines in professional orientation, but not in local 
orientation. In this regard, we suspect that our result could not support our hypotheses, 
because there are no pure-type cosmopolitans and locals.  
Additionally, we suspect that we were not able to find the moderating effect of 
educational backgrounds because of a large PhD effect. In fact, about 72% of the 
inventors with science degrees held a PhD, while ony 35% of the inventors with an 
engineering degree had a PhD. In future work, we would like to test the moderating effect 
by using PhD as a proxy for the cosmopolitan versus local argument.  
In conclusion, we found a positive effect of task and firm motives on commercialization 
of the invention. However, we could not support ourhypotheses that recognition motives 
were positively associated with the commercialization of the invention. Moreover, we 
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could not find significant evidence to support a moderating effect of educational 
background in recognition motives, nor in firm motives on patent commercialization.  
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Table 5.4 Regression Results on Commercialization of the Invention, Interaction with Educational Backgrounds 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Satisfaction of solving problem 0.254 0.225* 0.171 0.224* 0.221* 0.224* 0.174
(0.187) (0.117) (0.151) (0.117) (0.118) (0.117) (0.150)
Generating value for the firm 0.263 0.226** 0.225** 0.200 0.227** 0.227** 0.200
(0.166) (0.101) (0.101) (0.131) (0.101) (0.102) (0.130)
Recognition 0.066 0.029 0.025 0.030 -0.003 0.026 0.007
(0.205) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.143) (0.119) (0.145)
Monetary Rewards 0.113 0.113 0.112 0.114 0.111 0.100 0.104
(0.137) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.100) (0.102)
Science background 0.026 0.081 -0.425 -0.186 0.075 -0.002 -0.708
(0.204) (0.209) (1.051) (0.903) (0.210) (0.403) (1.529)
Science_Solving problem 0.116 0.105
(0.237) (0.241)




Science_Monetary reward 0.036 0.022
(0.152) (0.169)
Technical Significance 0.402*** 0.493*** 0.480*** 0.479*** 0.481*** 0.479*** 0.480*** 0.478***
(0.136) (0.089) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092)
Size of Project 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ln(work hours) 0.308 0.457 0.477 0.488 0.471 0.486 0.475 0.485
(0.396) (0.314) (0.312) (0.316) (0.316) (0.314) (0.311) (0.321)
Number of Inventors -0.038 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.001









Dependent Variable: Commercial use of patented invention (Y/N)
Science Only 
sample
All Sample All Sample Interactions 
Included
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Table 5.4 continued 
 
Inventor's Tenure -0.038 -0.012 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.067) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
(Inventor's Tenure)
2
0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Master Degree -0.060 -0.202 -0.151 -0.153 -0.153 -0.146 -0.152 -0.153
(0.516) (0.266) (0.273) (0.273) (0.272) (0.272) (0.273) (0.272)
PhD Degree -0.723* -0.489** -0.500** -0.494** -0.503** -0.498** -0.500** -0.497**
(0.403) (0.238) (0.238) (0.237) (0.238) (0.238) (0.238) (0.238)
SEEDS -0.386 -0.595*** -0.604*** -0.608*** -0.602*** -0.604*** -0.604*** -0.605***
(0.359) (0.230) (0.229) (0.229) (0.230) (0.229) (0.229) (0.230)
NEWLINE -0.138 -0.362* -0.403* -0.406* -0.407* -0.406* -0.403* -0.411*
(0.337) (0.218) (0.222) (0.223) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222)
Number of USPC subclasses 0.041 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008
(0.036) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Number of claims -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Large firm (>500) -0.026 -0.577 -0.567 -0.575 -0.573 -0.573 -0.567 -0.584*
(0.516) (0.356) (0.352) (0.352) (0.354) (0.352) (0.352) (0.354)
Small firm (<100) 1.362* 0.800* 0.758 0.754 0.755 0.756 0.758 0.749
(0.721) (0.468) (0.474) (0.475) (0.474) (0.474) (0.474) (0.475)
Constant -2.704 -0.939 -3.255* -3.040* -3.122* -3.265* -3.219* -2.910*
(2.350) (1.524) (1.677) (1.687) (1.728) (1.681) (1.666) (1.739)
Technology Class Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Patent Filed Year Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Observations 298 711 711 711 711 711 711 711
Log Likelihood -204.17 -475.06 -475.06 -475.06 -475.06 -475.06 -475.06 -475.06
Wald Chi2 37.01 75.24 77.73 77.49 78.20 77.51 77.95 78.44
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Weighted by sampling weights
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Figure 5.1 Interaction Effects of Task Motive and Science Background 
 
 






Figure 5.3 Interaction Effects of Recognition Motive and Science Background 
 
 
Table 5.5 Regression Results on Commercialization of the Invention, Interaction 
with Basic Research 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Satisfaction of solving problem 0.308 0.188 0.230** 0.230** 0.225** 0.183
(0.189) (0.145) (0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.143)
Generating value for the firm 0.296* 0.205** 0.156 0.208** 0.211** 0.157
(0.160) (0.096) (0.122) (0.096) (0.096) (0.120)
Recognition 0.156 0.039 0.044 -0.018 0.041 0.022
(0.211) (0.114) (0.113) (0.133) (0.115) (0.135)
Monetary Rewards 0.227* 0.129* 0.132* 0.129* 0.053 0.058
(0.135) (0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.090) (0.092)
Basic -0.273 -0.894 -0.898 -0.310* -0.803** -1.859
(0.180) (0.950) (0.853) (0.182) (0.397) (1.367)
Basic_Solving problem 0.138 0.109
(0.216) (0.225)




Basic_Monetary reward 0.212 0.198
(0.149) (0.162)
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Weighted by sampling weights
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent Variable: Commercial use of patented invention (Y/N)
Basic Only 
sample





5.3 Robustness Check 
In order to check the robustness of our findings, we conducted a new set of analysis for 
the sample that only consisted of solo inventors. Since we attributed one inventor’s 
motive to the whole patent and its commercialization, we might introduce some 
measurement error. Therefore, we ran the following a alysis shown in Table 5.6.  
Unlike our main analysis, we did not find a positive effect of task, firm, or pecuniary 
motives on commercialization of the invention. However, the recognition motive, again, 
had a negative relationship on the commercialization of the patent. None of the effects 
were statistically significant, though task and pecuniary motives showed negative 
association with commercialization of the patent, which was contrary to the results of the 
entire sample, calling into question the main model. In the controls-only model, we found 
that the level of education and the type of project were not significant, unlike the results 
of the full sample (even though positive and negative signs were the same). Other than 
this, the technical significance of the patent and the size of the firm were reported to have 
the same effect on commercialization for the solo inventor sample. Therefore, we 
questioned if solo inventors just have different motives from non-solo inventors in terms 
of commercialization of the patent. The simple correlation analysis suggested that this 
could be the case. As illustrated in Table 5.7, the task motive showed a strong positive 
correlation with the commercialization of the patent for non-solo inventors, but turned 
out to have a negative association with the commercialization of the patent for solo 
inventors. Also, the strong positive association betwe n the pecuniary motive and 
commercialization of the patent had become statistically insignificant. Therefore, we 
considered that the difference in the effects of motive is attributed to the difference 
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between solo inventors and non-solo inventors, rathe  than to measurement error. In the 
next chapter, we will examine different motives that solo inventors and non-solo 
inventors (who are engaged in collaboration) have in more detail.   
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Dependent Variable: Commercial use of patented invention (Y/N)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Satisfaction of solving problem -0.113 -0.101
(0.253) (0.257)




Monetary Rewards -0.037 0.010
(0.160) (0.178)
Technical Significance 0.414** 0.427** 0.403** 0.432** 0.413** 0.434**
(0.184) (0.187) (0.185) (0.187) (0.184) (0.190)
Size of Project 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.012
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
ln(work hours) 0.700 0.673 0.728 0.592 0.665 0.613
(0.746) (0.753) (0.735) (0.769) (0.758) (0.764)
Inventor's Tenure -0.022 -0.023 -0.016 -0.034 -0.025 -0.028
(0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.066) (0.063) (0.066)
(Inventor's Tenure)
2
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Master Degree -0.749 -0.737 -0.705 -0.710 -0.740 -0.650
(0.515) (0.515) (0.523) (0.520) (0.517) (0.529)
PhD Degree -0.789 -0.788 -0.756 -0.771 -0.792 -0.730
(0.507) (0.507) (0.512) (0.509) (0.507) (0.515)
SEEDS -0.536 -0.536 -0.520 -0.512 -0.525 -0.495
(0.465) (0.466) (0.468) (0.468) (0.469) (0.472)
NEWLINE -0.005 -0.013 -0.033 -0.022 0.016 -0.067
(0.451) (0.452) (0.453) (0.453) (0.460) (0.471)
Number of USPC subclasses -0.021 -0.024 -0.024 -0.020 -0.019 -0.027
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.061)
Number of claims -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Large firm (>500) -1.986* -1.991* -1.986* -2.054* -1.978* -2.068*
(1.130) (1.129) (1.129) (1.137) (1.132) (1.138)
Small firm (<100) -0.283 -0.305 -0.320 -0.454 -0.239 -0.544
(1.241) (1.240) (1.239) (1.267) (1.257) (1.311)
Constant 1.669 2.201 1.120 1.883 1.773 1.702
(2.165) (2.471) (2.365) (2.190) (2.212) (2.653)
Technology Class Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Patent Filed Year Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Observations 188 188 188 188 188 188
Log Likelihood -126.44 -126.44 -126.44 -126.44 -126.44 -126.44
Wald Chi2 52.38 52.58 52.72 52.80 52.43 53.39
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21




Robust standard errors in parentheses; Weighted by sampling weights
Controls 
Only
Task Only Firm Only Recognition 
Only
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Table 5.7 Correlation Between Motives and Commercialization: Non-Solo versus 
Solo Inventors 
 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Variables Non-Solo Inventors Solo Inventors
1 Commercialization of patent
2 Solving Problems 0.1017** -0.0662
3 Firm Performance 0.1063*** -0.0311 0.0678 0.0109
4 Recognition 0.0485 0.2234*** -0.0233 -0.0632 0.1891*** 0.0888
5 Monetary Rewards 0.1379*** 0.0542 0.0846** 0.2974*** 0.0499 0.0308 0.0925 0.3012***
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5.4 Conclusion and Discussion 
In summation, we have observed positive effects of he task motive, the firm motive and 
the pecuniary motive on the commercialization of patents. Note, however, that the motive 
geared toward recognition had no significant effect on commercialization regardless of an 
inventor’s educational background. Also, we have not found a moderation effect of 
educational background (science or engineering) on the relationship between motives and 
patent commercialization.  
We understand that the larger portion of the variance of commercialization of invention is 
explained by non-individual factors such as organiztional capability, technological 
distance, and geographical capacity (Jung, 2009; Huang, 2012). Even though we 
controlled for some of these (such as organization and project type) in our analysis, we 
acknowledge that it would not be enough to fully explain the path from individual 
motives to commercialization of the invention. Therefo e, we wanted to see how 
individual inventor motives might contribute to commercialization besides their effect in 
producing valuable invention. There are several possible reasons why motive might affect 
commercialization, given the invention. 
As to task motive, one possible explanation is thattask-motivated inventors produce 
various work outputs that act as the seed of knowledge for commercialization of the focal 
patent. Because they enjoy solving the problem, it is l kely that inventors with task 
motive are simultaneously engaged in multiple tasks, as long as the task is fun. In order to 
find the best solution, task-motivated inventors would seek out diverse ways for solving 
the problem, unlike inventors with other motives, and this trial and error could provide 
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seed knowledge for task-motivated inventors. In tur, it is suspected to increase the odds 
of commercialization of the focal patent, and thus the net value of the invention. Thursby 
and Thursby (2011) have tested university faculty participation in licensing, and found 
that patent licensing activities is not diverting faculties’ research profiles from basic to 
applied research. This result suggested that the financial incentive encourages faculty to 
conduct research more actively in general. Because of university faculties’ orientation 
toward solving problems, university research can continue to explore both tracks of basic 
and applied research. Likewise, we propose that the odds of commercialization are higher 
for task-motivated inventors, since their curiosity-driven work portfolio provides the 
diverse knowledge background that can be utilized on other work outputs.  
Another speculation was that inventors with a certain motive could be more engaged in 
the commercialization process. Some inventors could be more interested in 
commercializing their invention than others because their interest lies beyond the 
invention itself. In order to test this speculation, we looked at invention disclosures 
following Thursby and Thursby (2011). They used inve tion disclosure as a measure of 
faculty participation in licensing because it reflected faculty’s willingness to engage in 
commercialization, and it was not influenced by the opinion of technology transfer office 
or firm’s assessment of the commercial potential. Invention disclosure is under an 
individual’s discretion in many cases. Even though a researcher comes up with a novel 
outcome, they might not take the trouble to disclose. Filing disclosure forms with the 
company may cause extra work for researchers, and it is not guaranteed whether a patent 
will be applied for, given that it has to go through another screening process by the firm’s 
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legal department. Therefore, invention disclosure can reflect inventors’ willingness to 
commercialize their work output.  
In the GT/RIETI Survey, we asked inventors approximately how many invention 
disclosures respondents had made in the last three years, so that we were able to run a 
correlation analysis. As reported in Table 5.2, we found that firm motive has a stronger 
positive correlation with the number of invention disclosures than inventors with other 
motives (p < .01). This may be because inventors with firm motives were more willing to 
engage in the extra work it would take to write up the significance of the work output. 
Moreover, frequently disclosing their work output illustrates that inventors with firm 
motives were more actively participating in their company’s commercialization process. 
Since invention disclosures help the firm decide its potential, inventors with firm motives 
gave their organization more chances to explore an inventions’ utility. 
Moreover, inventors with firm motives were likely to devote their time and energy to 
ensure that knowledge was exchanged, understood, and integrated (Evans & Davis, 2005), 
and were more likely to deal with inconvenient work conditions created by others 
(Podsakoff et al., 2000). By understanding others and putting themselves in other 
people’s shoes, inventors with firm motives were repo ted to increase their creativity 
since it broadens researchers’ perspectives (Grant & Berry, 2011). In fact, we have found 
a strong positive correlation between firm motive and the sources of knowledge, both in 
the suggesting of and the completion of the project. This indicated that inventors with 
firm motive listen more to customers and suppliers, unlike task-motivated inventors, who 
were more likely to initiate as well as to complete th  project without other’s feedback. 
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With outside perspectives and inputs, firm-motivated inventors were more likely to create 
useful inventions than inventors with other motives.   
Table 5.8 Correlation Between Motives and Sources of Knowledge 
 
In addition, we employed Sobel-Goodman tests to examine whether having an external 
source of knowledge served as a mediator influencing an independent variable to a 
dependent variable (Sobel, 1982). Among the sources of knowledge, we recoded a 
variable if the knowledge came from universities, government research organizations, 
customers, suppliers or competitors. After running Sobel-Goodman tests, we found that 
the mediation effect of external knowledge was somewhat substantive for firm, pecuniary 
and recognition motives. For firm and pecuniary motives, mediation effects were about 
10% and 7%, respectively. As to recognition motive, a mediation effect was as large as 
51%. Also, after adding the measure of external information, the coefficient of firm 
motive dropped, and the effect of firm motive became less significant. For the pecuniary 
motive, the coefficient also dropped, and the effect b came insignificant. This result 
suggested that openness to others in conceiving and completing inventions mediated the 
relationship between motives (except the task motive) and commercialization of the 
inventions. This finding might provide some evidenc supporting the assumption that 
Solving Puzzle Firm Performance Ribbon Monetary Rewards
Idea suggested by customers 0.0091 0.1098*** 0.0427 0.0407
Idea suggested by suppliers 0.0143 0.0974*** 0.0979*** 0.1095***
High_Idea suggested by customers 0.0171 0.1155*** 0.0209 0.0563
high_Idea suggested by suppliers 0.0092 0.0817*** 0.0216 0.0607
Idea completed by customers 0.0023 0.1186*** 0.0888*** 0.0919***
Idea completed by suppliers 0.0011 0.0820*** 0.0931*** 0.0877***
High_Idea completed by customers 0.0339 0.1159*** 0.0903*** 0.0761
high_Idea completed by suppliers -0.0109 0.1090*** 0.0283 0.0147
*** p<.01
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inventors with firm motives are more likely to commercialize their inventions because 
they are more likely to integrate others’ ideas into their inventions.   
In this regard, we suggest that an inventor’s input is s ill important in commercializing 
the patent. In particular, inventors with firm motive are recognized as a type of researcher 
who could be more actively involved in the company’s commercializing effort. By being 
committed to the organization as well as prioritizing the goals of the firm, they are more 
willing to endure some of the inconveniences to their daily routine that pursuing 
innovation generates (Podsakoff et al., 2000).  
This chapter examines individuals’ motives as a wayto understand innovation. In 
particular, we suggest that firm motive matters for industry researchers in R&D work 
settings. Our work extends the few empirical studies that argued the importance of task 
motive for industry engineers (Sauermann & Cohen, 2010; Stern, 2004). We claim that 
organizational commitment and intellectual challeng also matters for innovation.  
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Collaborative research has been increasing over the last several decades, and has come to 
be considered a key strategy in the pursuit of excellence in research as well as in 
innovation (Katz & Martin, 1997; Wuchty, Jones & Uzzi, 2007). Also, where research is 
conducted has been diversified in terms of arrangements and context. As of this writing, 
much of the nation’s research is taking place in hybrid organizations that combine the 
characteristics of academia, industries, and governm nt laboratories. Gibbons et al. (1994) 
asserted that, while knowledge production was once located primarily at scientific 
institutions (universities, government institutes and industrial research labs) and 
structured by scientific disciplines, it now resides in new, diverse locations, and that 
practices and principles are much more heterogeneous. The growth of collaboration and 
the assembling of multidisciplinary teams in research centers has been examined by co-
authored papers (Etzkowitz & Kemelgor, 1999; Hicks & Katz, 1996). Also, using patent 
data, substantial empirical work on inter-organizational cooperation has been examined 
in the form of co-inventing, co-assignee and citation (Hagedoorn, 2003; Hicks, 1993; 
Hicks & Narin, 2001; Jaffe, Trajtenberg & Henderson, 1993). From archival data such as 
government documents and press releases, corporate c llaborative work has been studied 
in the form of licensing, joint ventures, and formal R&D collaborations or consortia 
(Arora, Fosfuri & Gambardella, 2001; Sakakibara, 2002). 
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Researchers have argued that individuals are the prime movers of knowledge creation in 
an organization (Nonaka, 1994), and that collaborati n among individuals who share 
their explicit and/or tacit knowledge could help knowledge creation at a collective level 
(Bartol & Srivastava, 2002; Quigley et al., 2007). Previous research stressed that 
communication among individuals is essential to exchange, combine and learn existing 
knowledge among co-workers in an effort to create organizational knowledge (Nahapiet 
& Ghoshal, 1998; Senge, 1990). As an important factor in technological progress, 
inventors need to utilize information and external opportunities in order to combine one’s 
own capabilities and resources. In particular, given that inventing is increasingly 
considered to be a collaborative activity (Chesbrough, 2003), it has become important to 
understand the relationship between the individual inventor and collaborative activities. 
Biographical and clinical studies find that certain individual dispositions (i.e. independent, 
self-sufficient, and self-directed) are commonly used to describe successful scientists 
(Fox & Faver, 1984). This chapter addresses the relationship between the inventor and 
collaboration, and examines what types of individual motives affect collaborative 
activities.  
We measured collaboration by co-inventing activities with those internal and external to 
the firm and by how many co-inventors were listed. As explained below, we set up the 
following hypotheses for the direct relationship betw en individual motives and 
collaborative patterns. Built upon previous literatu e suggesting that the experienced and 
the famous would gain a relatively small benefit by collaboration (Bozeman & Corley, 
2004), we expected that recognition motive would play out differently on collaborative 
patterns based upon the inventor’s experience. Also, due to high organizational 
 150
commitment, we hypothesized that inventors with a high score on the firm motive would 
choose particular collaborative patterns in order to secure the firm’s confidentiality.  
Hypothesis I: Task motives are negatively associated with collaborative activity. 
Hypothesis II: Pecuniary motives have no significant effect on collaborative 
activity. 
Hypothesis III: Recognition motives are negatively associated with the instance 
of collaborative activity.  
Hypothesis III-A: The relationship between recognitio  motives and 
collaborative activity is moderated by an inventor’s tenure (interaction effect).  
Hypothesis IV: Firm motives are positively associated with collaborative activity. 
Hypothesis IV-A: For inventors with firm motive, the difference in collaborative 
activity is larger for internal collaboration than for external collaboration 
(interaction effect).  
6.2 Regression Results 
In this section, we present the analysis focusing on co-inventing pattern. We present the 
multinomial regression result in Table 6.1 in order to clearly illustrate the point of this 
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chapter.9 Then, the result of interaction effect between recognition motives and inventor 
experience is reported in Table 6.2. Focusing on the hypotheses III and III-A, Table 6.3 
illustrates the regression result on any internal co-inventor. 
Model 1 and 2 in Table 6.1 illustrate the base model regression that only includes control 
variables. The interesting findings of this research spoke to the effect of an advanced 
degree on collaboration. Contrary to the conventional belief, inventors with higher 
degrees were less likely to collaborate. Both master’s and PhDs were less likely to 
participate in collaborative activities; this was esp cially prominent for external co-
invention. We initially expected that, because of the academic training that advanced 
degree-holders received, inventors with higher degre s would work with outsiders like 
those from universities. However, compared to bachelor’s degree inventors, masters and 
doctorate-educated inventors were significantly involved in non-heterogeneous 
collaboration (after controlling for the technical significance and the complexity of the 
technology, etc). We suspect this might be due to a perceived low payoff of collaboration 
held by advanced degree holders. Due to their sophiticated expertise, advanced degree 
inventors are more likely to consider that they cansolve the problem by themselves than 
bachelor inventors. Increased level of expertise and confidence in their ability to solve the 
focal problem would prohibit inventors from participating in collaboration, particularly 
with external entities.  
                                                 
 
9 We conducted the regression analysis on formal/informal collaborations as well as on the number of 
inventors listed in patent documents. Results were similar to that of the co-inventor, so they were not 
reported in this dissertation, but are available upon request. 
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In hypotheses I and II, we expected a rather simple direct effect of task and pecuniary 
motives. For the task motive, we anticipated a negative relationship with collaborative 
activities, and we hypothesized no effect between pecuniary motives and collaborative 
activities. We found that task motives had a positive effect on non-solo invention, as 
opposed to internal co-invention. Note that this effect was significant after controlling for 
the technical significance of the patent and the complexity of the technology. It indicates 
that task-oriented inventors would prefer to work by themselves even if how difficult and 
complex the invention is. Therefore, we can support ou  hypothesis I, which expected a 
decrease in collaborative activities. Since there is a preference for autonomy (Deci & 
Ryan, 1985), satisfaction is gained by problem-solving for task-motivated inventors, and 
as Cumming and Kisler (2007) suggested, collaboration may just not be fun for them.  
Regarding pecuniary motives, we cannot support our hypothesis II. We expected no 
effect of this particular motive because inventors would weigh the positive and negative 
effects of collaboration, and they would cancel out each other in the decision whether or 
not to participate. However, we found a mixed effect of the pecuniary motive on 
collaboration. For the most part, pecuniary motive showed no significant effect on 
collaborative activities (i.e. the number of external co-inventors and internal co-inventors, 
both dummy and count dependent variables). However, w  found a statistically positive 
relationship between pecuniary motives and dummy recod d external co-invention (See 
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Table 6.2, Model 1).10 This was consistent with previous arguments, in that decisions on 
whether to participate in the collaborative activity were affected by monetary reward 
(Lawler, 1981; Osterloh & Frey, 2000). It signified that a company’s monetary incentives 
awarded to participants of collaboration could encourage researchers to join collaborative 
activities.  
In hypothesis III, we supposed that the recognition motive had a positive association with 
collaborative activities. Here, the recognition motive was measured by factor loading of 
four indicators: “career advance,” “prestige/reputation,” “recognition from co-workers,” 
and “recognition from the field.” Due to “endorsement” (Stuart, Hoang & Hybels, 1999) 
and “status leakage” (Podolny, 2005), we expected that recognition-motivated inventors 
would seek to expand their collaboration network. In addition, in hypothesis III-A, it was 
assumed that inventor’s experience—measured by tenure after graduation—would 
moderate the relationship between recognition motives and collaborative activities. Based 
on the Matthew Effect (Merton, 1968; 1973a), we expected that less-experienced 
researchers were less likely to collaborate because they might worry about not receiving 
the credit they deserve. As for the more-experienced researchers, however, we expected 
that their established network of collaboration would expand based on the loop of 
positive feedback drawn by collaboration. We operation lized this moderation effect by 
                                                 
 
10 In separate regression analysis on any external co-inventor, we found a positive association between 
pecuniary motive (using a regular non-dichotomized indicator) and any external co-inventor.  
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measuring the interaction effect between tenure and highly rated recognition motives.11 
We created dummy variables for each motive, coded 1 if the respondents reported a 
higher score, and 0 otherwise. Here, high score stand  for either 4) Important, or 5) Very 
important. In the case of recognition factor loading, we recoded a high recognition 
variable, indicating 1 for the top 25%, otherwise 0. After examining survey categories in 
recognition variable, we found that all 4 variables’ top 25% include scale 4) and 5), 
important and very important, respectively. Therefo, it seemed to be reasonable to 
choose upper quartile for illustrating high scores on the recognition motive. Then, we 
multiplied these dummy-coded motives with the years of inventor’s tenure to test the 
interaction effects.  
Looking at Table 6.1 (models 7, 8, 11 and 12), we cannot support hypothesis III, in that 
the recognition motive was not significantly associated with co-inventing activities. 
However, we found that recognition motives were positively associated with the number 
of external co-inventing, showing that this motive was associated positively with the size 
of external collaborative networks. Considering that t e most valuable recognition comes 
out of external entities, this was not surprising. I ventors highly motivated by recognition 
were more likely to participate in collaborative activities as their tenure increased, 
particularly for external co-invention, which supported our hypothesis III-A (see Table 
6.2). Our results reported that the interaction effect of this motive and tenure is 
                                                 
 
11 We ran the same analysis substituting the tenure variable to the age variable, and the result was 
essentially the same. Therefore, we reported the analysis with the tenure variable, but the other analysis is 
available upon request.  
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statistically significant for model 4. In order to make sure the marginal effect distribution 
was statistically significant, we employed an interaction effect test by using inteff 
command in STATA. As portrayed in Figure 6.1, we found a positive marginal effect of 
interaction terms between recognition motive and teur  variable (even though it was 
close to 0). However, the z-statistic ranged from 0 to little over 1.96, so we cannot be 
confident in their statistical significance.   
To summarize, we found partially supportive evidence for hypotheses III and III-A, in 
that the recognition motive was positively associated with the collaborative activity of 
external co-inventing. The fact that only external co-inventing appeared to have a 
significant relationship with recognition motives suggested that inventors’ locus of 
interest leaned toward external entities rather than internal. As expected in hypothesis III-
A, we found that inventors with high recognition motives were more likely to participate 
in co-invention as their experience increased, as did the size of their external 
collaborative network. Even though collaboration may not be that beneficial for an 
experienced inventor’s productivity (Bozeman & Corley, 2004), inventors with an eye 
toward recognition have already established their own networks of collaboration, which 
they continue to maintain and expand (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997). 
In hypotheses IV and IV-A, we suspected that firm motives would increase collaborative 
activities, and we hypothesized that the effect would be prominent in within firm co-
inventing. Since our data could distinguish where collaboration took place (whether 
internally or externally), we could predict if organizationally committed inventors were 
particularly involved in collaboration in certain locations. Multinomial results in Table 
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6.1 show that firm-motivated inventors were significantly and negatively associated with 
external co-invention as opposed to internal co-invention (model 6). Also, Table 6.3 
shows regression results on internal co-inventing, a d we found that the firm motive was 
positively associated with the decision on whether o participate in internal co-inventing 
(See Table 6.3, models 3 & 6). The result turned out to have no significant relationship 
between firm motives and the number of internal/external co-inventors, and therefore, 
hypothesis IV could not be supported. However, we can support hypothesis IV-A in that 
the firm motive had a significant positive relationship with internal co-inventing. 
We thought that inventors with firm motives were more likely to participate in 
collaboration because it creates a sense of helpfulness to inventors (Osterloh & Frey, 
2000), and helps inventors to be attached to the community (Fox & Faver, 1984). Our 
results, however, suggested that the locus of interes  seemed to lay especially in the firm 
where the inventor worked, where helping others in the same firm held a great deal of 
value. R&D employees with firm motives, for example, portrayed distinct characteristics 
of locals (Gouldner, 1957b; 1958; Merton, 1957) when it came to collaborative activities. 
Due to their local-like characteristics, inventors with firm motives established a trust and 
shared identity only with the same firm collaboratos. Therefore, the transaction cost can 
be lowered within the firm by establishing explicit and implicit rules of coordination, and 
a shared identity and values (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). 
In conclusion, we have found mixed results across hypotheses tested in this chapter. Task 
motives negatively influenced collaboration; thus, we can support hypothesis I. As for 
firm motives, we cannot support hypothesis IV as firm motives showed variance across 
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all types of collaboration. However, this evidence more or less strengthened and 
supported hypothesis IV-A, in that organizationally committed inventors displayed local-
like behaviors. Our results showed that inventors with firm motives, in particular, were 
more likely to internally co-invent as their motivation level increased. It appeared that 
firm motives were negatively associated with external co-inventions, compared to 
internal co-inventions (See models 6 and 12 in Table 6.1). Pecuniary motives showed 
mixed results; therefore, we cannot support hypothesis II. As for recognition motives, we 
cannot support hypothesis III, in that recognition motives were only positively associated 
with the number of external co-inventors, while other dependent variables on 
collaboration were not affected by this motive. However, we found evidence to support 
hypothesis III-A; inventors with high recognition motives reported participation in 
broader and larger networks of collaboration as their experience increased.
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Table 6.1 Multinomial Regression Results on Co-Invention (Base: Any Internal Co-Inventor) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Solo Inventor Solo Inventor
Solving Problem 0.360*** -0.014 0.369*** -0.062
(0.118) (0.217) (0.120) (0.227)
Firm Performance -0.076 -0.291* -0.074 -0.313*
(0.092) (0.176) (0.093) (0.180)
Recognition 0.024 0.172 -0.044 0.193
(0.100) (0.219) (0.110) (0.238)
Monetary Rewards 0.004 0.043 0.015 0.026
(0.070) (0.146) (0.076) (0.154)
Technical Significance -0.070 0.085 -0.087 0.087 -0.068 0.102 -0.072 0.069 -0.070 0.083 -0.082 0.088
(0.084) (0.177) (0.085) (0.177) (0.084) (0.179) (0.085) (0.179) (0.084) (0.178) (0.086) (0.181)
Inventor's Tenure -0.004 -0.048 0.004 -0.048 -0.004 -0.046 -0.003 -0.041 -0.004 -0.047 0.003 -0.036
(0.031) (0.066) (0.032) (0.066) (0.031) (0.067) (0.032) (0.067) (0.031) (0.066) (0.032) (0.067)
(Inventor's Tenure) 2 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Number of Claims 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.003
(0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.011)
Number of USPC class 0.019 -0.146* 0.025 -0.147* 0.019 -0.145* 0.019 -0.150* 0.019 -0.147* 0.025 -0.151*
(0.026) (0.083) (0.026) (0.083) (0.026) (0.082) (0.026) (0.084) (0.026) (0.083) (0.026) (0.083)
Master Degree 0.100 -0.678 0.116 -0.671 0.088 -0.733 0.101 -0.671 0.100 -0.686 0.101 -0.724
(0.247) (0.485) (0.249) (0.485) (0.248) (0.488) (0.247) (0.485) (0.247) (0.486) (0.250) (0.490)
PhD Degree 0.122 -0.939** 0.145 -0.937** 0.112 -0.995** 0.117 -0.956** 0.123 -0.933** 0.148 -1.018**
(0.222) (0.457) (0.224) (0.457) (0.223) (0.459) (0.223) (0.458) (0.222) (0.457) (0.227) (0.461)
SEEDS 0.096 -0.237 0.062 -0.231 0.091 -0.243 0.095 -0.252 0.096 -0.242 0.056 -0.246
(0.214) (0.471) (0.215) (0.472) (0.214) (0.474) (0.214) (0.473) (0.214) (0.472) (0.216) (0.478)
NEWLINE -0.198 -0.628 -0.226 -0.621 -0.194 -0.604 -0.198 -0.632 -0.199 -0.638 -0.224 -0.599
(0.216) (0.499) (0.217) (0.502) (0.216) (0.501) (0.216) (0.500) (0.216) (0.501) (0.218) (0.504)
Large firm (>500) -0.183 -0.065 -0.133 -0.073 -0.167 -0.028 -0.180 -0.021 -0.184 -0.068 -0.125 -0.001
(0.370) (0.786) (0.371) (0.787) (0.371) (0.789) (0.370) (0.791) (0.370) (0.787) (0.373) (0.797)
Small firm (<100) 0.393 0.862 0.522 0.867 0.425 0.921 0.407 0.975 0.391 0.843 0.517 1.030
(0.430) (0.878) (0.434) (0.882) (0.432) (0.882) (0.434) (0.891) (0.433) (0.881) (0.446) (0.904)
Dependent Variable: Collaboartion Activities (base: Any Internal co-inventor)
Ext. 
Coinventor
Solo Inventor Ext. 
Coinventor




Solo Inventor Ext. 
Coinventor
Solo Inventor Ext. 
Coinventor
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Table 6.1 continued 
 
 
Constant -0.757 -17.097 -2.368** -17.075 -0.424 -15.832 -0.756 -17.049 -0.768 -17.200 -2.124* -14.534
(1.056) (0.000) (1.197) (0.000) (1.133) (0.000) (1.057) (0.000) (1.072) (0.000) (1.284) (0.000)
Technology Class Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Patent Filed Year Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Observations 843 843 843 843 843 843 843 843 843 843 843 843
Log Likelihood -571.56 -571.56 -571.56 -571.56 -571.56 -571.56 -571.56 -571.56 -571.56 -571.56 -571.56 -571.56
Wald Chi2 52.13 52.13 62.61 62.61 55.06 55.06 52.78 52.78 52.22 52.22 66.66 66.66
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Weighted by sampling weights
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Table 6.2 Regression Results on Co-Invention, Interaction Effects of Recognition Motives and Tenure 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
High_Recognition_Tenure 0.037 0.042** 0.004 0.0169 -0.00755
(0.023) (0.020) (0.019) (0.0183) (0.00518)
High-Solving Problem -0.454 -0.433 -0.624* -0.641** -0.326 -0.325 0.181 0.184 -0.0317 -0.0347
(0.304) (0.306) (0.323) (0.316) (0.253) (0.253) (0.205) (0.202) (0.0556) (0.0557)
High_Firm Performance -0.328 -0.333 0.109 0.185 0.610*** 0.609*** 0.330 0.325 -0.0322 -0.0303
(0.280) (0.279) (0.359) (0.347) (0.224) (0.223) (0.276) (0.272) (0.0679) (0.0675)
High_Recognition 0.142 -0.574 0.564** -0.239 -0.160 -0.227 -0.248 -0.523 -0.0917 0.0371
(0.282) (0.528) (0.259) (0.466) (0.203) (0.404) (0.184) (0.446) (0.0616) (0.116)
High_Monetary Reward 0.473* 0.468 0.361 0.296 0.186 0.184 -0.252 -0.256 -0.0105 -0.00748
(0.284) (0.287) (0.331) (0.322) (0.214) (0.214) (0.244) (0.243) (0.0655) (0.0652)
Inventor's Tenure -0.032 -0.038 -0.002 -0.017 0.013 0.012 0.0175 0.0156 -0.00284 -0.00139
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.0175) (0.0165) (0.00922) (0.00916)
(Inventor's Tenure)
2
0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.00110 -0.00116 -1.04e-05 7.75e-06
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000892) (0.000924) (0.000236) (0.000235)
Base Model Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Technology Class Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Patent Filed Year Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Observations 867 867 867 867 867 867 867 867 867 867
Log Likelihood -295.84 -295.84 -393.01 -393.01 -520.43 -520.43 -3475 -3469 -1685 -1684
Wald Chi2 40.01 41.37 44.22 48.48 41.38 41.53 36.19 34.64 37.53 40.88
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Weighted by sampling weights
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Any External Co-inventor Number of External Co-inventor Any Internal Co-inventor Number of Internal Co-inventor Number of Inventor in Patent
Logit ZIP Logit Poisson Poisson
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Table 6.3 Regression Results on Any Internal Co-inventor 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Controls Only
Solving Problem -0.381*** -0.393***
(0.116) (0.120)




Monetary Rewards 0.008 -0.010
(0.066) (0.072)
Technical Significance0.070 0.088 0.063 0.070 0.069 0.078
(0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.086) (0.085) (0.085)
Inventor's Tenure 0.013 0.006 0.015 0.013 0.014 0.008
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
(Inventor's Tenure) 2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of Claims 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Number of USPC clas -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.005
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Master Degree -0.217 -0.232 -0.193 -0.217 -0.217 -0.205
(0.254) (0.257) (0.253) (0.254) (0.254) (0.256)
PhD Degree -0.137 -0.148 -0.113 -0.135 -0.136 -0.137
(0.226) (0.226) (0.226) (0.227) (0.227) (0.230)
SEEDS 0.049 0.104 0.065 0.049 0.048 0.122
(0.208) (0.211) (0.208) (0.208) (0.209) (0.212)
NEWLINE 0.294 0.345 0.291 0.293 0.292 0.348
(0.242) (0.239) (0.239) (0.241) (0.242) (0.234)
Large firm (>500) 0.174 0.108 0.146 0.173 0.171 0.085
(0.338) (0.340) (0.346) (0.338) (0.338) (0.346)
Small firm (<100) -0.358 -0.524 -0.421 -0.361 -0.364 -0.559
(0.412) (0.417) (0.419) (0.418) (0.412) (0.429)
Constant 0.428 2.107* -0.296 0.427 0.410 1.473
(1.079) (1.163) (1.144) (1.079) (1.100) (1.237)
Technology Class Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Patent Filed Year Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed
Observations 867 867 867 867 867 867
Log Likelihood -520.43 -520.43 -520.43 -520.43 -520.43 -520.43
Wald Chi2 31.88 40.15 36.41 32.06 31.92 43.49
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Weighted by sampling weights
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent Variable: Any Internal Co-Inventor (Y/N)
Task Only Firm Only Recognition 
Only
Pecuniary Only All Motives
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6.3 Conclusion and Discussion 
This study examined antecedents of collaboration, particularly focused on individual 
motives. We found that task motive suppressed collab rative activities, while pecuniary 
motive only positively affected whether or not there were external co-inventors (Lawler, 
1981; Osterloh & Frey, 2000). Also, firm motives were found to increase chances of 
internal co-inventing. Regarding recognition motives, results suggested more senior 
people are more willing to participate, or more often invited to participate, or more able 
to handle participating, in larger collaborations.  
With the increasing trend of collaboration (Chesbrough, 2003; Hicks & Narin, 2001; 
National Science Foundation, 2012) as well as natio-wide policies such as CRADA and 
ATP created to encourage collaboration, collaboratin has gained more importance in the 
research on innovation. Through those policies, collab rative activities on the 
organizational level have increased (Walsh & Cohen, 2004). However, it is the individual 
who actually collaborates, so understanding the effct of individual differences on 
collaboration would be beneficial for successful col aborative activities. Previous 
literature has suggested that there are difficulties in motivating individuals to participate 
in collaborative networks and voluntarily share knowledge with other members (Wood & 
Gray, 1991). Since individuals and firms want to prtect their competitive advantage (and 
often it is proprietary), they could be reluctant to participate in collaborative activities out 
of concerns about unwanted spillovers. Szulanski (1996) identified some of the 
impediments that individuals face in transferring knowledge. According to Szulanski 
(1996), individuals were reluctant to share knowledge because they feared losing a 
competitive advantage based on ownership of knowledge, and perceived that individuals 
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would not be adequately rewarded for knowledge sharing. Individuals’ willingness to 
share their knowledge is difficult to change or manipulate (Lin, 2007), therefore, 
encouraging individuals to collaborate is one of the major challenges to increasing 
collaboration within and across organizations. In this regard, understanding what 
difference individual motives make in collaboration could complement organizational-
level policies. Given that there are not many studies that quantitatively examined the 
collaboration pattern at the individual level, this study is expected to suggest managerial 
implications on the research of innovation. For example, assigning the right person is 
essential in order to synergize the effect of collabor tion. The findings of this study 
demonstrated that it would be in the best interest of an inter-organizational collaborative 
effort to avoid putting together engineers who are focused on solving puzzles, and those 
who are organizationally-committed, despite the willingness of those more 
organizationally-committed engineers to participate in same-firm collaborative activities.  
It should be also noted that incidences of external co-inventing were about 10% of the 
sample, indicating that there are few opportunities for industry inventors to actually work 
outside of their own firms. This was consistent with prior research suggesting that 
external co-invention in Japan was also about 13%, based on the Japanese version of the 
GT/RIETI Survey (Walsh & Nagaoka, 2009). In fact, this was not a surprising result 
considering that inventors with task motives and firm motives were reported to have 
negative associations with external co-invention. It suggests the importance of motivating 
industry researchers to participate in external collab ration, and making collaborative 
activities more fun for those inventors. In particular, given that collaboration among firms 
is a key ingredient for successful innovation (Chesbrough, 2003), and especially that 
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vertical collaboration (with suppliers and customers) is shown to improve 
commercialization of the patents (Walsh & Nagaoka, 2009), our results call for attention 
to encouraging industry inventors to engage in external collaboration.  
Issues around property rights should be considered when discussing collaboration. 
Because of issues around securing property rights, ex ernal collaboration (particularly in 
the form of co-inventing) was suspected to be restricted. Even though we understand the 
importance of external knowledge in coming up with the innovation (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990; Laursen & Salter, 2006; March, 1991; von Hippel, 1988), the practical problem of 
assigning proprietary rights can prohibit the actual implementation of the collaboration. 
Particularly, as opposed to other types of collaborti n, results indicated that firm 
motivated inventors were more likely to collaborate only with researchers from the same 
firm. This could reflect that inventors with firm motives are less likely to work with 
entities outside of the firm due to considerations f ecrecy or intellectual property rights, 
as this unwanted spillover could decrease the returns of the firm. Our data did not have 
information relating to the property rights or confidentiality issues in creating an 
invention, but we call for future research that answers the question of how to motivate 
firm-committed inventors to participate in external co laboration without sacrificing their 
positive work performance, both in terms of creativity and commercialization of the 
patent.  
We observed that advanced degree-holding inventors we e less likely to participate in 
external collaboration. Even if they had enough socialization from academia, the findings 
of this study indicated that communalism can be easily neglected when working in 
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industry, with reference to both those inside and outside of their firm. In fact, some 
companies simultaneously restrict their engineers from publishing and presenting their 
research output, while encouraging conference attendance and journal subscription. This 
difference is even more striking when comparing company policies for filing a patent, in 
that they have rewarded engineers monetarily in order to promote patent applications. We 
may claim that industry R&D has provided strong ince tives to un-socialize the academic 
scientific norm and exploited the scientific norm of “communalism.” In order to cultivate 
the field of scientific research, reciprocity would be more sustainable in the long run. 
This leaves questions for future research regarding the balancing of property rights and 
communalism in industry R&D.  
This study assumed that collaboration and knowledge sharing was the individual 
researcher’s choice. However, this may not always be the case, since industrial 
collaboration can sometimes be unavoidable for the industry researchers. For example, 
some company strategies mandate employee participation in intra-firm collaboration. 
Moreover, when it comes to co-inventing, individuals’ voluntary participation may be 
less likely given the proprietary nature of co-invetion. Therefore, we must acknowledge 
that motives significantly affected collaboration even when it was a required activity.  
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This research examined the individual antecedents of inn vation performance and 
collaboration patterns. We proposed to expand the dim nsions of motives in order to 
explain innovative performance in depth. Based on the novel dataset, the purpose of this 
was to answer questions regarding the relationship between motive and creativity with a 
focus on invention novelty, the effects of motive on invention commercialization and the 
interaction between an inventor’s motives and education l background on invention 
commercialization, and last, how motive affected collaboration patterns. Innovative 
performances were examined with two perspectives: patent originality and patent 
usefulness. While there are ample studies examining the relationship between individual 
motive and creativity, this dissertation contributed o this literature by measuring 
creativity in terms of patented invention, and patent usefulness in terms of 
commercialization of the invention. As opposed to earli r studies examining creativity 
based on subjective measures such as supervisor’s rating (see Grant & Berry, 2011), 
measuring creativity using bibliometric indicators tied to a patented invention is expected 
to increase the objectivity of the measure. Also, this dissertation examined the 
relationship between individual motives and patent commercialization based on survey 
data. It enabled this dissertation to distinguish if t e patent had resulted in innovation, and 
examining individual motives and commercialized patents is relatively novel since earlier 
studies have relied on bibliometric data. Also, taking into account the importance of 
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collaboration on the productivity of the research, this dissertation is expected to enhance 
our understanding as to how individual motives are associated with collaborative 
activities. In particular, investigating collaboration differences by the location of co-
inventor is one of the advantages held by this dissertation.    
While the collective actions of individuals form the resources and knowledge of 
organizations, there was a limited body of research that investigated knowledge 
recombination at the individual level in addition to the level of organizations (Felin & 
Hesterly, 2007; Rothaermel & Hess, 2007). The theoretical contribution of this 
dissertation is to fill that gap by demonstrating the effect of individual differences on 
innovative performance and knowledge creation as well as collaborative patterns. 
Empirically, this study contributes to the examination of innovation by focusing on 
invention and its commercialization, rather than by counting patents.  
The unique dataset used in this study was based on a survey of 1,919 triadic patent 
inventors. It contained detailed information on the commercial uses of patents and 
collaboration patterns, as well as inventor characteristics. In addition, we created 
measures of the novelty of pairs of U.S. patent technology subclasses (USPC) based on 
the data of Lai et al. (2011) to measure the creativity of the patent. We have evidence that 
individual motives affected the production of new technological subclass pairs, 
commercialization of the patent, and collaborative activities.  
In next section of this chapter, we summarize the results of each research question, give 
remarks on these findings, and propose policy implications and limitations of the research.  
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7.2 Summary of Key Findings 
As summarized in Table 7.1, we first looked at the eff ct of motives on the novelty side 
of the invention, which was measured by the paired technology subclasses. This measure 
of recombinant technologies was employed as our operationalization of generative 
creativity (Fleming, Mingo & Chen, 2007). In Chapter 4, we found that recognition 
motives negatively influenced the creation of new combinations. 
In Chapter 5, we investigated how motive influenced the commercialization of the 
invention, and if an inventor’s educational background, measured by science or 
engineering major, moderated the effect of motives on the same dependent variable by 
looking at the usefulness of the invention. Since earli r studies addressed that scientists 
and engineers hold a different “basic orientation” (Merton, 1957) to external reference 
group or local community, respectively (Gouldner, 1957; 1958), we hypothesized that the 
effect of the motives would be moderated by an inventor’s educational background. 
Industrial scientists were expected to be more innovative if they had a high recognition 
motive, whereas engineers were expected to be more innovative if they had a high firm 
motive. We observed a positive effect of the task, firm, and pecuniary motives on 
commercializing patents, but the recognition motive had no significant effect on 
commercialization. Also, we have not found any difference caused by inventors’ 
educational backgrounds on the relationship between motives and patent 
commercialization.  
As opposed to creating novel inventions, commercialization of the invention requires 
resources from the non-individual level. Hence, a larger portion of the commercialization 
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of inventions has been explained by factors such as organizational capability, 
technological distance, and geographical capacity (Jung, 2009; Huang, 2012). 
Nonetheless, in order to explain why motives still matter for commercialization beyond 
the value of the invention, I assumed that inventors’ willingness to engage in 
commercialization might be associated with particular motives. For example, our results 
indicated that inventors with firm motives were notonly positively associated with the 
number of invention disclosures, but also more likely to employ external ideas both when 
initiating and completing the invention. This suggested that inventors with firm motives 
were more likely to exert additional effort for commercializing their work output, and to 
take external perspectives in producing their invention, which enhances applicability of 
the invention. This provides some evidence toward my assumption, in that particular 
motives might be more likely to be associated with the inventors’ involvement in the 
commercialization process, and firm motive can be on  example of those. 
The last chapter investigated the effect of motive on collaboration. We examined the co-
inventing pattern using co-inventor’s locality (same-firm versus outside-of-the-firm) 
based on the GT/RIETI Survey. We found that task motive was negatively associated 
with collaborative activities, and the firm motive was particularly found to have positive 




Table 7.1 Summary of Key Findings 
 
7.3 Discussions and Implications 
 
7.3.1 Motives 
This study suggested that inventors with firm motives could be the most productive and 
innovative researchers in industry R&D. They were positively associated with the 
creation of new combinations, commercialization of patents, and instances of 
collaboration with coworkers. These findings reflected the importance of organizational 
commitment for industry S&E professionals. Meyer and Allen (1991) defined effective 
organizational commitment as “emotional attachment to, identification with, and 
involvement in, the organization.” Empirical studies t stified that individuals with a 
higher level of organizational commitment performed b tter (Hunter & Thatcher, 2007; 
Morin et al., 2011; Vandenberghe, Bentein & Stinglhamber, 2004). Meta-analyses 
confirmed these results (Mathieu & Zajac, 1990; Meyer et al., 2002; Randall, Fedor & 
Longenecker, 1990; Riketta, 2002; Wright & Bonett, 2002), We suspect that 
organizationally-committed researchers feel attached to their firms, and thus do not 
consider themselves as “estranged labor” (Marx, 1932), which, in turn, positively affects 
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supervisor who listens and is attentive to employees’ n eds, can develop into 
commitment to the firm. Free from a sense of alienatio , employees meet their need for 
security, and in this safe environment, are fully committed to their performances.  
Inventors with firm motives are also likely to take others’ perspectives, which, in turn, 
positively influences innovative performances. Mohrman, Gibson and Mohrman (2001) 
argued that employees were more likely to develop useful ideas when they took others’ 
perspectives. Based on this, Grant and Berry (2011) reported the motive toward helping 
others brought useful creativity, since it broadened researchers’ perspectives. We 
extended the boundary of others to the whole firm, and inferred that inventors with firm 
motives were more likely to generate useful creative ideas. Our data reported a strong 
positive correlation between firm motives and the sources of knowledge, both in 
suggesting the project and contributing to completion of the project (See Table 5.8), and 
we found some mediating effects of “openness to others” on the relationship between 
motive and commercialization of the invention. In other words, inventors with firm 
motive listened more to customers and suppliers, compared to task-motivated inventors, 
in both the initiation and the completion stages of the project, and this greater use of 
outside information partially explained their better commercialization performance. With 
perspectives and input from customers and suppliers, f rm-motivated inventors were able 
to be more innovative than inventors with other motives.   
Additionally, as reported in Table 5.2, we found that inventors with firm motives were 
more strongly positively associated with invention disclosure than inventors with other 
motives (p < .01). Given that invention disclosure to the firm requires initiative by 
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employees (even if their contract mandates disclosure), we suspect that inventors with 
firm motives were more actively participating in the company’s commercialization 
process. Considering that the ultimate goal of the firm is profit, this is another reason to 
value R&D researchers with firm motives. 
Therefore, this dissertation suggests several managerial implications related to firms’ 
need to develop policies that reduce employee’s sene of estrangement. Perceived 
organizational support (Podsakoff et al., 2000), perceptions of procedural justice, and 
participation in the decision-making process (Konovsky, 2000) were reported as creating 
a work environment that induced commitment to the organization. Moreover, to build a 
sense of belonging, companies can launch programs focu ed on establishing strong 
mentorship and cohort-ship. For example, Samsung has created a strong sense of cohort 
with fellow employees who were hired in the same year through a summer-camp-like 
program. Also, increased mentorship in addition to desirable supervisory relationships 
would be a plus. Even though the system can generate “es ranged labor,” individually 
targeted policy can mitigate this effect.  
Overall results suggested that recognition motives w re not positively associated with 
innovative performances. It had a negative associati n with the creation of new 
combinations, and a non-significant association with the commercialization of the 
invention. Given that our sample was restricted to industry R&D employees, this finding 
indicated that Mertonian recognition is not as relevant for industry researchers as it is for 
university scientists. Merton’s seminal work (1973) addressed that scientists were 
rewarded by a “priority-based reward system.” Scientists produce specific types of 
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knowledge, endowing credit for intellectual priority, establishing reputation, and opening 
the opportunity for involvement in prestigious insttutions and access to resources for 
future research (Merton, 1973b). Dasgupta and David (1994) also made an important 
point as to how priority-based science works well in terms of development. They argued 
that a priority-based reward system expedited the dev lopment of science because 
scientists produced more knowledge within a system that reduced shirking by infusing an 
idea of “less work and less possibility of receiving rewards.” As illustrated in Figure 3.1, 
however, industry inventors were more likely to consider that their job was to invent, as 
opposed to university inventors who cared more about their reputation in the field. Even 
though some have suggested that industry researchers rave recognition (Judge et al., 
1997), our results implied that it may be worthwhile for R&D management to place 
stronger emphasis on other types of motives in order to generate a higher rate of 
innovative performances from industry researchers. For example, as opposed to providing 
publication opportunities, R&D managers are recommended to employ mechanisms that 
emphasize industry researchers’ task, pecuniary and firm motives.  
Note that we found a significantly negative association between recognition motive and 
new combinations. The result supported the assumption that there was risk associated 
with creativity, which could hamper the creativity of R&D employees. Considering that 
recognition-driven inventors are more likely to depend on other’s approval, they can be 
more apprehensive about being different from others, and creating new ideas. In the firm 
level, creating work environments that protect R&D employees from encountering hard 
criticism might help encouraging recognition-driven inventors to come up with new ideas. 
Also, if inventors acknowledge that unusual inventio s can be taken seriously under any 
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circumstances in their work setting, recognition-driven R&D personnel would be less 
likely to worry about losing their reputation, whic, in turn, might positively affect the 
creativeness of inventors with recognition motives.   
7.3.2 New Combinations: Novelty and What? 
Instead of focusing on how the idea was transferred and diffused, this research added 
evidence of individual effects on the process of idea generation (Damanpour, 1991; 
Fleming, 2001; Rogers, 1995). Even though we have found that firm motives positively 
affected the creation of new combinations of technology subclasses, we simultaneously 
found a significantly negative association with therecognition motive, and a positive 
association with variables such as bachelor’s degree and a project aimed at enhancing 
existing lines of business. Since the positive associati n with these control variables was 
not expected with a measure of creativity, we questioned what the creativity measure 
could mean in addition to the novelty of the inventio .  
Based on our findings, we could argue that the creation of new combinations of 
technological subclasses is close to “exploitation” a d minor contribution, rather than 
“exploration” and major contribution, such as technological breakthroughs (Mumford & 
Gustafson, 1988). Exploitation still signifies learning, improvement, and acquisition of 
new knowledge (Gupta, Smith & Shalley, 2006), but is based on an existing 
technological trajectory (Benner & Tushman, 2002; March, 1991). By putting together 
two never-combined technology subclasses, these inventions are based on existing 
technologies. Also, bridging one technology with another could be considered a 
refinement and extension, especially if the two technologies are close to each other; 
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therefore, it can be attributed as being close to exploitation. Taking this into account, it 
might not be surprising to find that inventors with firm motives and bachelor’s degrees 
had a positive association with new combinations, i contrast to inventors with 
recognition motives.   
In this regard, there is an avenue for future research. I propose to measure the 
technological distance of new combinations, and to escribe as to where the new 
combination is located in the continuum of creativity. Our measure of new combinations 
allows us to distinguish the extent to which combinations are technically close to each 
other. If each technological subclass in the new combination belongs to the same 
technology class, it is considered incremental creativity. Contrarily, the new combination 
will be considered as a technological breakthrough if each of the subclasses belongs to 
two different technology classes. This process will expand our understanding as to what 
new combinations really mean, and the relationship between individual motive and 
degree of creativity.  
7.3.3 Collaboration at the Individual Level 
With the extra help of national policies such as CRADA and ATP, collaboration is an 
increasing trend (Chesbrough, 2003; Hicks & Narin, 2001; National Science Foundation, 
2012). Through those policies, collaborative activities on an organizational-level have 
increased (Walsh & Cohen, 2004). However, collaborati n is conducted at the individual 
level, and it has been reported that knowledge-sharing behavior is hard to change and 
manipulate (Lin, 2007). Previous literature has suggested that there were difficulties in 
motivating individuals to participate in collaborative networks and voluntarily share 
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knowledge with other members (Wood & Gray, 1991). Szulanski (1996) also mentioned 
that individuals were reluctant to share knowledge because they could fear the loss of 
competitive advantage based on ownership of the knowledge, and perceived that 
individuals who shared their knowledge were not adequately rewarded. Therefore, 
understanding what individual differences make in collaboration could complement 
organizational-level policies in order to enhance th  instances and effect of collaboration.  
Our results showed that inventors with task motives w re less likely to participate in 
collaborative activities due to their innate prefernce toward autonomy, and because their 
satisfaction is derived from solving problems. Monetary rewards may persuade 
researchers with pecuniary motives to participate in xternal co-invention, but do not 
necessarily expand the size of their collaborative networks. The possibility of sharing 
rewards with collaborators could inhibit pecuniary-motivated inventors from increasing 
the size of collaboration. Also, we found that the firm motive only increased internal co-
inventing. As for the recognition motive, the result  presented a positive association with 
the size of the external collaborative network.  
Given that collaboration among firms is a key ingredient for successful innovation 
(Chesbrough, 2003), and especially since vertical collaboration (with suppliers and 
customers) has been shown to improve commercialization of the patents (Walsh & 
Nagaoka, 2009), our results call for appropriate policies that will help to stimulate 
industry inventors to engage in external collaborati n. Firm practices that are geared 
toward making collaboration fun or enjoyable for task nd firm-motivated employees 
should be implemented, as well as policies that will help employers determine how to 
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best match inventors with different motives to an external collaborative project for the 
maximum obtainable benefit for the endeavor. Implications of these policies can be seen 
in these examples: researchers with task motives could be assigned certain tasks 
exclusively for them, even though it may be a part of a larger collaborative work, making 
those researchers more likely to enjoy the work since the “task” is solely theirs to solve; 
and for inventors with a strong attachment to the firm, the company could initiate the 
collaborative project by assuring them of the benefit the project could bring to the firm. 
As for external collaborations, an organization would do well to advise inventors in 
advance about the property rights and/or property assigning issues that could otherwise 
be a barrier to participation. 
Taking into account the previous literature claiming the benefit of collaboration on 
research output and innovation (Jones, 2009; Chesbrough, 2003), there is an opportunity 
for future research. We can connect the three dependent variables employed in this 
research to see if collaboration mediates the relationship between inventor motives and 
innovative performances. Given that we measured innovative performances by patent 
originality and patent usefulness, this future research is expected to enhance our 
understanding as to how collaboration differently influences those variables, and the 
extent to which the impact of motives on performance is the result of how motives affect 
collaboration. Moreover, it can provide additional managerial implications as to the 
extent to which motives need to be emphasized in the industry R&D setting. For example, 
we observed that task motives were not significantly associated with collaboration 
activities, yet were positively associated with the cr ation of new combinations as well as 
the commercialization of the invention. Considering the importance of external inputs in 
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innovation, this future research could contribute to further understandings as to how the 
link between task-motivated inventors and innovative performances can be enhanced 
with external collaboration.  
7.4 Research Limitations 
This study had several limitations. Primary among them was that the variance of the task 
motive was small. As described in Chapter 3, the mean score of task motives was 4.4, 
with standard deviation 0.84. It had the smallest standard deviation among all motive 
categories.12 In Figure 3.2, we have also shown that 75% of the sample rated that 
satisfaction from solving a puzzle or completing a task was either important or very 
important. In other words, the task motive was considered essential for industry R&D 
researchers. Therefore, there was not much variance to explain task motives, even though 
it was one of the most significantly discussed motives in this study. In this regard, we 
would like to investigate what is so special about the task motive. It is the characteristic 
that distinguishes laymen from scientists and engineers (General Social Survey, 2001), 
and even with that small variance, in this research task motive evidenced positive effect 
on the creation of new combinations and the commercialization of the invention. A field 
study can be proposed in order to closely examine the task-motivated inventors in 
industry and the effect on innovative performances.    
                                                 
 
12 It was consistent with Sauermann and Cohen (2010), in that intellectual challenge had the highest mean 
score and the smallest standard deviation among all categories of the motives. 
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Moreover, we would like to acknowledge that collaboration among industrial researchers 
is not 100% the individual’s choice. Collaboration n industry can be mandatory to a 
certain extent, and moreover, when it comes to co-inventing, an individual’s voluntary 
participations may be less likely given the proprietary nature of the co-invention. 
Therefore, we were cautious in interpreting our results in a way that assumed the 
individual researcher could choose their participation in collaborative project, regardless 
of situation.  
Another limitation was related to endogeneity. First, given the nature of the data, our key 
variables reflected constructs at the time of the survey. Especially considering that 
individual motives can change upon situational factors, i.e. individuals recently being 
monetarily rewarded, we should examined if individual motives were systematically 
affected by their past performances. As mentioned i the literature review section, we 
assumed that individual motives were more “trait-like,” which implies stable 
characteristics, but that assumption may not hold and it would be better if we could 
control for this explicitly.    
Again, note that our sample was selected on triadic patents (filed in Japan and European 
Patent office and granted in the U.S. Patent Office), onnoting technically significant 
inventions with higher probability of global commercialization. Therefore, the results can 
be skewed to the high performers, and we employed Heckman selection by including the 
residual in the first-stage OLS regression (Wooldridge, 2001) to investigate this 
possibility. Using variables like being married or having children at the moment of 
developing the focal patent, we tested the first-stage regression. The results on 
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commercialization of the patent, for example, did not show significant effects of those 
variables on the residuals, and no significant associati ns between the first and second 
stage models. Therefore, we need to further investigate as to which instrument variables 
can appropriately address this possibility.  
Additionally, there is a potential issue relating to the selections at the individual and firm 
levels. We considered that individuals’ employment in a particular firm size was not the 
result of a random assignment, but a self-selection by the individual and/or selection by 
the organization. Accordingly, our results may be biased to the extent that selection into 
firm size (e.g., those that are more productive) depends on individual motives. We 
examined this possibility by exploiting measures of m tives to see if they were associated 
with their employment in a particular firm type. Our results of multinomial logit 
regression on firm size suggested that pecuniary motives were positively associated with 
small firm as opposed to large firm, and task and recognition motives were negatively 
associated with small firm as opposed to large firm. However, in order to fully address 
the possible selection biases, we need to find proper instrument variables that only affect 
selection into the firm, but do not influence our dependent variables. 
In interpreting the results on innovative performance, it should be also noted that firm 
size may determine our performance regressions. For example, our results indicated that 
small firms had a positive association with the creation of new combinations, but it is 
possible that having new combinations could have result d in those firms appearing in 
our sample. We expect that this selection bias differs rom industries where patents 
matter the most in creation of new companies, such as Pharmaceuticals (Cohen et al., 
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2000). Therefore, we could have enhanced our robustnes  by running regressions using 
industry subsamples, for example, between Pharmaceuticals and Computer System 
Design. Our sample, however, had only 31 cases of Computer System Design (NAICS 
5415); therefore, we instead employed the regression analysis without start-up companies 
(less than 5 years old) since they could be more or l ss influenced by the focal patent in 
the analysis. The results indicated that the positive effect between small firms and the 
creation of new combinations disappeared, but the result on the motives remained the 
same.   
7.5 Policy Implications 
The patent system has long served as an important policy instrument for stimulating 
innovation. Based on this fundamental mechanism of endowing exclusive rights in 
exchange for disclosing inventions, patents are expected to be commercialized in order to 
actually fulfill the purpose of innovation. Nonetheless, there are many unused patents 
available, which is one reason for recent discussion on “sleeping patents” (Arya & 
Mittendorf, 2004; Jung, 2009). Even though we acknowledge that some patents are 
strategically unused (see Jung, 2009), many countries around the world have debated 
policies to stimulate commercialization of patented inventions. The Bayh-Dole Act is one 
such policy designed to increase use of patents from Federally-funded research. The U.K. 
recently (April, 2013) introduced a policy called “the Patent Box,” which allowed 
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companies to apply a lower rate of corporation tax on profits from exploiting patented 
inventions.13  
In this regard, this research contributes to our understanding as to how individuals’ 
motives might enhance the uses of invention. By examining individuals’ motives for 
generating more creative patents and generating more commercialization of inventions, 
we have expanded our understanding on what motives should be more emphasized for 
industry researchers, and this should be taken into consideration when formulating 
policies. 
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